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ABSTRACT

ATOMISM AND INFINITE DIVISIBILITY
FEBRUARY 1994

RALPH
M.A.

,

KENYON JR., B.A., B.S., MIAMI UNIVERSITY,

E.
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M A

,

Ph D

.

.

.

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Bruce Aune

This work analyzes two perspectives, Atomism and Infinite Divisibility, in the light of modern mathematical knowledge and recent developments in computer graphics.

A de-

velopmental perspective is taken which relates ideas leading
to atomism and infinite divisibility.

A detailed analysis

of and a new resolution for Zeno's paradoxes are presented.

Aristotle's arguments are analyzed.

The arguments of some

other philosophers are also presented and discussed.

All

arguments purporting to prove one position over the other
are shown to be faulty, mostly by question begging.

Includ-

ed is a sketch of the consistency of infinite divisibility

and a development of the atomic perspective modeled on com-

puter graphics screen displays.

The Pythagorean theorem is

shown to depend upon the assumption of infinite divisibility.

The work concludes that Atomism and infinite divisibil-

ity are independently consistent, though mutually incompatible, not unlike the wave/particle distinction in physics.
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PREFACE
The belief that there are indivisible units of exten-

sion is termed 'atomism'.

The opposing view is that exten-

sion is infinitely divisible.
I

For the purpose of this work,

shall occasionally refer to this position as 'divisionism'

and the adherents to this view as 'divisionists'

Preliminary studies showed that some of the traditional
arguments supporting infinite divisibility make use of pre-

misses which effectively beg the question.
true of Atomism.

In this work

I

The same appears

show that the traditional

mathematical arguments for infinite divisibility are flawed
and that most philosophers in the past did not discover the
flaw.

My view is that the two positions, atomism and divi-

sionism, are each internally consistent and, though mutually

incompatible, are independent in a way not unlike Euclidean
and non-Euclidean geometries or the waves and particles of

quantum physics.

xi

CHAPTER

I

PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
Introducti on

People have been dividing things and sharing them for
millennia.

When it comes to dividing something among two or

three persons, the "right amount" can often be cut or broken
off at once.

But when one is dividing something among four

persons, it is often easier to divide it in half and then

divide each half in half again.
tions is most often achieved by

successive division.

Division into smaller pora

process of repeated or

At some time long past it must have

occurred to someone to wonder how long such a process could
be continued.

Practical experience sometimes suggests that there is
limit to the process.

a

In dividing something, and dividing

the results again, sooner or later one reaches a limit where
the remaining parts cannot practically be divided again.
For some things this limit is much more obvious than others.

Dividing a bag of marbles among children provides an example
of an obvious limit.

But practical experience also suggests

that sometimes there are non-obvious cases.

Dividing a

pitcher of liquid refreshment among imbibers provides an
example of this.

One might resort to counting drops, but

1

2

drops come in different sizes, and there
is the matter of
the residual film of liquid.
We can easily conjecture that
the liquid could continue to be divided beyond
our ability
to distinquish the divisions.

We can use a magnifyinq glass and a razor blade to

divide a droplet of water that we could not perceive as
large enough to divide when we looked at it with only the

naked eye.

We can also use a microscope and appropriately

sized tools to divide the droplet that seemed too small to

divide when we used only the magnifying glass.

The use of

higher and higher powers of magnification shows that at each
stage an apparently indivisible droplet proved to be divisible when it was looked at with greater magnification.

While

very high powered devices have been able to distinguish the
individual atoms of heavy metals, no such results have been

obtained with water.

It is our atomic theory of matter that

allows us to conclude that there is also an indivisible

minimum size for water.

Apart from that modern atomic theory, we can easily

generalize that the process of successive division need have
no end

—

that the process can continue indefinitely.

we are quite aware that our perception is limited.

are smallest amounts

—

But

There

less than which we cannot perceive.

3

Humans, being the divisive people we are, take
sides and

argue about such guestions.

We may reasonably infer that

ancient peoples were divided in their opinions even
before

recorded history.

Atomism is the view that successive division must terminate in some indivisible minimum.

The opposing view is

the belief that successive division can be continued infinitely.

Since division is a process that is applied to

something, an immediate dichotomy concerning the guestion is
possible.

The question may be asked with emphasis on the

object of the process, or it may be asked with emphasis on
the process itself.

It is from the former that the name

'infinite divisibility' derives and is given to the view

opposing atomism.
'divisionism'

.

I

shall sometimes refer to that view as

Divisionism is most often expressed as the

view or belief that matter or extension is infinitely divisWhat may be the proper object of the process has

ible.

varied with the major philosophical positions.

I

have already hinted that recognition or perception

might influence knowledge of divisibility.

I

will touch on

the epistemological concerns relating to the arguments, but
I

will primarily be focusing on the metaphysical aspect of

the question.

The Epicureans argued from the perceptible to

4

the imperceptible by analogy.

More recently the question

was applied to the conceivable.

One way to organize the perspectives taken by
concerns
for metaphysical questions, epistemological questions,
and

questions regarding conceivability is along
objective dimension.

a

subjective-

Philosophical perspectives fall along

that dimension with realism toward the objective end, idealism toward the subjective end, and phenomenalism somewhere

between these two.

In the context of realism, one asks whether matter, ex-

tension (space), and duration (time) are infinitely divisible.

In the context of phenomenalism, one asks whether per-

ceptions are infinitely divisible.

In the context of ideal-

ism, one asks whether concepts are infinitely divisible.

If

one is to focus on the process itself, questions concerning
the meaning of 'infinite' arise.

All these questions can be asked with a decidedly meta-

physical flavor as well as with a decidedly epistemological
flavor, but realism lends itself much more easily to meta-

physical questions while phenomenalism lends itself much
more easily to epistemological questions.

And idealism

lends itself more easily to questions regarding conceivabil-

5

ity.

The ana-

OBJECTIVE

n

logical rela-

tionships

I

see
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=
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trated in figure
Figure
1

1.

Subjective-Objective dimension.

.

In this exposition

I

shall be concerned mostly with the

validity of various arguments for and against each position.
I

am particularly concerned with mathematical arguments that

have been presented and the light they shed on premisses

which have been used to support one or another position.

To

"cut to the chase", my research suggests that there is no

valid argument with true premisses which establishes one

position over the other.

It seems that there are consistent

models for both positions.
"axiom"

—

And these models differ by one

the presumption of atomism on the one hand or of

infinite divisibility on the other hand.

I

also presume a "developmental" perspective consistent

with genetic epistemology. 1

I

assume that, for the most

part, earlier writers assimilated or understood by means of

fewer distinctions, and that some problems with earlier

6

views may be resolved by more recent distinctions.
there are instances when the mere addition of
is insufficient to resolve the issues.

a

However,

distinction

The mappings of con-

cepts may have to be significantly reorganized in order
to

accommodate a newer development

2
.

This developmental per-

spective is also suggested by Furley when he traces the

evolution of Atomism as presented by Epicurus:
[This] essay will show how Epicurus' doctrine
evolved; it is a modification, adopted for the
purpose of meeting Aristotle's criticisms, of a
doctrine which the earlier atomists put together
to meet and thwart the Eleatic attack on plural3
ism.

Some of the earliest writings on this subject are at-

tributed to Zeno of Elea.

By Zeno's time the controversy

was fairly well developed; the positions were characterized
as beliefs in "atomism" and "infinite divisibility".

These

contrasting beliefs are closely related to the earlier question, whether "things are one" or "things are many".

If

things are infinitely divisible, any division into parts

yields parts which are themselves divisible into parts
"All things are many" (all the way down).

—

If things are not

so divisible then there are things that are not many

—

"things are one" (and indivisible).

Even earlier than Zeno, Heraclitus had things to say

about the controversy.

Interestingly enough, Heraclitus

))

7

seems to have had the most mature views on
the topic, although records of his thoughts are the most
scanty.

(See

page 17

.

Mathematical Induction

Mathematical induction figures prominently in my analysis of infinite divisibility, and

briefly present it here.

I

would be remiss not to

Mathematical induction is applied

to a statement which is expressed in terms of some arbitrary

natural number, usually represented by 'N'

.

Induction, as

one might expect, is a way of reasoning to conclusions about

more particulars than may reasonably be examined.

Mathemat-

ical induction has two premisses and one conclusion.

One

premiss that must be satisfied is that the statement in

question be true for some small value of

N.

This need not

be the smallest, but it usually is and most often is the

number

1.

The second premiss that must be satisfied is a

material conditional going from an arbitrary number N (equal
to or larger than the value used in the first premiss) to

the next larger number N+l.

If these two premisses are

satisfied, then one may draw the conclusion that the state-

ment is true for all values of N (greater than or equal to
the small value of N).
S(X).

Premiss
S(A

1

Suppose we refer to the statement as

would be expressed:

is true.

)

8

Premiss

would be expressed:

2

IF S N
(

is true THEN S(N+1)

)

is true (whenever N>A)

.

The conclusion that may be drawn is:
For ALL X (>A)

,

S(X)

is true.

This conclusion is justified by the following reasoning.

Suppose A is

premiss

2

1.

S

(

2

by modus ponens.

and premiss

2

may be inferred from S(l) and
S(3) may be inferred from S(2)

by modus ponens.

This process may be contin-

ued until X is as large as you like.

Mathematical induction

is the shortcut method for deducing the truth of S(X) for

all X.

Simply by showing that premisses

and

1

2

are satis-

fied for some statement, S(X), we may use mathematical in-

duction to directly demonstrate the truth of S(K) without
going through K-l applications of modus ponens.

Because

mathematical induction is only a shorthand for deductive applications of modus ponens, it is strictly truth preserving,
as are all valid deductive arguments.

Infinity
In the literature three primary senses are given for

the term "infinite" and its derivatives.

trarily large, unending, and aleph null

These are arbi(K 0

)

•

Distinguishing

carefully among these senses takes one a long way toward

.

.

9

resolving Zeno's paradoxes.

in many instances substituting

the appropriate phraseology in a premiss
statement using the
term "infinite" renders the truth value of the
premiss much
more apparent.

The first sense, arbitrarily large, is illustrated by

James Thomson in "Tasks and Super-Tasks".
[T]o say that a lump is infinitely divisible is
just to say that it can be cut into any number of
parts 4

Infinity is paired with any number with the implicit understanding that this number may be as large as you like.

The second sense, unending, is illustrated by Russell.

Etymologically,
end'

'infinite' should mean 'having no

5

The third sense, aleph null, is most precisely captured
by the axiom of infinity in the Zermelo-Frankel set theoretic representation for numbers 6

.

That axiom is an existence

axiom in that it postulates the existence of a number with

certain properties.

The axiom of infinity can be para-

phrased in terms of ordinary natural numbers as follows:
There is a number X (infinity) such that 1<X and whenever
N<X then N+1<X, where N is any natural number generated from
1

by repeated applications of the successor axiom (+1).

10

This axiomatic definition for infinity

(K„)

explicitly uti-

lizes the structure of mathematical induction.

Motion
The notion of "motion" or "velocity" figures into
atomism versus divisionism arguments in a number of ways.

implicit in two of Zeno's arguments and explicit in

it is

a third.

It is appropriate to present a brief view of the current

space-time perspective on motion to provide an explicit

background for understanding the arguments presented as they
reflect on it.

In mathematical physics velocity ("motion") is defined

as the rate of change of position with respect to time.

When time is taken as

a

fourth dimension, and one looks at

events as having both spatial and temporal coordinates, no
"motion" can be seen.

When one adopts such a "four-dimen-

sional space-time perspective", one attends to a three-di-

mensional "object in motion" as a four-dimensional spacetime "worm" with its "starting position" at one place-time
and its "ending position" at another place-time.

The start-

ing position is identified by its having a "lower" time-

coordinate.

From the four-dimensional space-time perspec-

tive a "velocity" is seen as just the slope of

with both space and time coordinates.

a line

drawn

It is no different

11

from the rate of change of one spatial
dimension with respect to another, such as the slope of a road.
For example,
on a road with a 7% grade, the road rises 7
feet for every
100 feet of length.
Saying the road "rises" is only valid
in respect to one's position along the road (and
whether one
is going up the road or down the road).

In order to develop

the analogy with motion, references to time must be
removed

from the notion of physical slope.

As one stands in differ-

ent positions along the road, one's elevation varies depending on one's position.

The physical slope of the road corresponds directly to
the ratio of position with respect to time.

When an object

in three-space is moving in time its spatial coordinates are

changing, but only as the time coordinates are changing.
Its position coordinate varies with its time coordinate just
as one's elevation coordinate varies with one's position

coordinate along the road.

When one looks at an object from the four-dimensional

space-time perspective one sees all the space-time coordinates of the object.

Both the starting point and the ending

point coordinates are immediately available.

The view is

one that could be called "omniscient" in that all space-time

positions can be seen "at once". 7

The analogous perspec-

.

12

tive for viewing the road is from the side.

By standing to

one side of the road with a 7% grade, far enough back,
one

can see both the bottom and the top of the hill "at once".
In a like manner,

"standing to one side of time" allows one

to adopt the four-dimensional space-time perspective and see

both the beginning and end of the motion of an object "at
once"

From the four-dimensional space-time perspective no
"motion" is seen at all

—

thus exonerating the ancient

argument that motion is impossible.

However

I

will discuss

the questions mostly from the more conventional, three-di-

mensional perspective.

Keeping in mind the way motion is

defined in mathematical physics will provide

a

consistent

view of the problems of infinite divisibility and atomism.
Developments Leading Toward Atomism
The concept of the atom did not emerge on the scene

full-blown.

It evolved from a number of earlier views

through a gradual process involving a number of stages.
Atoms, as we know them, and as most clearly presented by

Lucretius, are conceived of as hard, indivisible bits of

solid matter that come in various shapes and kinds.

They

whiz around in empty space colliding with each other, some-

times bouncing off and sometimes sticking to each other.

13

All the "stuff" of the universe is made up
of them.

Atoms

could not exist as even a concept were it not
for the coexistence of empty space into which to put them.
The universe can be seen as distinguished into bits of matter

and

space.

But without the notion of empty space, the notion
of

atoms cannot exist.

A "solid" concept of atomism also requires some stabil-

ity concerning the guestions what the stuff of existence may
be made of and in how many kinds it can come.

I

will touch

only briefly on this question as it is peripheral to my main
interest.

But developments in this argument do affect the

development of atomism proper, so

I

present

a

brief summary.

Atoms (of matter) also represent a synthesis of the

notions of dividing and not dividing.

The stuff of the

universe is divided into bits (atoms), but the atoms themselves can not be divided.
"size" for matter.

Required also is some notion of

Arriving at a birth for the concept of

atomism requires that all these questions have undergone
some development and some resolution.

And all these devel-

opments depend upon some notion of existence.

I

ments.

will not be touching deeply on these early developBut

I

will outline them briefly to establish a con-

.

14

text for the main discussions.

My main focus is on the

mathematical arguments that arise as a result of
these early
arguments
"Being" or Existence

The question of "being" permeated the early pre-Socratic philosophy.

The convoluted arguments centered around

what appeared then to be worse than an oxymoron

—

the ap-

parently contradictory act of asserting the existence of
something in order to deny it.

The act of speaking or even

thinking something was viewed at the time to have had existential import.

when the goddess points out to her listener that
he could neither know nor point out what-is-not
(2.7-8), she is precluding reference in thought or
speech to the non-existent. 8
This made talk of "nothing" or non-existence very problematic.

It was the denial of this "void" that lead to monism.

In the denial of nothing the early Ionians concluded that

everything was one and that motion was impossible.

Atomism

has its roots in this concept of "the one" or unity

—

which

later became associated with the idea of indivisibility.

Thales and Anaximander

Thales of Miletos is credited with having explained
that everything is made of water; that air, ether, and even

15

earth are just different forms of the one substance.

As a

result, Milesian thought was dominated by corporeal
monism

,

that all things reduce to the one (body) which
ap-

pears in different forms. 10
All the Ionians had taken for granted that the
primary substance could assume different forms,
such as earth, water, and fire, a view suggested
by the observed phenomena of freezing, evaporation, and the like.
Anaximenes had further explained these transformations as due to rarefaction and condensation (§ 9). 11

Thales is credited with opening the guestion that leads
to the atomic theory. 12

It might be reasonable to attrib-

ute the contrasting view to Anaximander, of the next genera-

tion of Milesians, who was a follower of Thales.
Thales, Anaximander seems to have argued, made the
wet too important at the expense of the dry. 13

Burnet credits Anaximander with giving some equal standing
to the different "elements".
[It] is more natural to speak of the opposites as
being 'separated out' from a mass which is as yet
14
undifferentiated
.

.

.

.

But he also begs the question by suggesting that this some-

how entails it being made of "particles".
That, of course, really implies that the structure
of the primary substance is corpuscular, and that
there are interstices of some kind between its

16

particles.
It is improbable that Anaximenes realised this consequence of his doctrine. 15
No such conclusion is warranted without some
presumption of

the incompressibility of matter, a later atomic development.
The mixing (and separation) of colors shows a non-particulate counter-example.

Burnet seems to have "projected" a

more modern view into his analysis.

Already the Ionians have

a

general question regarding

whether there is some primary stuff of existence that is
divisible into other substances, or there is one of these
that cannot be so divided.

Anaximander affirmed divisibili-

ty while his predecessor Thales affirmed the one.

Pythagoras
The Pythagoreans taught that all things were number.

And number is an expression of unity or oneness
lesian monism in a less corporeal form.

—

the Mi-

Pythagoras, who was

in Kroton from about 532 B.C. to the end of the sixth centu16
ry, was probably a disciple of Anaximander.

He is cred-

1
ited with discovering the problem of doubling the square.

"

"Pythagoras discovered that the square of the hypotenuse was equal to the squares on the other two sides;
but we know that he did not prove this in the same way
It is probable that his
as Euclid did later (1.47).
than geometrical; and, as
rather
arithmetical
was
proof
triangle, which is
the
with
acquainted
he was
have started
may
he
triangle,
right-angled
always a

3:4:5

17

from the fact that 3 2 + 4 2 = 5 2
He must, however, have
discovered also that this proof broke down in
the case
of the most perfect triangle of all, the
isosceles
right-angled triangle, seeing that the relation
its hypotenuse and its sides cannot be expressed between
by anv
numerical ratio. The side of the sguare is incommensurable with the diagonal." 18
.

In the atmosphere of Milesian monism,

it must have been

quite disconcerting to be unable to find whole numbers giving a ratio for doubling the square.

With monism firmly

established in the culture, the faith that such

a

number

existed and would be found probably prevented the discovery
of what is now known to be

\f~2

.

Had it been discovered

then, atomism might have been dealt a disabling blow.

If

the square root of two is to be a number, then number can no

longer be strictly a unity.

Heraclitus and Parmenides

Heraclitus of Ephesus (fifth century) was known for his

theory of flux and his doctrine of the unity of opposites.
Most of Heraclitus's works are lost, but a few fragments
have been gleaned from various sources; he was quoted by

ancient philosophers from Plato on.

Enough substance is

contained in those fragments to provide

a

reasonable assess-

ment of his view concerning the present question.

The an-

cient question concerned whether all things were "one" or
"many".

We may understand "many" to mean "composed of

parts" where the term 'parts' is used circularly or recur-

]

18

sively.

Zeno's paradox of plurality (page 41) explicates

this issue more fully.

visible whole".

By "one" we may understand "an indi-

While this pairing may not be exact,

I

think it naturally evolved into the atomism versus
infinite

divisibility distinction.

Atomism may be an early attempt

to resolve the paradox of plurality.

If so,

it would pro-

vide for a true recursive definition for the term 'part'.

A

part is either an atom or it is something composed of smaller parts.

[See the discussion of the Paradox of Plurality

on page 41 below.

For Heraclitus, the question whether all things are one
or many is answered by fragment 112:

From out of all the many particulars comes oneness, and out of oneness comes all the many particulars. 19

While this hints at Hegel's synthesis of thesis and antithesis,

it also suggests that anything that is one is also

divisible.

One could interpret this as an affirmation of

infinite divisibility.

But his doctrine of the unity of

opposites actually mandates that he affirm both views.

His

theory of flux, in which things are continually changing
into their opposites, is moderated by his principle of balance.

That principle is best stated in fragment 33 and can

be understood as a conservation law.

19

[The] resultant amount is the same as there
had
been before. 20

On this account, it would seem, Heraclitus would
not have

subscribed to the naive view that if something were infinitely divisible then it would be divisible into nothing at
all.

Such a premiss would violate his principle of balance.

Yet that premiss is exactly the one which has gone unchal-

lenged for millennia.

I

shall return to this premiss when

it is more explicitly stated.

[See the discussion under the

paradox of plurality on page 73 below.]

Parmenides taught, in opposition to Heraclitus, that

being was "a solid, homogeneous, extended body", 21 and that
it was spherical and unchanging.

In many ways this reaf-

firms the earlier Milesian view of the one, but the similarity to the later conception of an atom is readily apparent.

Empedocles and Anaxagoras

Empedocles seems to have attempted to synthesize the
Thales made everything out of

views of his predecessors.

water; Heraclitus made everything out of fire; Anaximenes

made everything out of air 22
these primacy.

;

Anaximander gave none of

Empedocles made everything out of all of

these, including earth, and, as such, provided the first

theoretical forerunner of modern atomic chemistry.

M
20

Empedocles called his elements 'roots', and Anaxagoras called his 'seeds', but they both meant
something eternal and irreducible to anything
else, and they both held the things we perceive
with the senses to be temporary combinations of
these 23
.

But Anaxagoras apparently thought Empedocles's system
flawed.

He did not think that four elements could produce

all the substances we see.

According to Burnet, Anaxagoras

was misunderstood by both Aristotle and the Epicureans.

Burnet explains that Anaxagoras's "seeds" were infinitely

divisible but differed in their proportions.
He therefore substituted for the primary 'air' a state
of the world in which 'all things x Pfi arQ: ) were together, infinite both in quantity and in smallness'
( Fr
I).
This is explained to mean that the original
mass was infinitely divisible, but that, however far
division was carried, every part of it would contain
all 'things'
and would in that respect be
X pfi Mckt or )
just like the whole 24
(

.

,

(

.

The "flavor" of the disputes of the time were perhaps

eloquently expressed by Zeno in his paradoxes, to which we
now turn.

—
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CHAPTER II
ZENO'S PARADOXES

Arguments about atomism and infinite divisibility
were
first developed in detail by Zeno of Elea (born
c. 490
be)

in the form of his now famous paradoxes.

Since these para-

doxes have had a very important influence on subsequent

disputes regarding atomism and divisionism, it is important
to identify them here.

I

shall give the basic thrust of

each paradox by a short statement, and then, in order to

show the logical form of the underlying argument,

offer an expanded version of it.

I

I

shall

shall defer my critical

comments on the paradoxes and the relevance to my subject to
the next chapter.
The Achilles
I

can succinctly state the Achilles paradox as follows:

Achilles and the tortoise race; the tortoise is given
start.

a

head

By the time Achilles reaches the spot where the

tortoise was, the tortoise will have moved on.
can never catch the tortoise

So Achilles

1
.

To appreciate the logical structure of the paradox, the

relevant premisses and conclusions must be identified and

23

:

24

set forth in explicit terms.

Some of the premisses are

merely implicit in the brief statement of
the paradox.

A basic assumption of the argument is this:

APO

To catch the tortoise, Achilles must eventu-

ally occupy the same spot as the tortoise.
This premiss is present in the argument in a
contrapositive
form:

APO' If it is always the case that Achilles does not

occupy the same spot as the tortoise, then Achilles never catches the tortoise.

The information given in the argument ostensibly does not

permit the conclusion that Achilles does catch the tortoise.
What the premisses do ostensibly warrant is indicated as
follows
The initial premiss is:
API

The tortoise is given a head start.

Premiss, inference, and conclusion statements will be
labeled according to the following scheme: The first letter
or letter and digit will identify the argument; the second
letter will identify the statement type; and the third digit
will be a sequence number. A sub-sequence number may also
be used in some cases.
*

First letter or letter and digit
The Achilles
A
The Dichotomy form 1
D1
The Dichotomy form 2
D2
The Arrow
R
The Stadium
S
P
Paradox of Plurality

Second letter
Premiss
Inference
Conclusion
Definition

P
I

C
D

2
3
4
5

25

All

API ==> AC1

AC1

The tortoise is ahead of Achilles.

AP2

If the tortoise is ahead of Achilles
then Achilles

runs toward the tortoise.
AI2

AC1

AC2

Achilles runs toward the tortoise.

AP3

If Achilles runs toward the tortoise, then the

&

AP2 ==> AC

tortoise runs on ahead to another spot.
AI3

AC 2

AC 3

The tortoise runs on ahead to another spot.

AP4

If the tortoise runs on ahead to another spot

&

AP3 ==> AC

then, when Achilles reaches the spot previously

occupied by the tortoise, the tortoise will occupy
a spot

different from the one Achilles occupies.
AP4 ==> AC

AI4

AC 3

AC 4

The tortoise occupies a spot different from the

&

one Achilles occupies.

AP5

If the tortoise occupies a spot different from the

one Achilles occupies, then the tortoise is ahead
of Achilles.

AP5 ==> AC

AI5

AC 4

AC 5

The tortoise is ahead of Achilles.

&

But AC 5 is just ACT; the argument leads to the original

premiss.

No valid reasoning with these premisses leads to

.

.
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any other conclusion.

No matter how many times the argument

is followed through, the conclusion is
always the same

the tortoise is ahead of Achilles.

—

No premiss or conclusion

in the argument leads to Achilles being
in the same spot as

the tortoise.

We could argue that what is true of each instant
is

true of the whole race, but that would involve the
fallacy
of composition.

A stronger wav to conclude that Achilles

can never catch the tortoise is to use mathematical induc-

tion on each iteration of the argument.
the first iteration.

AC1 is true after

Assume AC1 is true after N iterations.

Then, by applying the premisses in order, AC1 is also true

after N +

1

iterations.

These two conditions satisfy the

requirements for mathematical induction and allow us to

conclude that it is always the case (after every iteration)
that Achilles does not occupy the same spot as the tortoise.
(If always AC4

,

then Achilles can never catch the tortoise.)

However, since mathematical induction was not available to
Zeno, we may appeal to additional premisses.

AP6

There is no end to an infinite sequence (of steps
or acts )

AP7

Achilles's repeated attempts to catch the tortoise
constitute an infinite sequence.

AI6

AP6

&

AP7 ==> AC6

7

:
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AC6

There is no end to Achilles repeated
attempts to
catch the tortoise.
in other words, Achilles can
never come to the end of his sequence
of attempts
to catch the tortoise
that is, Achilles can't
catch the tortoise.

—

It is interesting to note that this argument
is valid

without reference to the speeds of either Achilles
or the
tortoise.
it is clear that if Achilles runs slower

than the

tortoise or at the same speed as the tortoise then we
have
no difficulty with the conclusion.

But if Achilles runs

faster than the tortoise the conclusion is absurd.

Achilles is "the fleetest of all Greek warriors" 2

,

Since
we may

assume
AP8

Achilles runs faster than the tortoise.

AP9

If Achilles runs faster than the Tortoise, and he

runs toward the tortoise, then Achilles will be

closer to the Tortoise when he reaches the spot
the tortoise left.

With these two additional premisses, it is possible to conclude, validly, that Achilles is always getting closer to

the tortoise.
AP9 => AC

AI7

AC 2

AC 7

Achilles is closer to the tortoise.

&

AP8

&

:
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But nothing in these premisses allows us
to conclude

that Achilles actually catches the tortoise.

The paradox is

that an apparently valid argument with acceptable
premisses
yields such an unacceptable outcome.
The Dichotomy

The dichotomy has two forms.
1.

way.

For Achilles to reach any point he must get half

Then he has to get half the rest of the way.

since

there will always be a fraction to go, he can never reach
any point.

This argument must also be unpacked and stated in the

form of premisses and conclusions.

Here are the relevant

premisses
D1P1 For Achilles to reach another point (his destination) he must first get half way to it.

D1P2 If Achilles is at a point not his destination,

then he moves toward his destination point.
D1P3 If Achilles moves toward his destination point

then he first reaches a point half way towards it.
D1P4 If Achilles is at a point half way towards his

destination, then he is at a point which is not
his destination.

29

D1P5 Achilles is at a point which is not
his destina-

tion

.

And here is the form of the argument:
Dill D1P2

&

D1P5 => D1C1

D1C1 Achilles moves toward his destination.
Dll 2 D1C1

&

D1P3 => D1C2

D1C2 Achilles reaches a point half way toward his des-

tination
D1I3 D1C2

&

.

D1P4 => D1C3

D1C3 Achilles is at a point which is not his destina-

tion

.

But D1C3 is just DIPS

.

As in the Achilles, the argu-

ment leads to the original premiss.
leads to any other conclusion.

No valid reasoning

No matter how many times the

argument is followed through, the conclusion is always the
same.

Nothing in the argument leads to Achilles being at

the other point.

As in the Achilles, this form of the Di-

chotomy rests on the premisses (1), that an infinite series
has no end and (2), that Achilles is traversing an infinite

series of points.

Since an infinite series has no final

term it is concluded that Achilles cannot reach the end of
the series.

But this is just what he must do in order to

reach the other point.

:

.

.
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The second form of the paradox can be
explained this

2.

way
For Achilles to reach any point he must get
half way.
To get half way, he must get to half that, etc.

To get any-

where, he must have already covered an infinite
number of

points

3

In this form of the Dichotomy, the infinite series of

points that Achilles is to traverse is "reversed" from that
of the first form.

As the points are enumerated, the second

is one quarter of the way to the destination in the second

form while it is three quarters of the way to the destination in the first form.

Between Achilles and any other

point there is an infinite series of points.

For Achilles

to get to any one of these points, he must have already

traversed, in reverse order, the infinite series of points
which, according to the premiss in the first form, he can

not come to the end of.
a

This form of the Dichotomy entails

premiss which is less clearly acceptable.
D2P1 Achilles cannot traverse an infinite number of

points
D2P2 Between Achilles and any point is an infinite

number of points.
D2P3 To traverse the distance to any point, Achilles

must traverse all intervening points.

.

.

.
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D2I1 D2P2

&

D2P3 => D2C1

D2C1 To traverse the distance to any point,
Achilles

must traverse an infinite number of points.
D2I2 D2C1

&

D2P1 => D2C2

(Modus Tolens)

D2C2 Achilles cannot traverse the distance to any

point

This argument is more straight forward, but it is also

clear that premiss D2P1 is not obviously true.

However,

this argument and the preceding first form of the Dichotomy

exhibit symmetry.

Support for premiss D2P1 can be achieved

with a additional premisses

—

namely:

D2P4 Achilles can traverse an infinite seguence of

points if and only if he can come to the end of

a

infinite series.
D2P5 Achilles can not come to the end to an infinite

series
D2I3 D2P4

&

D2P5 => D2P1

(Modus tolens)

D2P1 falls out as a conclusion from these two less

questionable premisses.

Since it is clear that Achilles can

not come to the end of an infinite sequence, it must also be
the case that he can not traverse an infinite sequence of

points

.

.
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The first form of the Dichotomy concludes that
Achilles

can't reach any point, and the second form concludes
that he
can't even get started. Although the arguments appear

to be

valid, both conclusions are clearly absurd.
The Arrow

The arrow cannot move.

To do so requires that it be in

one place equal to itself during one part of an instant and

another during another.

Also, it would occupy a space larg-

er than itself in order for it to have room to move. 4

'

5

RP1

Everything at a place equal to itself is at rest.

RP2

A flying arrow is always at a place equal to it-

self at every instant in its flight.
RP2 => RC1

RI1

RP1

RC1

A flying arrow is at rest at every instant in its

&

flight
RP3

That which is at rest at every instant does not
move
RP3 => RC2

RI2

RC1

RC2

A flying arrow does not move.

&

While the above rendition of the argument suffers from
the fallacy of composition, it is possible to render the ar-

:

.
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gument in a form not subject to this fallacy.

This can be

done as follows:

Def: RD1

An instant is an indivisible minimal element of

time
Def: RD2

Something is at rest (instantaneously) iff it is
in its place (one place equal to itself) in one

instant and it is in the same place (equal to
itself) in different instants (remains at rest).
Def: RD3

Something moves iff it is not at rest.

RI3

RD2

RC2

Something moves iff either

&

RD3 => RC2
(A)

it is not in one

place (equal to itself) in one instant or (B) it
is in different places (equal to itself)

in dif-

ferent instants.
I

will present the two disjuncts as separate cases.

Case

1

(A)

That which moves is not in one place (equal to

itself) in one instant.

It would appear that this case could be disposed of im-

mediately by noting that it seems to contradict RP2 directly.
a

—

RP2 could be interpreted that everything is always in

place equal to itself.

—

However, it is instructive to

)
.

.

2
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analyze more deeply.

We can consider the 'not' as applying

to "one place" or alternatively to "one
instant".

Let us

first consider the 'not' applied to "one
place". "Not one
place" becomes "different places".

RI42 RC2 => RC2
RC22 Something moves iff it is at different places
in
the same instant.

place

(An instant has more than one

.

Although this interpretation is practically inconceivable to us, it is the interpretation intended by the argument.

But we can think of it as like the blurred photograph

of something in motion.

The object is apparently at (many)

different places (equal to itself) at the "instant" the

photograph was taken.

RP4

If something is at different places during the

same instant then it is not at one place equal to

itself
RI5

RP4 => RC3

RC3

If something is at one place equal to itself then

it is not at two different places during the same

instant
RI6

RP2

&

RC3 => RC4

.

.
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RC4

An arrow in flight is not at different
places during the same instant.

RI7

RC2 2

RC5

An arrow in flight does not move.

&

RC4 => RC5

The "also" clause has more the form of an "otherwise"

clause

RP5

Something cannot occupy
self

RP6

a

space smaller than it-

.

If something is not at a place equal to itself

then it occupies a space either smaller than or
larger than itself.
RI8

RP5

RC7

If something is not at a place equal to itself

RP6 => RC7

&

then it occupies a space larger than itself.
RI9

RP4

RC7

If something is at different places during the

RC6 => RC7

&

same instant then it occupies a space larger than
itself

RI10 RC22
RC8

&

RC7 => RC8

If something moves then it occupies a space larger

than itself.

(An arrow must occupy a space larger

than itself if it is to move.)

:

1

.
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RC22, however is also in direct conflict
with a widely held

premiss

RP7

Nothing can be in two different places (equal
to
itself) during the same (one) instant.

This case concludes that the arrow cannot move during
an
instant. We are left with case

Case

2.

2

(B)

That which moves is at different places (equal to

itself) in different instants.

RI41 RC2 => RC2
RC21 Something moves if it is at different places
(equal to itself) in different instants.

(This is

our usual understanding of motion.)

We are considering whether an arrow can be in motion in
an instant.

By the above case, something could move only if

it were in different places in different instants.

There-

fore, for it to move in the one instant under consideration,

that instant would have to have two parts which were also
instants.

It would be these "sub-instants" in which the

arrow were at different places.

But, by RD1

,

an instant is

37

indivisible; so, it has no such parts which
are instants.
Consequently, at each instant it is not possible
for the

arrow to be at different places in different
instants.

In either case the arrow cannot move.

Consequently the

logical disjunction of the two cases also yields an
unmoving
arrow.

The Stadium

Oppositely marching rows of soldiers pass each other
and a standing row of soldiers in the same time.

Since op-

positely moving rows pass twice as many bodies as each passes stationary bodies,
is equal to half'". 6

"Zeno concluded that 'double the time

Vlastos states that "Aristotle and

all our other ancient informants understood this as a (sup-

posed) paradox of relative motion" and attributes the inter-

pretation which follows to Paul Tannery. 7

If extension and duration are atomic, that is, there

are minimum amounts of each, then an analogy can be made

between atoms of extension moving in jumps of atomic time
and rows of soldiers drilling in a stadium.

rows of soldiers, one standing (A B C)

right

(1

2

3),

,

Consider three

one marching to the

and one marching to the left

(456).

As the

row of soldiers marching to the right passes the row of
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standing soldiers, it takes one (minimum)
unit of time for
the soldiers to move one unit of distance
from a position
opposite certain standing soldiers to a position
opposite
the next ones.

—

1

2

3

ABC

=>

=>123
ABC

After one
time unit

On the other hand, the other row of soldiers, marching
left,
al so move one unit of distance in one unit of time.

ABC
4

5

6

<=

After one
time unit

ABC
4

5

6

<=

The problem is that the relative change between the soldiers

marching left to those marching right is twice the distance
in the same amount of time.

1
4

Soldier

2

3

5

6

6

=>
<=

After one
time unit

=>123
4

5

6

ends up opposite soldier

<=

1

after

1

unit of time.

In order to get there he had to pass soldier 2.

This must

have taken one unit of time, and passing from there on to

soldier

1

must have taken another unit of time.

expression "double the time".

Hence the

It is reasonable to presume

that "half the time" refers to the immediately preceding

antecedent (the doubled time) rather than to the fixed unit
of time which got doubled.

Otherwise, we would be looking

39

for a relationship of

4

to

1

instead of

2

to

1.

Vlastos

confirms this interpretation in his
quotation:
So it follows, he thinks, that half
the time equals its
double [that t/2 = t] (Aristotle, Physics
239b35). 8
It is difficult to get the sense of
the conflict be-

cause we are accustomed to thinking of time as
continuous.
The perplexing nature of the situation may be
illustrated by

noting that there must be some time when soldier
site soldier

2,

6

is oppo-

while the argument says that there is not.

Unpacking the argument into premisses and conclusions yields
the following:

SP1

Soldier

6

passes from soldier C to soldier B in a

minimum unit of time.
SP2

The instant at which soldier

6

is opposite soldier

C is the instant that soldier 6 is opposite sol-

dier

3,

and the instant at which soldier

6

is

opposite soldier B is the instant that soldier

6

is opposite soldier 1.

SP2 => SCI

SI1

SP1

SCI

The minimum unit of time that soldier

&

6

takes to

pass from soldier C to soldier B is the minimum

unit of time that soldier

soldier

3

to soldier 1.

6

takes to pass from

)
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SP3

If two instants are separated by
the minimum unit

of time there is no instant between
them.
is atomic

.
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SCI

SC2

At one instant soldier

&

SP2 => SC2
6

is opposite soldier

at the next instant soldier
1,

and

3

is opposite soldier

6

and there is no instant between these two in-

stants
SP4

(Time

.

Any soldier passing from soldier

1

to soldier

3

must pass all those in between.
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SC2

SC3

Because soldier

&

SP4 => SC3

soldier
SP5

6

2

is between soldiers

must pass soldier

1

and

3,

2.

If soldier 6 passes soldier

there must be an

2

instant at which this happens.
SP5 => SC4
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SC3

SC4

There is an instant at which soldier

&

soldier
SP6

passes

2.

If there is such an instant,

the instant that soldier

6

it must be between

is opposite soldier

and the instant that soldier
1

6

3

6

is opposite soldier

6

passes soldier

.

SP6 => SC5
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SC4

SC5

The instant at which soldier

&

between the instant that soldier

6

is opposite

2

is

.
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soldier

3

and the instant that soldier

site soldier
SC6

6

is oppo-

1.

SC5 contradicts SC2

The paradox of plurality

This paradox can be tersely stated as follows:
Ultimate

parts must have no magnitude or they would not
be ultimate
parts.

But an extended object cannot be made up of parts

with no magnitude.

Parts of zero size add up to zero size.

So an extended object must be "so small as to have no
magni-

tude".

The parts must have magnitude.

But an infinity of

extended parts must have infinite extension.

So an extended

object must be "so large as to be infinite". 9

Expanding this statement to show more fully the premisses, inferences, and conclusions yields:
PP1

The size of an extended object is not zero.

PP2

Extended objects are made up of parts.

PP3

Ultimate parts have no magnitude (zero size).

PP4

The number of the parts an extended object is

infinite
PP5

If something is made up of parts then its size is

the sum of the size of its parts.
PP6

Parts of zero size add up to zero size.

::

:

3

..
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PP7

An infinity of parts of non-zero
size adds up to
infinite size.

If an extended object has parts,
there are two cases to

consider

Case

the parts are ultimate or the parts
are extended.

PI1

PP2 > PCI OR PC2

PCI

An extended object is made up of ultimate
parts.

PC2

An extended object is made up of extended
parts.

1

The parts are ultimate (PCI holds).

PCI

An extended object is made up of ultimate parts.

PI2

PCI

PC3

An extended object is made up of parts of zero

&

PP3 => PC

size
PI 3

PC3

PC4

The size of an extended object is the sum of parts

&

PP5 => PC4

of zero size.

PI4

PC4

PC5

The size of an extended object is zero size.

&

PP6 => PC5
("It

is so small as to have no magnitude").

Case

1

concludes that an extended object has no size

clearly unacceptable result.
Case

Case

2

—

a

fairs no better.

2

The parts are extended

PC 2

An extended object is made up of extended parts.

PI5

PC2

PC6

An extended object is made up of parts of non-zero

size

&

(

PC2 holds).

PP1 => PC6
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PI6

PC6

PC?

The Slze of an extended object is the
sum of parts
of non-zero size.

PI7

PC7

PCS

Th e size of an extended object is the
sum of an

&

&

PP5 => PC7

PP4 => PC8

infinite number of parts with non-zero size.
PI8

PC8

PC9

The size of an extended object is infinite size.

&

PP7 => PC9

(It must be "so large as to be infinite".)

Case

2

size

—

concludes that an extended object must be infinite in
an equally unacceptable result.

The paradox lies in the following: it cannot be denied

that things are made up of parts; but if things are made up
of parts then there are two possibilities, and both possi-

bilities lead to absurd conclusions.
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CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION OF ZENO'S PARADOXES
Salmon suggests that Zeno is not just putting
paradoxes
forth
It has been suggested, and Owen elaborates
this
theme, that Zeno's arguments fit into an overall
pattern.
"Achilles and the tortoise" and "The
dichotomy" are designed to refute the doctrine
that space and time are continuous, while "The
arrow" and "The stadium" are intended to refute
the view that space and time have an atomic structure 1
.

The pattern suggested by Owen suggests a Zen koan

—

a

para-

ble with illustrative value that is often logically inconsistent.

Such parables are used to stimulate a disciple

toward certain realizations, and

a

perennial theme of Zen

koans is that obvious choices should be rejected.

In this

case the choice is between atomism and infinite divisibility.

Heraclitus rejected such a choice in his doctrine of

the unity of opposites.

Zeno's arguments, purporting to

refute both choices, seem compatible with Heraclitus.

But,

as with Zen, many disciples never master the teachings; some

write long dissertations arguing pro or con regarding some
illustrative parable.

Regarding oneness or manyness

atomism or infinite divisibility
have been written.
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—

—

many such dissertations
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Zeno confuses discrete and dense sets, and
he assumes
that zero times infinity is zero. These errors
figure prominently in his arguments.
In a sense, 'discrete' means

atomic and 'dense' means divisible.

(See page 100.)

Today

we are accustomed to distinguishing between these
two kinds
of sets.

Certain properties or attributes are associated

with each kind of set.

For example, the notion expressed by

'next' or 'successor' is one from counting and is associated

with discrete (atomic) sets.

Whenever one asks about the

next one of any sequence, one is introducing the atomic per-

spective into the discussion.
of both kinds of sets.

We have mathematical models

The integers are discrete; the ra-

tional (and real) numbers are dense.

Both numbering systems

are applied to extension, as Aristotle notes.
91.)

(See page

Metric space theory allows discrete as well as contin-

uous measures of extension.

But continuous metrics are far

more well known than discrete metrics.
On The Achilles
In "Achilles and the Tortoise", Max Black suggests that

the paradox derives from an imprecise use of language.
[The] fallacy in Zeno's argument is due to the use
of the words 'never' and 'always'." 2

But Black does not expand and make explicit his assertion.
Instead, he suggests that an infinite series of acts is
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self-contradictory.

Black is guilty of exactly the charge

he levies, only with a different word.

It is not the infi-

nite series of acts that is problematical;
it the notion of
completing an infinite series of acts on a one-at-a-time
basis.

Black's statement, "the machine comes to

suggests this sense

3
.

a halt",

The sense of completion involving

a

one-at-a-time process presumes that there is an end to the
process, whereas Peano's successor axiom presumes that
there
is no end to the process (of counting natural numbers).

if

complete is understood in this sense, then "completing" an
infinite series of tasks means "coming to the end of

a se-

quence with no end", which is indeed self-contradictory.
For it is the very essence of [an infinite] progression not to have a last term and not to be
completable in that ordinal sense! To maintain
the self-contradictory proposition that in such an
actually infinite aggregate of order type w, there
is a "last" set of divisions which ensure the
completability of the process of "infinite division" by "reaching" a "final" product of division
is indeed to commit the Bernoullian fallacy 4
.

But there is another sense of complete which must be

used while scrupulously avoiding the sense which connotes

coming to an end

5
.

That sense is expressed by "all there".

For finite sets, and in ordinary usage, both senses apply at
the same time.

In fact, one discovers whether the silver-

ware is "all there" by counting it and coming to the (right)
end.

When we distinguish between these two senses of com-
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plete

we see that we cannot apply both
senses to an infinite set. An infinite series of acts,
or an infinite set of
numbers, is complete in the sense that all
acts, or numbers,
are included, while it simultaneously fails
to be complete
in the sense of coming to an end.
Finite sets may be dis,

tinguished from infinite sets by examining whether
the sense
of "complete'' expressed by 'coming to an end'
applies.

Black fails to make this distinction.

If we follow-up on Black's imprecise lead we can
see

that 'always' is used in a particular way in Zeno's argument.
N"

.

It can be properly represented as meaning "for all

In the form of the argument expressed by Black, Achil-

les runs at the speed of 10 yards per second, while the

tortoise runs at
head start.

1

yard per second and is given a 100 yard

(Achilles has a 100 yard handicap.)

If Achil-

les runs at 10 yards per second and the tortoise has a 100

yard head start, then Achilles will take 10 seconds to arrive at the spot vacated by the tortoise.
10 sec.)

(100 Yd /10 Yps =

In that 10 seconds, the tortoise, who runs at

yard per second, will have run 10 yards.

So,

1

according to

this form of the paradox, while Achilles runs the 100 yard

handicap, the tortoise has run another 10 yards.
the tortoise 10 yards ahead of Achilles.

This puts

We can think of
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the race as starting again with a 10 yard
handicap,

while

Zeno runs the 10 yards the tortoise runs one
yard.

Let us assign N=1 to the first race and N=2 to
the

second race.

Naturally, there is a third race, and a

fourth, etc., etc.

In the first race Achilles runs 100

yards; in the second race he runs 10 yards; and in the
third

race he runs

1

yard.

This sequence can be expressed in

exponential form as 10 2

,

10 1

,

10°,

•••.

The relationship

between the distance and the race number can be more clearly
seen if we express the sequence as 10 (3_1)
.

.

.

.

10 <3

' 2)
,

els 10 yards; in the

,

1

In the 10 second first race he trav-

second second race he travels

sponding sequence for the tortoise is 10 (2_1)
.

.

,

where N is the race

in the .1 second third race he travels .1 yard.

.

" 3)

The tortoise, on the other hand, travels at 1/10

the speed of Achilles.

.

10 (3

We can compute the distance run in each race by

Achilles if we use the expression 10 <3_N)
number.

,

,

1

yard;

The corre-

10 (2_2)

,

10 (2_3>

,

We can compute the distance run in each race by the

tortoise if we use the expression 10 <2 ~ N>

.

By the same reasoning we can discover an expression for

the distance between Achilles and the tortoise after each
race.

After the first race the tortoise is ahead by 10

yards; after the second race by

1

yard, and so forth.

Each
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terra in the sequence,

using the expression

10\
10‘ 2 ->.

10“ ,

10"

can be computed

This is the same as the amount

the tortoise runs, and this makes sense because
it is the
amount the tortoise runs that puts him ahead of
Achilles.
Now, it is quite clear that this number is a positive
quan-

tity for every N.

Since there is never an end to numbers,

it is usually concluded that Achilles can never come to
the

end of the races, that is, Achilles can never catch the

tortoise.

That there is never an end to numbers is perhaps

better stated by Peano's successor axiom: every number has

successor

.

a

In the present context we should not conclude

that Achilles can never catch the tortoise; rather, we

should conclude that for every N, the tortoise has

yard lead on Achilles."

a 10 (3_N)

While this can be paraphrased as:

"the tortoise is 'always' ahead of Achilles" and subsequently re-paraphrased as "Achilles can 'never' catch the tor-

toise", it is usually forqotten that the 'always' and 'never' are limited by the oriqinal context to the integers

which index the successive races.
'always'

—

"for all time" ('never'

The more qeneral sense of

—

"at no time") domi-

nates our understandinq of the final paraphrase.

The argu-

ment, in effect, equivocates between two meaninqs of 'al-

ways' or 'never'.
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Were we to 'extend' the integers by
adding the axiom of
infinity, without explaining how Achilles
might "complete"
the finite races, trans-finite races would
place Achilles
at, and beyond, the location of the
tortoise.

But the axiom

of infinity essentially assumes that the
number infinity

exists.

in the context of the Achilles, that is
tantamount

to assuming that Achilles catches the tortoise.

There is

a

subtle fallacy at work in the argument.

can be illustrated by an analogy.

it

Godel's incompleteness

theorem showed that arithmetic is essentially incomplete.
That is, true statements can be constructed in arithmetic

which are formally undecidable on the basis of the given
axioms.

While an undecidable statement may be added as an

axiom, the extended system so created is also incomplete. 6

As noted above, "nothing in these premisses allows us to

conclude that Achilles actually catches the tortoise."

The

statement "Achilles catches the tortoise", is not decidable
on the basis of the premisses and inferences given for The

Achilles.

It is, of course, true that Achilles catches the

tortoise.

Like Godel's constructed undecidable statement,

"Achilles catches the tortoise" may be assumed true and
added as a premiss.
AP10 Achilles catches the tortoise.
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And, by the earlier mathematical analysis,
this corresponds
to assuming the axiom of infinity.
The truth of the premiss
is demonstrable by means other than the
system of premisses

and inferences, so we cannot argue that the
premiss could be
assumed to be false. We are without a means to
demonstrate
its truth, and that is an epistemological issue.

The falla-

cy is in confusing epistemological and metaphysical
issues.

We may not infer that, because we can see no way to infer

the truth of a statement from certain premisses, the state-

ment is therefore false.

pening in the Achilles.

But this seems to be what is hapOf course, this fallacy is being

facilitated by equivocation between different senses of
'always'

('never').

This effectively disposes of "the

Achilles" as a paradox.
On The Dichotomy

The first form of the Dichotomy suffers from the same

fallacy as the Achilles.

The computation may be made some-

what simple by presuming that the total distance to be
unit.

1

When Achilles has reached the half way point, his

distance traveled is 1/2 the total, and the remaining distance is 1/2 the total.

Then, when he has reached half the

rest of the way, his distance traveled is the original 1/2
plus 1/2 the remaining 1/2, or 1/2 + 1/2 *1/2, and the re-

maining distance is 1/2 the previously remaining 1/2, or

)

)

)

)

)
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1/2 -1/2.

We can safely assume that Achilles, being
"the

fleetest of all Greek warriors" 7

races toward the unreach-

,

able point, and construct a table showing his
progress after
each "race".
Race

Distance traveled

#

Remaining dist.anrp

1/2
1/2 + 1 / 2 - 1/2
1/2 + 1 / 2 * 1/2 + 1 / 2 * 1 / 2 * 1/2
1/2 + 1 / 2 . 1/2 + 1 / 2 - 1 / 2 - 1/2 + / 2

1

2

3

4

1/2

/ 2 - 1/2
1 / 2 - 1 / 2 - 1/2
1 /2 - 1 /2 - 1
/ 2 - 1/2

1

-

1

/2

-

1

/ 2 - 1/2

The distance traveled for each race after N races can be

expressed as the series:
•

•

•

as:

/

(1/2)

(1/2)

N
.

N
,

(

1/2

1

(1/2)

,

2
,

(

1/2

3
,

(

1/2

4
,

and the remaining distance can be expressed

The fraction Achilles has already covered after

N races is just the sum of the first N terms of the above
N

series and may be expressed as S

(

1

1/2

.

This sums to 1-

1=1
(

1/2

N,

N
.

The proper conclusion is "For all natural numbers

Achilles has a (1/2) N fraction of

run".

a

unit remaining to

As in The Achilles, that Achilles has a positive

fraction remaining to run for all N does not mean that he
has a positive fraction to run for all time.
A New Resolution of the Paradoxes

There is yet another resolution of the paradoxes.

proposed resolution is one that
in any of the writings.

I

The

have found no mention of

The new resolution can be approach-

ed with an example from model-theoretic semantics.

A model
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consists of a language, a set of objects, and an
interpretation function from the language to the objects,
sets
of ob-

jects, and relations among the objects.

It is not necessary

to go into the technical structure of models in more
detail
to present the formal structure of the proposed resolution.

Suppose there are two such models related in
lar way.

a

particu-

The two languages are different, and the set of

objects from one model is a proper subset of the objects
from the other model.

For the purposes of this discussion

I

shall refer to the model whose objects are the proper subset
as the limited model;

general model.

I

shall refer to the other one as the

shall also use these terms to refer to the

I

respective parts of the models.

In such a structure it is possible to use a set or

sequence of terms from the limited language to pick out an

associated set or sequence of limited objects.

Since these

objects are also members of the objects in the general model,

a corresponding sequences of terms in the general lan-

guage can also be constructed.

Because the languages are

different, there is nothing to suppose that there cannot be

additional objects, in the general model and not in the
limited model, which may be selected by the terms of the
general sequence

8
.

By way of an analogy we may correlate
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colloquial language with formal language,
and reference to
the interpretation function. Under this
analogy, when a
formal language term picks out some object
or set
of ob-

jects, the colloquial language refers to or
describes the

analogous object.

In the first form of the dichotomy, Achilles'
inexora-

ble dash achieves and passes the limit, not by
following the

sequence as N gets bigger (limited language), but by remaining in motion for a sufficient time (general language).

The

distance covered is the product of the velocity and the time
elapsed.

Under my new resolution the first form of the

dichotomy and the elapsed time argument are both descriptions of the physical race.

It is possible to describe

Achilles' position using the infinite series method only up
to the limit of that series.

The language of the series

cannot describe what happens at or beyond its limit.

The

description of the race using linear velocity, time, and
distance can describe what happens at and beyond the limit
of the series.

Since the infinite series or limited system

of representation cannot describe events past its limit, its

use should be suspect.

The general fallacy implicit in the arguments seems to
be the belief that the totality of all languages can de-
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scribe everything

cannot describe

-

—

a

that nothing can exist that language

point not universally accepted.

Collo-

quial languages can describe things which
do not exist, and
we are accustomed to describing only those
things the lan-

guage can describe.

Like the blind-spot, the contents of

which we do not see, and the existence of which
we are normally unaware, languages have limits; they do not
describe
some things, and we are normally unaware that
indescribable
things may exist.

It is quite clear that limited subsets of

language cannot describe everything the whole of language
can.

That a particular subset of language, which we might

call a system of description, cannot describe certain objects does not entail that those objects cannot exist.

Yet

that is just what both the Achilles and the Dichotomy would

have us accept.

The second form of the dichotomy suffers from equivoca-

tion on the sense of 'complete' as well.

The idea that

Achilles can't even get started comes from the view that his
first step must be onto the "last" member of an infinite se-

quence of bisections.

If the sequence is "complete" in the

sense of coming to an end, then Achilles can step onto that
end for his first step.

But no such end exists, so Achilles

has no place to make his first step.

This view requires

that the members of the series and the starting point stand
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in the successor relation to each
other.

But the limit of a

sequence does not stand in the successor
relation to any of
its members.
K 0 has no predecessor. 9
[See the discussion
at the bottom of page 60.]
The limit of the sequence

stands

in a relation to its members not unlike that
of the rela-

tionship of a pedestal to the floor around it.

Whenever

Achilles steps off the pedestal down onto the series, he
has
already stepped past an infinite number of elements
ever small his step.

—

how-

Similarly, he cannot get back on the

pedestal by following the successive steps; he must jump up

through an infinite number of steps onto the pedestal (the
first form of The Dichotomy).

With the pedestal analogy in mind, the second form of
the Dichotomy seems not to pose a problem as long as exten-

sion can continually be divided in half.
the conclusion seems acceptable.

If it can, then

Nothing would be wrong

with "covering" an infinite number of points.

But the con-

clusion depends upon the presumption that extension is, in
fact, infinitely divisible by bisection.

If,

at any stage

in the process, half way becomes an indivisible minimum, as

would be the case were extension not infinitely divisible,
then getting half that way becomes an impossible act.

In

other words, this argument begs the question by presuming
that extension is infinitely divisible.

It is supposed to

I

h
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prove atomism by concluding that an infinite
number of
points must be covered
on the premiss that covering an
infinite number of points is an impossible
act.
But there
are an infinite number of points to cover
only if

—

is— nfinitely divisible

;

the argument contains a premiss

which presumes the purported result.
the minimum distance.

One cannot cover half

The premiss "for Achilles to rpar

any point he must g et half way" is not true when the
point
h e must reach is only the minimum distance away.

He must

get there in one fell swoop since there is no intermediate

"half-way" point.

That he can cover an infinite number of

points entails the presumption of divisibility.

J.

0.

Wisdom noticed the difficulty in "Achilles on

a

Physical Racecourse", but he interpreted it as supporting
his contention that the argument is intended to apply to

theoretical divisibility.
This, I think, is the easiest way of seeing that
Zeno's premiss cannot characterize a physical
race: the 'and so on' is inapplicable because
somewhere two neighboring physical points will
touch each other and it will be impossible to
subdivide the distance between them without altering the assigned size of the points, [sic] 10

On both the Achilles and the Dichotomy

James Thomson attempts to resolve the problems of infinite divisibility by appealing to the definition of "infi-

o
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mte"

ln the sense of arbitrarily large.

chosen is still finite.

Any such number

He distinguished this sense from

the sense in which "infinite" is taken to
mean an unending
process and from the sense in which infinite
means the first
number which every finite number is less than
(K 0

)

.

say that a lump is infinitely divisible is
T
just to say that it can be cut into any number of
parts.
Since there are an infinite number of
numbers, we could say: there is an infinite number
of numbers of parts into which the lump can be
divided. And this is not to say that it can be
divided into an infinite number of parts. If
something is infinitely divisible, and you are to
say into how many parts it shall be divided, you
have K 0 alternatives from which to choose. This
is not to say that K 0 is one of them ." 11
"

[

]

Thomson proposes that it is the infinite number of ways that
an object may be divided that unpacks what "infinitely di-

visible" means.

In any such way of dividing it, the object

would actually be divided into only a finite number of extended parts.

This alternative avoids the obviously con-

tradictory notion of completing an unending process of repeated division.

This is not, however, the argument Zeno

advanced, and Thomson defines the notion of "super-task" for
the purpose of resolving Zeno's argument.

Thomson defines a super-task as a task that is completed if and only if an infinite number of tasks are completed.
To suggest that an infinitely divisible object is actually
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divided in this way would be to presume
that an unending
sequence of divisions had been completed.
The presence of
both "unending" and "completed" in the
reformulation

of this

premiss makes it rather obviously self-contradictory
(if
'complete' is taken to mean 'came to the end').

It is just this apparently self-contradictory
nature

which determines the actual formulation for the axiom of
infinity.

In terms of ordinary numbers, the axiom can be

stated: there is a number X (infinity) such that 1<X and

whenever N<X then N+1<X. 12

By formulating the axiom in

this manner, one makes no attempt to "complete" the process
of "+1" in any way whatsoever; one merely conforms to the

requirements of mathematical induction.

We may use induc-

tion to infer that for all N, N<X.

Notice that X is not the successor of any number N

because N+1<X.

There is no number N whose successor is

consequently, X does not have a predecessor 13

.

Thomson al-

ludes to this point, but is not explicit at all.
But it is obviously unreasonable to ask where the
runner was when he was at the point immediately
preceding his destination. [Italics mine] 14

One reason it is unreasonable is that there is no such
point; that is, K 0 has no predecessor.

X;

.
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If the infinite sequence of remaining
halves has been

traversed and one is at the point
havinq ascended to the number K 0

1,

this is equivalent to

But X 0 has no predecessor

.

so there is no immediately precedinq point
to have been at.

Most people are more familiar with decimal
mathematics, so
the equivalence may be better illustrated by
taking the
fraction traversed (in the Dichotomy) to be 9/10 ths
rather
than one half.

The first step covers 9/10 ths (.9) of the

way; l/10 th remains.

The second step covers 9/10 ths of the

remaining l/10 th (9/10.1/10) or .09, and the total distance
traversed after two steps is

.09 =

.9 +

covers .009 for a total of .999.

.99.

The next step

"Completing" the "super-

task" mentioned above requires traversing .999999..., and it

can be shown that that is just being at

1.

The following demonstration shows that the number ex-

pressed by .999999... is the same number as is expressed by
1.

If these are the same number, then to have traversed all

the remaining 9/10 ths is just to have reached

1.

= 1.
Proof of .99999...
X =
.99999.
(1) Let
=
Then
10X
9.99999...
(2)
and 2 - 1 is 10X - X = 9.00000...
Therefore:
9X = 9
and, by division,
X = 1.
.

)

(

(

)

Completing the sequence of repeatedly getting 9/10 ths of the
rest of the way just is being at

1

.

In other words,

if one
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has completed the sequence then one is
at

1.

So, by modus

tollens, if one is not at 1, one cannot have
completed the
sequence.
Consequently, one cannot have completed the
sequence without being at 1
To presume that one has completed all the points in the sequence but is not
at
.

1

presume a hypothesis that is false

—

is to

which leads, of

course, to anything at all.

Owen seems aware of this, but violates it in the same

breath that he denies doing so.
Notice that Zeno is not first setting up a division which cannot have a last move and then asking, improperly, what the last move would be.
He
is asking, legitimately, what the total outcome of
the division would be; and for there to be such an
outcome there must be a smallest part or parts. 15
The size of the parts is bounded below.

greatest lower bound, and it is zero.

In fact, there is a

However, this great-

est lower bound is not in the set of sizes.

Consequently,

contrary to the above claim, there is no smallest part or
Because there is no smallest part we cannot conclude

parts.

that the size of any such parts resulting from the division

process is zero.
not.

Mathematical induction shows that it is

The size of the parts is bounded below by zero, but no

part is of size zero, and there is no smallest part.

The

real numbers under the usual order relation are not "well-

ordered"

.

If they were well-ordered, then the greatest low-
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er bound would be in the set,
and there would be a smallest
(last) member whose size would
indeed be
zero.

On The Arrow

The physics of the relation between
position and velocity has some interesting structural
consequences. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that
the position and
the momentum (velocity) of an object cannot
be simultaneously measured to any degree of accuracy;
accuracy in the mea-

surement of one is lost at the expense of accuracy
in the
measurement of the other 16
A homely macroscopic analogy
.

illustrates this principle.

Take a photograph of an object in motion.

The length

of time the shutter is open (the reciprocal of the shutter

speed) can be used in conjunction with the amount of blur in

the image to estimate the speed of the object.

The longer

the shutter is open the longer the blur and the more accu-

rately the speed can be measured.
is,

But the longer the blur

the less accurately one is able to determine the posi-

tion of the object.

Conversely, the sharper the picture is,

the more accurate knowledge of the position of the object

will be, but the more uncertain knowledge of its velocity
will be.
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In Zeno

thought experiment

a

very sharp view, namely,

the arrow being -in its place-,
is taken; this leaves no
blur at all to use in determining
the velocity.
The mental
shutter speed would have to be infinite
to obtain an indivisible instant
we are left with an instant with
zero
duration.
Since motion is measured by determining
the ratio
of distance traveled to the time
duration, Zeno's thought
experiment leaves zero (length blur) divided
by zero (length
duration) for the computation of velocity.
And zero divided
by zero is undefined.
One has perfect information about the
position but no information about the velocity.
While it is

—

true that a stopped object leaves no blur, it
seems falla-

cious to assume that velocity is zero when one sees
no blur.
And any blur at all does have the immediate consequence
that
the object is indeed occupying a space larger than itself.

It has been argued that an object always takes up the

space it occupies.

It can also be argued that an object in

motion always takes up less space than it occupies.

Rela-

tivity theory holds that an object in motion is contracted
in the direction of motion.

The shortened length, X', can

be calculated in terms of the at-rest length, X, and the

velocity, V, using the Lorentz contraction equation.

equation is X'=X* ( 1-V 2 /C 2
light.

17

1/2
)

,

where 'C' is the speed of

The faster an object is moving, that is, the

That
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larger V is, the smaller X' is.

if an instant is indivis-

ible and is the same "size" regardless
of whether the object
is at rest or in motion, then the
moving, and hence contracted, object takes up less space; it
has room to rattle
around in the same sized instant which
immobilizes the object at rest.
But according to relativity theory
objects in
motion experience a time dilation effect. That
can be in-

terpreted to mean that the size of an instant is
increased
or "stretched ". 18
room.

This gives the moving object even more

Also according to relativity theory faster moving ob-

jects are contracted more.

The greater the contraction, the

relatively greater the room to move

—

and hence the greater

the speed possible.

Consider the possibility that an instant is indivisible
in the sense that it has no duration.

An instant without

duration is not consistent with our usual definition of
velocity.

Velocity is the ratio of distance traversed to

the duration in which the traversal occurs.

An instant with

no duration would be just the temporal coordinate of an object.

Taken together with its position coordinate, the

result forms the event coordinates of
time point.

a

particular space-

It is not possible to determine the velocity of

an object on the basis of a single event.

events are required.

At least two

Even our notion of velocity at a point
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depends upon more than one event.

We define the velocity at

point as the instantaneous rate of change
of position with
respect to time. An instantaneous rate of
change, from the
differential calculus, involves taking the
limit of the
a

ratio of the change in position (distance)
to the change in
time (duration) b etween two points
That limit may
be some

.

definite quantity, but all computations not at the
limit
require an extended duration, and no computation is
possible
at the limit (the denominator would be zero, and
division

by

zero is forbidden).

if an instant has no duration, then no

velocity within the instant is possible.

Velocity at an

instant is not determinate without reference to the context
of the instant, that is, events external to the instant.

The renditions of the argument as

I

have presented them

significantly reflect our modern view of motion.

The Arrow

as originally presented speaks only to motion within an

instant.

The definition of motion

I

proposed, a modern one,

in conjunction with the attending argument concludes, validly,

that motion is a phenomenon that is "trans-instantane-

ous".

If instants are infinitely divisible, as the divi-

sionists presume, then any moving object exists in different
places (equal to itself) at different instants, as close as
you like.

On the other hand. If instants are atomic, as the

atomists presume, then any moving object exists in different
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places (equal to itself) at different
instants, and the
motion is as described more fully in
the discussion of "uniform" velocity on page 72 below.
But in both cases the
concept of moving, as we understand it,
cannot apply "within" an instant.
Our concept of motion, which is based
upon
infinite divisibility, requires that we
think of objects as
moving continuously. If „ e think of instants
as intervals
(durations), that means we think of the object
as crossing
each interval continuously until it enters the
next instant,

crossing that into its successor, etc.

But this view is not

consistent with atomism, as the Arrow shows.
On The Stadium

The alternative to an instant with no duration is an

instant which is indivisible in the sense that it is atomic,

that is, that it has a minimum but indivisible duration.

It

is exactly this premiss that is used in the argument known

as The Stadium.

The stadium purports to prove that objects may pass

each other without ever being opposite one another.

That

conclusion is presumed to be absurd and stands as the basis
for seeing The Stadium as a paradox.

But we seem to have

actually observed just such behavior in the context of quantum mechanics, and that observed physical behavior may be
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offered as an empirically based counter-example
to The Stadium.
Protons appear to "by-pass" a point where
they cannot
physically exist in the physical process known
as tunneling

19
.

A proton in a radioactive nucleus having
enough en-

ergy to exist outside the nucleus is confined
to the nucleus
by a potential field with an annular region
reguiring a

greater potential than the energy of that proton.

Because

the proton has less energy than is reguired to be in
this
area, the area is called a potential barrier.

This barrier

confines the proton to the region of the nucleus of the
atom.

There is also a region outside the potential barrier

in which the potential is less than the proton requires to

be there.

For a proton to traverse from the inner region to

the outer region, it must pass through a region requiring

more energy of its occupants than the proton has.

The prob-

ability of the proton being located there is therefore zero,
but the observation is that some protons do get out

They do so without being in the restricted region

21
.

20
.

They

are described as having "tunneled " 22 through the potential

barrier

23
.

In doing so they,

in effect,

"march" past oth-

ers without ever having been opposite them.

Relativity theory offers us another model that is incompatible with our "common sense" experience.

Relative

velocities do not add according to ordinary arithmetic.

The

.
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relative velocity of the row of soldiers marching
left to
the row of soldiers marching right (V3) is not
just

the sum

of the relative velocity of the row of soldiers
marching

left to the row of soldiers standing (VI) plus the
relative

velocity of the row of soldiers standing to the row of soldiers marching right (V2).

In the case of very high veloci-

ties the sum can be nearly the same as the original velocities.

The formula for the resulting velocity

—

the law of

—
H

addition of velocity
in terms of ordinary addition, is:
Vi + V 2
TT
Vs ~
where a
velocities are expressed as a
1 + V x .V
fraction of the velocity of light (C). 24
'

Suppose our soldiers are marching very fast.

If the

relative velocity of the moving soldiers to the standing
ones is nine-tenths the speed of light (.9C) then the relative velocity between the two oppositely marching rows of

soldiers is not twice this (.9C +
9C +
+
9C
.

1

.

.

..

9C
9C

.

.

9C = 1.8C);

it is only

9945C

In addition, objects moving at relativistic speeds

experience a contraction or foreshortening in the direction
of travel.

This contraction means that the minimum length

becomes smaller as the velocity increases.

The amount of

this foreshortening is computed using the Lorentz contrac-

tion formula

—

X'

= X(1 - 6 2 ) 1/2

,

where B = V/C. 25

In the
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case of the soldiers inarching at
.9C relative to the standing ones, the contraction computes
2
1/2
to l (

.

9

)

=

4359

This means that two of the moving
soldiers take up less
space than one standing one
with room to spare! This
would mean that the moving atomic units would
take up enough
less space that both could be opposite the
one stationary

—

atomic unit at the same instant.

As the fast moving sol-

diers pass the standing ones, the minimum distance
in the

direction of travel has shrunk by over a factor of two
to
one.

This, paradoxically, would allow two moving soldiers

to be opposite one standing one!

Since this is true of both

rows, a standing soldier would see two moving ones on each
side, and they would appear to be passing one another.

In the case of the soldiers marching at .9945C relative

to the row of oppositely marching soldiers, the contraction

computes to

(

1

-

.

9945 2

172
)

=

.

1050.

If one takes a "stand"

with one row of moving soldiers, the relative contraction of
the other moving soldiers is nearly a factor of 10 to

1

.

This would allow nearly 10 soldiers to be opposite one!

relativity has its own paradoxes.

To the other moving sol-

diers, it would also seem that ten were opposite one.

There is other evidence that calls into question the

argument of the stadium

—

But

evidence that does not need to
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evoke relativistic speeds.

This particular evidence comes

from the studies of human perception.
an epistemological approach.

As such it represents

We believe that we can per-

ceive smoothly continuous motion and that
that smooth perception would contradict the atomistic assumptions
about
time and space.
However, psychological experiments
show

that velocity perceived as smooth may in reality
not be
smooth.
In the experiment an observer sees two distinct
lights.

sequence.

One is turned off and the other is turned on in

Within a narrow range of the parameters of sepa-

ration and the duration in which both lights are extinguished, the two lights appear to observers as one light

which moves smoothly instead of as two lights which blink
off and on respectively.

The underlying neurological pro-

cesses involve the length of time an image of

a

stimulus is

retained in the neural circuits and our experience with

moving objects.

Under certain conditions we cannot percep-

tually distinguish between a continuously moving object and
one which ceases to exist at one point and then begins to

exist at another point (as would be the case under the hy-

pothesis of atomism)

.

An argument from the perception of

smooth motion that atomism is false fails because perceptual

experiments show that smooth perception arises in response
to atomistic jumps in motion.
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About both the ar row and the stadinm
It seems clear that the various writers
recognize that

movement involves a change of position over
different parts
of a span of time.
But the two arguments, the arrow

and the

stadium, seem to presume that motion is somehow
continuous.

Continuous motion would require continuous space and
time.
The arguments suggest that a contradiction results
from

assuming that space and time have an atomic structure.

The

contradiction actually results from the implicit assumption
that movement does not also have an atomic structure.

Were

movement to also occur in discrete units, no contradiction
would arise.

A discrete movement would occur when an arrow

was in one position at one instant of time and in another

position in another instant of time (like electrons changing
energy levels in "atoms").

Clearly, the slowest non-zero

"uniform" velocity occurs when the arrow occupies the adja-

cent position during the successive instant.

A slower mo-

tion would require the object to remain "at rest" in the
same position during more than one successive instant.

motion would be full of starts and stops.
motion would require "skipping" positions.
fast would skip every other position.

Such

However, a faster

Moving twice as

But it is the assump-

tion that motion is continuous that is required to show that
an object must also pass, or be in, any intermediate posi-

tion.

The mean value theorem in calculus proves that, in
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the case of a continuous, monotonic
increasing function, the
midpoint must be passed by the function
at some intermediate
point.
A key prerequisite for this theorem
is that the
function concerned be continuous 26 it
is similarly so
.

with the paradoxes of the arrow and the
stadium.

For the

arrow which moves twice as fast to occupy the
intermediate
position, it must also occupy an intermediate
instant.

by assumption there is no intermediate instant

—

time is assumed to be atomic and not continuous.

cannot be continuous when time and space are not.

But

because

Motion

Assuming

that motion is continuous assumes a contradictory premiss
and anything follows.
On The Paradox of Plurality
If something is composed of parts then the parts must

also be composed of parts, ad infinitum.
the question "what is a part?"

This leaves open

To give a definition of

"part" in the context of the plurality hypothesis, one must

necessarily produce a circular definition.
which is composed of parts

.

"

"A part is that

In modern times we could sal-

vage this circularity by making the definition recursive

27
.

"A part is either an ultimate part, or it is composed of

parts."

Of course, for the definition to be satisfactorily

recursive, it must provide some reassurance that parts are

composed of ultimate parts after a non-infinite number of
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reentries.

it is, after all, the finite
number of reentries

that distinguishes recursion from
circularity and infinite
regress.
The plurality hypothesis, as it is
represented,
entails a circular definition of part just
because there is
no base case definition of a part nor any
way to terminate
the regression back to such a base case after
a finite number of tries.

A part is a part is a part is a part ... can

continue infinitely.

Many of the premisses no longer command the loyalty
they once did.

There are many counter-examples that cast

doubt on the truth of the premisses.

I

shall examine each

statement which forms a part of the argument (as presented
on page 41) and present one or more examples where the pre-

miss entailed by the statement no longer holds.

Consider the first statement, "Ultimate parts must have
no magnitude or they would not be parts."

just defines what an ultimate part is.
just a part with no magnitude.

This statement

An ultimate part is

The second statement, "But

an extended object cannot be made up of parts with no magni-

tude", is questionable in the light of modern physical theory.

According to the standard model in modern physics, the

extended proton is composed of a finite number

(3)

of unex-

.
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tended quarks.
quarks

The proton consists of two up and one
down

28

The proton and neutron are both about 10 A -13
cm or
about 1/100,000 of the size of an atom. ...
By
rect means the sizes of quarks and electrons are indiknown
to be less than 10 A -16 cm, less than 1/1000 of
the size
of neutron or proton.
Indeed, there is no evidence
that these particles have any size at all, they may
be
thouqht of as points of matter occupyinq no space. 29

This clearly shows that the third statement, "A finite number of unextended parts cannot comprise an extended whole",
is not true for particle physics.

While, for practical

purposes, the premiss is almost always true, it is a fallacy
to apply it by analoqy to sub-atomic particles.

Modern mathematics also permits questioninq this premiss, as Grunbaum notes.
In the context of modern mathematics, Zeno is thus
defyinq us to obtain a result differing from zero upon
adding all the lengths of the super-denumerable infinity of points that compose a unit segment. This means
that we are being asked to add as many zeros. To Zeno's
mind, it was axiomatic (1) that such an addition is
necessarily feasible and permissible and (2) that the
result of any addition of zeros would be zero, regardless of the cardinality of the set of zeros to be added.
But he could not anticipate that the addition of a
super-denumerable infinity of numbers, be they zero or
positive, presents a problem altogether different from
adding either a finite sequence of numbers such as 3,
4, 7 or a denumerable infinity of numbers such as 1,
1/2,

1/4,

1/8,

1/16,

1/32,

30
.

.

.

.
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There are two models from mathematics.

The easier model is

from integral calculus and is the definite
integral, which
involves denumerable infinity. The definite
integral of a

function computes the area under the curve between
two limit
points.
Such a function is integrated by dividing
the area

under the curve into a finite number of pieces, summing
the
area of the parts, and then by taking the limit of the
sum

as the number of parts gets larger and the parts
themselves

get smaller.
nite.

The limit of the number of the parts is infi-

The limit of the size of each part is zero.

The sum over these parts can be non-zero and non-infinite.

For a simple example,

I

will show the steps involved

in integrating the function X 2 over the interval from

0

to

1

'l

X 2 dx.

While there are many different methods for apL

Jo

proximating the area under the curve, the simplest involves
treating each segment as

a

small rectangle.

interval is divided into N pieces.
is 1/N
I

th
)

,

First, the

The width of each part

but the height depends upon which rectangle (the

is considered.

Since the function X 2 always increases,

the right-most point of each rectangle is the highest point
in the interval.

If we call it the I th rectangle (out of N

of them), that height is (I/N) 2

.

gle is its width times its height:

The area of the
(

1/N

)
•

(

I/N) 2

.

I

th

rectan-

The area

under the curve is approximated by adding the area of all

N

)

I

(
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these small segments.
to N of

(

1/N )

•

(

2

I/N

That value is just the sum
from 1=1

—

S

(

1/N)

•

(

I/N) 2

.

Computing the exact value of the area
just involves
taking the limit as N approaches
infinity.

of each piece is

(

1/N)

since the size

I/N )\ this limit is zero; and
the

.

limit of N is infinity.

We have an infinity of parts of

size zero, yet the resulting area is
neither zero nor infinite.
To show that the sum is a definite number
we can

algebraically manipulate the sum before we take
the limit.
The expression for the sum can be simplified
by factoring
out (1/N).
2
This reduces to 1/N) 3 (2 I 2
=
But
(

.

)

S

.

1=1

N

*

(

N+l

)

(

•

(1/N)

6

1/3.

*

«N

3

N+l /6 31
)

(

to [(2
1/ (

2

+3

1/N)
-N

2

3
*

,

i=i

so the sum is the product of this and

[N* (N+l

+N)/6 ]/N 3

.

)

(

•

2

«N+1 )/6

)

]

.

This multiplies out

Simplifying, we get 1/3 + 1/(2*N) +

2

•

which, as N approaches infinity reduces further to
Limit
So,
X 2 dx =
[1/3 + 1/(2- N) + 1/ 6N 2 )] = 1/3
N-«x)
)

,

(

which is clearly neither zero nor infinite.

The second mathematical model involves taking transfinite sums of infinitesimals.

non-infinite.

These can also be non-zero and

Illustrating the model is not necessary,

however, as the principle is similar to that of integration.

.
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The statements, "Parts of zero
size add up to zero
size.
So an extended object must be so
small as to have no
magnitude" commit another fallacy when
it comes to the
context of an infinitude of parts. Adding
the same q uantity
many times is the same as multiplying that
guantity by the
number of times it is an addend. For example,
10 added to
itself 4 times (10 + 10 + 10 + 10) is 10
multiplied by 4
,

.

In the immediate context adding an infinitude
of zero sizes,

that is, adding zero an infinite number of times,
is the
same as multiplying 0 times infinity.
But multiplying

zero

times infinity is one of the undefined operations, or
at

best produces an indeterminate result.

That zero times any-

thing is zero is a fallacy; zero times infinity is not defined.

The next statement in the argument is:
"the parts must have magnitude."

[Therefore,]

Ordinarily, the argument

to this point would constitute a reductio that there can be

ultimate parts or that an extended object can be made up of
ultimate parts, but the argument proceeds (rhetorically) for
effect

From "the parts must have magnitude" it does not follow
that that magnitude must have a non-zero lower limit.
for a moment, at the process of bisecting an extended

Look,
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length.

For simplicity take the length
of the extended
object to be 1 unit. When the first
bisection is completed
the length of each part is 1/2
(half the length of the original).
Now consider a part which results
when the unit has
been bisected N times.
N
N
Its length is
(1/2)

.

(1/2)

is

still extended.

When we bisect that length the result
is
also still extended and is of length
N+1
(1/2)
i have

just

.

shown that bisecting (dividing) an extended
length yields an
extended length for N=1 bisections.
I have also shown that
whenever the length after N bisections is extended,
then so
is the length after N+l bisections.

These two premisses

satisfy the requirements for mathematical induction and
we
may conclude that "for all N, after N bisections the
length
is extended".

So, the process of bisection yields an infin-

ity of parts, all of which are extended.

But notice that

after one bisection there are two parts of size 1/2; after
two bisections there are

bisections there are

2

N

4

parts of size 1/4; and after N

parts whose length is (1/2) N

.

In

each case the total length of the parts adds up to the original length.

To assert that an object is composed of unextended

parts because this limit of the size of the parts is zero is
just not valid reasoning.

The flaw is very subtle and has

been the basis of controversy in mathematics for millennia.
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It confuses the limit of a sequence
with the members of that

sequence, a point which Thomson notices:

Hence Whitehead emphasized that the sequence
1,

1/2,

1/4,

.

.

.

was convergent and had a finite sum. He also
thereby pointed out a play on the word 'never
the sequence never reaches 0, the sequence of
partial sums never reaches 2. (The sequence does
not contain its limit: but it is converqent,
the
limit exists.) 32
7

;

The arqument, "But an infinity of extended parts must

have infinite extension", is based upon the unwarranted

assumption that because the parts are all extended there
must be a smallest non-zero size to the parts.

Were there

such a limit, then infinite extension would follow.

But

there beinq no such limit, infinite extension does not nec-

essarily follow.
verge

Some infinite series converge

;

some di-

.

This argument goes past the point of establishing

contradiction, and hence a reductio;

I

a

would think that it

does so for the poetic license of being able to say that an

object composed of a plurality of parts must be both small
and large without limit.

The argument above purports to

establish the existence of an extended object with no magnitude.

It actually establishes that an object made up of

parts cannot be made up of ultimate parts.

A missing pre-
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miss is that any object composed
of parts is composed of
ultimate parts.

The question that arises is: are
ultimate parts composed of parts? The first tendency
would be to say no, that
that would prevent their having been
ultimate.
But a second
reading is possible. That ultimate parts
have no magnitude
does not mean that they have no parts.
A line has no width
but it has both a left and a right side.
Moreover, these
parts combine to form the whole which has no
magnitude
(width).
be.

An alternate definition of 'ultimate part'
could

A part is an ultimate part if it has no parts."
But

this alternate definition clashes with the notion
that a

part is composed of parts ad infinitum.

There can be no

ultimate parts under the plurality hypothesis if ultimate
parts are parts which have no parts.

:

.

,
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CHAPTER IV

ARISTOTLE (384 322 BC) AND INFINITE
DIVISIBILITY
Before we can reasonably examine
Aristotle's views on
the subject, we need to briefly outline
the events and conditions that transpired between Zeno and
Aristotle.
it was

during this period that true Atomism was
born.
The—Birth of Atomism Proper

The birth of atomism in its modern form can be
traced
to a reinterpretation of Melissos's arguments to
support

Eleatic monism.

Melissos re-presented Parmenides' arguments

in Ionic prose, but he deviated from Parmenides'
teachings.

Parmenides claimed the real was a sphere, which suggests
that the real was finite.

Melissos claimed that the real

was infinite.
The real, he said, could only be limited by empty
space, and there is no empty space 1
.

Melissos also presented a reductio argument against pluralism.

If there were many things, they would have to be
of the same description as I say the One is 2
.

While Parmenides had earlier advocated the spherical
nature of the one, it was Melissos's assertion that there
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was no empty space that suggests
the next development, combining Parmenides sphere with
the denial of both Melissos's

assertions, that the real is infinite
and that there is no
empty space, yields a spherical
non-infinite "real" in existing empty space. The denial of
monism multiplies these
non-infinite reals and produces atoms.
That task fell
to

Leukippos

Leukippos (450-420 be)
It is certain that Aristotle and
Theophrastos both
regarded [Leukippos] as the real author of
the
3
atomic theory.

Leukippos modified Melissos's statement into
the proposition that there are many things and that they
are all

spherical as Parmenides had said the one is, but not
infinite.

He also denied the non-existence of empty space.

Creating empty space provides a "place" to put these
many
little "reals".

This development can be seen as distin-

guishing between substance and existence.

Prior to this

distinction, substance was that which existed and non-sub-

stance or void was that which did not exist.

When the two

notions are distinguished, then it is possible to have non-

substance that exists (void).

Prior to Leukippos the strong association of being with

anything that could be thought of or said constituted

a
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denial of a void in nature.'

Whatever is thought of is,
and the world is full of substance.
Nothing could not exist
and could not be thought.
Arguments fairly raged about
whether that substance was one or
many, and if so, how

many.
But it was Leukippos who distinguished
between non-existence
and empty space.

Leukippos supposed himself to have
discovered a
heory which would avoid this consequence
impossibility of motion and multiplicity]. [the
kippos was the first philosopher to affirm, Leuwith a
full consciousness of what he was doing,
the existence of empty space. The Pythagorean void
had
been more or less identified with 'air',
but the
void of Leukippos was really a vacuum 5
.

Taking this new distinction literally poses
problems for
Aristotle later when he struggles with point and
place.

(See page 120. below.)

Democritus (460-370 be)
This distinction is also more clearly made when Democ-

ritus clarifies and expands Leukippos's theory.

Leucippus had been content to speak of it, as did
the Eleatics who denied that it existed at all, as
the 'not-real' or 'non-existent' yuf| ov): according to Aristotle, Democritus, taking advantage of
the distinction between the two Greek negatives,
called it the 'unreal' (ok ov) or the 'nothing'
(oi>6ev).
He was in this way able to distinguish
the void whose existence he affirmed as stoutly as
Leucippus from absolute non-existence (to /if) ov),
and to dispose of his opponents' objections by
phraseology as well as argument.
'space' was
not 'the real'(ov), not body, neither was it the
(

.

.

.
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'noli-r^ai' (/if) ov), that which
does not exist at
all, but only 'unreal' (ook
6v).
The distinction
° ng reinforce >" e "t of „ hat
Leucippus
meant?«

No one, even in modern times,
has given a more
S±C ex ession
atomism ... the only diffllt
erences allowed to the elements are
strictlv
P lu s the motion in space necessary to
IltPr^hpf
alter their positions.
For Democritus therefore
rinCiPle explain everything: atoms and
empty
?
space.
in the first place, each atom is
indivisible.
The word atom itself means indivisible, it was for that reason that
Democritus invented the term atom and applied it to
his elements

^

^

'

^no

.

.

A number of things come together here.

Matter and

space are distinguished from existence and
non-existence.
It is denied that matter has both infinite
extent and infi-

nite divisibility.
its scope.

But plurality is preserved by limiting

This actually foreshadows the development of

recursion in the twentieth century.

it also disposes of the

problem of infinite regress implicit in the notion of infinite divisibility.

We also have each of the types of matter

previously conceived preserved as individual types of atoms.
This polished atomic theory holds together quite nicely,

although its incompatibility with geometry will readily
become apparent.

We now turn to Aristotle's struggles with

this and his rejection of the atomic theory.
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Aristotl o

Infinite divisibility had already long
been
philosophical discussion before The Philosopher
scene.

a

topic of

came on the

Aristotle, in his characteristic way,
summarized

selected arguments about it in his On
Generation and corrnption 8 and, to a lesser extent, in The Physics 9
.

He accom-

panied these summaries with critical analyses
which include
his reasons for rejecting the views of the
atomists.

Aris-

totle is not putting forward

a

positive model of infinite

divisibility; he is presenting the horns of the atomists'

dilemma and rejecting both horns.

The atomists say that there must be atoms, because

things being infinitely divisible leads to the absurd con-

clusion that there is nothing left to reassemble.

Aristotle

argues that although things are infinitely divisible, they
are not divisible everywhere.

He thus rejects a premiss of

the atomists' necessary to conclude that nothing is left to

reassemble.

He does not go further and present a positive

account of infinite divisibility.

Here is the abstract form of the atomists' and Aristotle's arguments.

.

;

.
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The AtomistK
Either A OR B.
IF NOT B THEN A.
IF B THEN C.
NOT C.
Conclude NOT B.
Conclude A.
A
B
B'
C

~
“
-

Aristotle;
Either A OR B ' AND NOT B)
IF (B' AND NOT B) THEN
NOT A.
IF X THEN (B' AND NOT B)
(

1

X.

Conclude (B' AND NOT
Conclude NOT A.

*

B)

Reality is made up of atoms.
Reality is everywhere divisible.
Reality is anywhere divisible.
There is nothing left to reassemble.
Point is not contiguous to another

point.

There are flaws in both arguments.

in what follows,

I

shall examine Aristotle's critical
analyses and supporting
definitions from various perspectives.
I shall contrast his
writings with our current understanding of
mathematical
infinity, the real-number line, and model-theoretic
semantics.
My aim is to show that the use of these
perspectives

allows us to identify problems with his analyses
that are

otherwise difficult to uncover and to provide some
account
for one of his more opaque passages.

I

shall begin by exam-

ining his supplementary definitions.

Quantity

Only divisible quantities may be considered as candidates for infinite divisibility, and Aristotle defines what
a

quantity is in The Categories

10
.

tity into discrete and continuous.

In 4b20 he divides quan-

According to Aristotle,

number and language are discrete, and lines, surfaces, bodies, time, and place are all continuous (4b22).

Aristotle
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distinguishes between discrete
and continuous in the
way
their parts interact. The
parts of discrete quantities
do
not have co,»o„ boundaries;
the parts of continuous
quantities do. Aristotle is also
explicit in stating that nothing
else is a quantity:

e
nti0 ed are CaUed ^"titles
srrictiy,
strLtlv^all
all the
Uhe ol'h
a
others derivatively;
for it is
k “ hen WS 0311 thS ° therS
q uan tities
t5a38)°°
-

Aristotle, in The Metaphysics 18

,

strongly suggests that

quantities, and only quantities, are
divisible.
Quantum' means that which is divisible
into two
or more constituent parts of which
each is by
nature a 'one' and a 'this'. A quantum is
rality if it is numerable, a magnitude if a pluit is
measurable.
'Plurality' means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts
magnitude' that which is divisible into continuous parts; (1020a7) ... for these also are
called quanta of a sort and continuous because
the
things of which these are attributes are divisible.
(1020a30)

The foregoing illustrates how Aristotle has identified

what are quantities and hence what are divisible.

A quanti-

ty is something that is divisible; on the other hand, any-

thing that is divisible is

a

quantity.

As a result, the

phrase 'divisible quantity' is redundant; however, it will
often be useful to keep this redundancy in mind.

Aristotle

has, in effect, established that infinite divisibility can

be analyzed only as "infinitely divisible quantity".
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The Infinite

The nature of infinite divisibility
depends upon the
nature of the infinite. To examine the role
the infinite
plays in infinite divisibility, we must turn
to Aristotle's
discussion of the nature of the infinite in The Physirg
jn
.

20

2b3 0 - 203bl4

,

he surveys the opinions of his predecessors

concerning the nature of the infinite and includes
in the
survey opinions of those who affirm infinite divisibility

as

well as opinions of atomists who deny it.

Some of Aristotle's predecessors held the view that in-

finity was some real thing itself, a view which Aristotle

objects to.

In spite of the reification of infinity sug-

gested by his own use of the definite article in his discussions of "the infinite", Aristotle essentially settles on

a

definition of 'infinite' which rejects its being a proper
subject.

things

—

"Infinite", in his view, is predicated of other

magnitude and number in particular as well as time

and motion.

Aristotle said:

Some of these do not treat infinity as an attribute of something else but make the infinite itself
a substance; but of these the Pythagoreans treat
it as present in sensible things, and also describe what is outside the heavens as infinite,
while Plato recognizes nothing outside the heavens, but makes the infinite a constituent both of
sensible things and of ideas.
(203a4)
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Aristotle rejects these views
in favor of a more process-oriented view, one which spans
the distinction between
atomism and its opposition. He
cites supporters of this
view from both the atomist camp
and their opposition, those
who favor infinite divisibility:
Those who make them infinite in
number as Anaxagoras and Democritus do, describe
the infinite as
continuous by contact.
(203a20)
,

Aristotle supports the rejection of a
reified infinity by
arguing that the infinite is a principle.
[The infinite s being ungenerated and
imperishable points to its being a principle; for
there is
a limit to all generation and
destruction. This
is why the infinite has no beginning
but is itself
thought to be the beginning of all other things
^
203b7
'

•

.

•

.

(

]

)

This argument can be interpreted as follows: If
the infinite

were a thing then it would be something that could
come to
be and cease to be.

cease to be.

The infinite cannot come to be nor

Since it cannot come to be nor cease to be, it

must not be a thing.

In 203bl5-24, Aristotle offers the following as sup-

porting the existence of the infinite.
Belief in the infinite is derived from five sourc(1) from the infinity of time, (2) from the
divisibility of magnitudes, (3) from the fact that
the perpetuity of generation and destruction can
es:

)
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be maintained only if there
is an infinite source
to draw upon, (4) from the
fact that the limited
is always Umited by something
else; but aboie
he ^finity of number, of
^
magnitudes, and of
d the heaVens is inferred frim
(5)
t£e fact°tw
rn
hat there
is no limit to our power of
P
thinking of them; (203bl5)
.

.

.

Aristotle

'

s

statements of these beliefs seem somewhat

question-begging or circular, but they all
hint at something
which can be continued again and again
(presumably without
end).
He clearly favors the perspective on
infinity which
treats infinite as an attribute of a process
which cannot be
gone through. He would certainly agree that
the
infinite is

not a thing which can come to be and cease to
be; infinite
is that attribute which identifies a process
as having no

end.

Aristotle explicitly gives four senses of 'infinite

7
,

three of which include the notion of a process which
cannot
be completed.
We must first distinguish the senses of 'infinite'; (1) That whose nature forbids its being
traversed, (2) that which admits of incomplete or
(3) difficult traversal, or (4) which, though of
such a nature as to be traversable, yet does not
admit of it. Again what is infinite is so in respect of addition, of division, or of both.
204a2
(

Even though Aristotle's language treats "infinite" as
an object, these three senses clearly emphasize the intermi-

nable nature of processes that are said to be infinite.

That such a process is said to be infinite makes it

a
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"thing" which 'the infinite' is
predicated of.
his continuing discussion, Aristotle becomes
more explicit in this
regard by stating:

m

F°r infinity is an attribute of
number and magnitude, and an attribute of an
attribute is even
less capable of independent existence
than an
attribute.
(204al5)
Of course, attributes are predicated
of other things.

(in-

finite is an attribute predicated of
divisibility and divisibility is an attribute predicated of magnitude.)
Once the
infinite is predicated of processes, and limited
to the

process of addition and division at that, the
subjects of
the processes come under examination.

Aristotle claims that a thing is infinite only by addition or by division.

This is more precisely stated by say-

ing that a thing is infinite only by the process of addition

or division.

Extracting the essence of this in regard to

the infinite yields "the process is infinite".
is then predicated of a subject.

"Infinite"

The only subjects he deems

appropriate are magnitude, number, time, and motion.

In

regard to addition, Aristotle concludes, "Clearly then there
is no actually existent infinite body"

with which modern science agrees,

divisibility to extension.

(206a7), a conclusion

He goes on to apply
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Spatial extension is not infinite in
but is so (a) by division (the belief actuality
in indivisible lines is easily refuted); (206al7)
So,

the infinite is not actually predicated
of magnitude per
se.
it is the divisibility of magnitude
the process of

—

dividing

—

that infinite is actually predicated of.

Atomism

Aristotle's discussion of infinite divisibility in The
£fry sics is intended mostly to elucidate "the infinite" rather than to address the topic of infinite divisibility
it-

self.

The parenthetical insert at 206al7 is not justified.

It appears to be question-begging.

were right.

Suppose the atomists

First consider the simple case of dividing a

line by the process of bisection.

If each line were always

divisible exactly in half, it would have had to have had an
even number of points.

Not only would the number of points

have to be even, it would have to be an exact power of two

—

2,

4,

8,

16,

32,

•

•••.

The consequence would be for

lines of four and eight points to exist but not for lines of
six points.

Bisecting a line of length six yields two lines

of length three

—

a length not capable of being bisected.

This is clearly absurd (except, perhaps, to the Pythagoreans).

14

The alternative would be for a line to have had an

unending supply of points.

But having an unending supply of

points is just having an unending supply of places where it
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IS divisible.

Therefore, to presume that

a

line is divis-

ible exactly in half is to presume
that it is infinitely
divisible. Rather than refuting atomism,
this begs the
question by assuming infinite divisibility.

Let s examine a bit further the consequences
of the
atomists' position. Under their presumption,
lines will be
composed of a finite number of (indivisible and
extended)
points.

To presume that a line may be divisible into
two

(not necessarily equal) parts is to presume
that the line is

at least as long as the magnitude of two (adjacent)
points.

Since a line must consist of at least two points by
definition, a line is always divisible into two parts.

But the

two parts may be single (extended and indivisible) points
and hence not proper lines.

generate or improper "line".

We can call such a part a de-

These improper lines are not

themselves divisible; hence there is a limit to divisibility
(under the presumed atomic structure).

Consequently, that

there are no indivisible lines, per se, does not necessitate
that lines are infinitely divisible.

The atomists' position

is not as fragile as Aristotle would have us believe; he

believes lines are continuous, and his belief has infected
his reasoning.
itous.

His parenthetical remark at 206al7 is gratu-

It reminds one of the remark Fermat scribbled in the

margin of a book

—

the remark about the existence of an al-
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leged "elegant and simple" proof of
his famous last theorem
(which was proven in 1993, but the
proof was not trivial).
Infi nite Divisibi 1 ty and Matter
i

In Th e Physics

,

Book III, Chapter

7,

Aristotle asserts

reciprocal relationship between number and
magnitude.
Number is potentially infinite by addition just
as magnitude
is potentially infinite by division.
Number has a minimum
unit while magnitude has an (unspecified) maximum.
a

He con-

cludes

:

(1)
(2)

Magnitude is infinitely divisible.
Number is infinitely addable.

Peano's successor axiom makes
number.

(2)

explicit with regard to

"Every number has a successor" captures the notion

that number has the nature of being, as Aristotle would say,

"infinite by addition"; addition is
Consequently,

But,

I

a

never-ending process.

cannot argue with (2).

it seems to me,

(1)

can be questioned.

Hume and

Berkeley both argue against it.
Infinite Divisibility
I

have approached Aristotle's treatment of "infinite

divisibility" by looking first at the logically prior treatments of (divisible) "quantity" in The Categories and "the

)
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infinite" in T he Physics

.

Aristotle deals specifically with

"infinite divisibility" in On Generation
and corrup t
In
chapter two of that work he attempts to
clarify what 'infinite divisibility' means.
He needs to clarify the meaning of
infinite divisibility', because, as he sees
it, several
important notions (coming to be, alteration,
growth, and

undergoing the contrary of these) all depend upon
how infinite divisibility is characterized.
Basic to all this is the question whether the
things there are come to be and alter and grow and
undergo the contrary of these things because the
primary existences are things which have size, and
are indivisible, or whether nothing which has size
is indivisible; this makes a great deal of difference.
315b24
(

On a first reading of this chapter, one might think

that Aristotle had two models which were not compatible and

that their incompatibility could be accounted for by Georg

Cantor's account of transfinite numbers.
could have devised

a

That is, Aristotle

coherent characterization of "infinite

divisibility" had he known of the different orders of infinity as characterized by Cantor. 15

Aristotle was getting

apparently contradictory views by tacitly assuming (falsely)
that there is only one kind of infinity.

As a result of Cantor's work, we differentiate among

infinities of different cardinality (size).

The first such
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division is between the size of the
natural numbers and the
real numbers, and lines are usually
modeled

by real numbers.

Some of Aristotle's descriptions
conform to a cardinality
characteristic of the natural numbers and
some to a cardinality characteristic of the real-number
line.

On a more careful analysis of Aristotle's
passages on

infinite divisibility, and in consideration of
the types of
language he uses in describing his analysis, a more
subtle
reading is possible. The need for different infinities
may
be too strong.

A lesser difference may be sufficient to

account for the problem.

The difference here is the dis-

tinction between so-called "discrete" sets and "dense" sets.

In this particular use of 'discrete', the members of

such a set can be placed "next" to each other and be counted.

Two elements can be said to be next to each other,

successive, or adjacent, if there are no other elements

between them.

Aristotle's corresponding definitions can be

found in The Physics
tween' in book
of motion.

5,

.

He defines 'in succession' and 'be-

chapter

3,

in the context of a discussion

For our purposes here, only certain aspects of

these definitions are necessary.
'Between' involves at least three terms;

(226b26)

)

.
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That is 'in succession' which,
being after
has nothing of the same kind
between
it and what
it is in succession to.
226b34
.

.

.

(

The natural numbers, with the
successor function, is the
primary exemplar of such a set and
represents the discrete
model.
in the case of any set of
macroscopic objects which
are stacked or lined up and can be
counted, the "successor"
or next" relation can be shown of
any given one of such
objects (except the last one in a finite
set).

Sets which are "dense" have the property
that between

any two members of the set another can be
found.

numbers provide the most common example.

The real

if you have two

real numbers x and y, then the number (x+y)/2 is
between x

and y

One's first reaction to Aristotle's problem with infinite divisibility might be to consider the difference between the natural numbers with their successor property and
the real numbers with their dense property as providing a

way of explaining Aristotle's difficulty.

These two sets

represent different orders of infinity, so one might be

tempted to think the different orders of infinity are required to extricate Aristotle from his difficulties.

102

In the problem of infinite
divisibility,

it is the

dense property of the real numbers
which suggests a difference sufficient to distinguish
between the two models. it
is not the greater cardinality
of the real numbers which is
significant, merely their denseness.
Another dense
set is

the set of rational numbers.

if you have rational numbers

a/b and c/d, then the number (a/b+c/d)/2,
which is just the
rational number (ad+bc)/2bd, is between a/b
and c/d. Just
as with the real numbers, between any
two rational numbers
is a third.

But rational numbers have the same cardinality

as the natural numbers.

The distinction between the dense

and discrete property may be adequate to explain
the diffi-

culty with infinite divisibility.

One potential source of difficulty is that Aristotle

views magnitude as a continuous quantity.

"The 'continu-

ous'", says Aristotle, "is a species of the contiguous; two

things are continuous when the limits of each become identical and are held together." (227a7)

He had previously pro-

posed a definition for 'contiguous' in 227a6: "That is 'contiguous' which, being in succession, is also in contact."

The rational numbers do not form a continuous set.

In

fact, the set of rational numbers is discontinuous "every-

where" because there are irrational numbers arbitrarily
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close to any rational number.

There are infinitely many

irrational "holes" in the (rational)
number line. Aristotle's definition of 'continuous' might
seem to require a
greater infinity than the countable.
('Countably infinite'

means having the same cardinality as the
natural numbers.)
Even the real-number line seems to fail
to satisfy his definition of 'continuous'. Two things are continuous
if they
are of the same kind, are contiguous, and touch.
Certain
sets of real numbers

—

touching, form a unity.

intervals

—

can touch and, when

But two (distinct) single real

numbers cannot touch any more than two rational numbers can.

If we ignore the irrational "holes" in the number line,

then sets of rational numbers behave just like real numbers
as above.

In other words, relative to the set of rational

numbers, closed interval sets of rational numbers can form

contiguous, touching, consecutive sets of the same kind.
(They "touch" provided their terminus is a rational number

and not an irrational one.

ending with

2

For example, the closed interval

touches the closed interval beginning with

2.

But the open interval terminated by n does not touch the

open interval beginning at

it

since n is irrational.)

So,

some closed interval sets of rational numbers are continuous
qua the rationals.

Half-open intervals would seem to quali-
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but they do not touch, even though
there is nothing be
tween them.
fy,

Potential and Antnai
The potential/actual distinction applied
to divisibility seems to correlate with these two
models.
That which is
potentially divided forms contiguous parts with
a common
boundary wherever it might be actually divided.
The actually infinitely divided would give an exploded
view with adja-

cent parts "next" to one another (but not touching

discrete sets).

—

as in

These views are irreconcilable in that the

potentially divided retains its dense structure, while the
actually divided does not.

Now, we can find a mapping from

the natural numbers to the rational numbers showing that

there is still the "same number" of points.

But the order

required by "next" gets changed around.

In 316al6-25

,

as Aristotle summarizes the Atomists'

argument, he is clearly using a dense model when he argues

that no body or thing possessed of size is left, since, if

anything left had size, it would also be divisible.
body has the same structure as denseness in that
exists between any two distinct points.

a

Such

point

a

105

In 316326 33 he is discussing
the characteristics of

sizeless" points.
them are
only one
only two
all size

Since points have no size,
when two of
placed together they become
coincident; that is,
point remains. Moreover, an object
composed of
points, when divided, still retains
the same over(two points of no size still
adds up to no size).

However, generalizing from combining
any finite number of
points to combining infinitely many
points is not valid.
But this is just what Aristotle does.
He asserts that an
object assembled from ("infinitely") many
sizeless points
cannot have size:
So even if all the points are put together
they
will not produce size.
(316a34)

One suspects that Aristotle doesn't have it
all together in
view of his previous statement:

Similarly, if it is formed out of points it will
have guantity; for when the points were in
contact and there was just one thing possessed of
size and they were together, they did not make the
whole the slightest bit larger; (316a28)

Aristotle is a bit loose here.
contact without being coincident.
seems aware of the errors
and 'together'

—

—

Points cannot be in
In his notes, Williams

he adds quotes to 'in contact'

but he focuses on the issue of continuity

and questions Aristotle's mastery of the argument involving
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the "sawdust model". >•

Joachim notes

a

grammatical shift

Of subject at the same point
(or is it "place "?) 17

It seems clear to me that
Aristotle's mental model in-

volves "exploding" a body of size into
discretely separated
sizeless parts (points) and then sequentially
putting together points two at a time. He is left
with only one point
after each step. This process can continue
for a countably
infinite number of steps and still yield the
same

result: an

object the size of one point

—

"a set of measure zero".

Something is intuitively wrong when the reassembled
parts do not make up the original whole.

The flaw is in

presuming that "exploding" the original yields discrete
consecutive points, that is, gives the same result as

completed infinite division.
slowly

;

a

Mentally explode something

it stretches rather than breaks.

The dense nature

of a continuous object supplies "as many more points as

necessary" to fill in any gaps where it might be [is potentially] divided.

Mathematically, an interval of any size

can be transformed into one of any other size, including

between the finite and the infinite.

I

will return to this

subject later; for now, it is sufficient to comment on the

difference between the discrete "exploded view" and the
dense "assembled view".

,
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This difference corresponds to
the distinction between
counting and measuring, about which
Ackrill, in his comments
on The C ategories says:
,,

Aristotle does not stop to examine carefully
the
nature of counting and measuring nor
does he
survey the different ways in which
guantity or
18
guantities may be spoken of;
.

If

'guantity' represents an abstraction subsuming
both
counted guantities and measured guantities
and these are
somewhat conflated, as Ackrill implicitly suggests,
then

Aristotle's apparent shift between a discrete and

a

dense

model is understandable.
Infinity Times 7Prn

There is a problem with Aristotle's use of 'all' when
he refers to putting "all" the points together.

'All',

this sense, stands for an undistinguished infinity.

in

By

adding all the points together, we have the sum over infinity of a zero-sized body.

Summing the same thing many times

amounts to multiplying by the number of times; for example,

adding

4

times 10.

a total of 10 times is the same as

multiplying

4

The net result is that adding all the points has

the structure of multiplying zero times infinity; that prod-

uct is mathematically indeterminate.
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If we coordinate the division
process with the summing

process, we can overcome this
indeterminate resuit. Suppose
we divide a body into N pieces,
each of size L/N where L

stands for the length or size of the
object.

(Remember,

Aristotle's conception of the infinite
is of a process which
cannot be gone through. Dividing a
magnitude in an attempt
to achieve infinite divisibility by such
a process is dividing it with an ever-increasing number of
divisions and cannot actually be completed.)
Something is infinitely divisible if N is getting larger and larger.
Conversely, L/N is

getting smaller and smaller, until finally (if there
can be
a finally), N reaches infinity and L/N
reaches zero size.
Of course, according to Aristotle, the infinite
cannot be

gone through; the limit cannot be reached by any direct
method.

Since the infinite cannot be gone through, any

attempt to put things back together must be done with the

incompletely divided fragments

—

which are of size L/N.

By coordinating the summing with the division, we per-

form the multiplication of size L/N times the number of

segments N and obtain a product of (L/N).N.

Notice that

this simplifies to L, and it no longer matters how big N is.
So,

if we take the limit as N approaches infinity of

(L/N)*N, we end up with L, the same size we started with.

Aristotle and the atomists neglect the fact that infinity

.
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cannot be gone through when they
presume something to be
infinitely divided. Additionally,
both the atomists and
Aristotle implicitly presume that
infinity times zero is
zero.
Of course there would be nothing
reassembled if this
were true.
But infinity times zero is not

zero; it is inde-

terminate.

The atomists' premiss, that there
would be nothing reassemblable, is not compelling.
The reductio argument
fails

T he Atomi sts 7 Argument Exparuipri

The atomists' argument is flawed in
another way, as is
Aristotle's presentation. Here is a greatly
expanded version of the argument.

Every perceptible body is potentially divisible
at

every point.

It is impossible that a body is actually divisible
at

every point (simultaneously).

(Premiss

2

is proven by

reductio in conjunction with premiss 3.)

3

.

Nothing can come to be out of nothing or cease to be
into nothing.

(319al6-21)

.
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2.1.

It is possible that a
perceptible body is actually
divided at any point.
(Assume the contrary of
2.)

2.2.

If a body is actually divided
at every point, then

there will be nothing left.

(Premiss 2.2 is it-

self proven by reductio.)

2.2.1.

if there were something left,

it could be

further divided at some point,
contradicting
its having actually been divided at
every

point.

2.3.

If nothing is left, then the body will
have van-

ished into something incorporeal

2.4.

If a body vanishes into something incorporeal,

then it ceases to be (something corporeal).

2.5.

If something can cease to be something corporeal,

then it can also come to be something corporeal
(out of points or out of nothing at all).

Therefore, 2.1 leads to the contrary of
is proven by reductio.

3

and absurdity;

2

:

)

Ill

If a body is not actually
(simultaneously) divisible at

every point, then consider
whether it is potentially (nonsimultaneously) divisible at every
point.

4.1.

If a corporeal body is divided,

corporeal bodies.

it is divided into

(a trivial case is division

into a corporeal body and separate
points.

The

corporeal body is not diminished by this
form of
division.

4.2. Division into parts cannot yield
a process which

goes on to infinity because infinity cannot
be
gone through.

Non— simultaneous division is a

process of successive divisions which, by the
nature of the infinite, cannot be completed.

Any

stopping point would yield, by 4.1, undivided
corporeal bodies.

So, a body cannot be divisible everywhere because either
the

process could not be completed and something of size would
be left, or nothing at all would be left.

The Atomists are happy with the first horn but must

further reject the second horn.
follows

That rejection flows as

.
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If the process were to be carried
out to infinity (or

simultaneously

)

,

the parts would all be nothing at
all

or vanishingly small points.

6.

If coming to be and ceasing to be are
to take place by

aggregation and segregation, then aggregation must
be
capable of adding to the size of what comes to

be; con-

versely, segregation must diminish the size of
what

ceases to be.

7.

Aggregation cannot proceed by the accumulation of nothing at all or points (vanishingly small pieces).

Con-

versely, segregation cannot proceed by diminution from

vanishingly small pieces or points.

8.

Coming to be takes place by aggregation; ceasing to be
takes place by segregation.

9.

Aggregation must proceed by the addition of pieces of
some determinate size.

gation

Conversely it is so with segre-

.

Here the atomists' argument actually makes
faith

a

wild leap of
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10.

The process of aggregation itself
proceeds by exactly
the size of the limit of divisibility,
and that is the
minimum size (which just happens to
be so small as to
be invisible).

That aggregation must proceed by the
addition of pieces
of some determinate size begs the
guestion if "determinate"
is taken to mean "minimum".
The argument is that aggregation must occur by the addition of something
of size.
Nothing is actually presented to rule out
continuous accretion.
If there were some non-guestion-begging way
to rule out

continuous accretion, we would have a nice, tight
reductio.
But it leaks.

Aristotle has it that aggregation occurs by "leaps and
bounds", that is by the addition of large clumps of material
at each "step".

These clumps are themselves infinitely

divisible but not divisible at every point.

He rejects the

atomists' solution, retains infinite divisibility, but rejects the notion that objects of size are everywhere divisible.

(The real-number line satisfies this by having a

countably infinite number of rational "division points" and
many irrational "non-division points" but does so by including different orders of infinity.)

Of course, Aristotle be-

lieves that time is infinitely divisible; there is no prob-
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lem with half as big an increase
occurring in half the time,
continuous accretion is the natural
consequence of this
model.
However, aggregation by atoms goes
along equally
well with a limit to divisibility
of both magnitude and
duration.
The nature of time (continuous or
discrete) would
seem to fit in the appropriate model.
Even if duration were
not infinitely divisible, aggregation
could still occur by
the addition of divisible clumps at
each interval.

Aristotle, however, does not proceed along this
line;
he takes another tack.
"Contact
In

3

11

16b6 Aristotle introduces a statement from another

level of analysis.

He states;

And any one contact always involves two things,
since there has to be something else besides the
contact or division point.

Aristotle asserts that any one contact requires two things,
in the sense of distinct things.

This requirement seems to

be based upon a syntactic-level notion for the word 'con-

tact'.

Contact requires two distinct objects touching or

"contacting" at a single point.

Remaining distinct while

still sharing a point (of contact), in truth, requires a

minimum of

3.

points.

Since there is no reason to prefer one
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object over another, each must
provide a point distinct from
the point of contact. Otherwise,
one object would not be
distinct from the point of contact,
which is part of the
other object as well. We would, in
such a case, have one
object with a point of contact and
no other object.
Aristotle's argument is a little weak here,
since he asserts
only the need for 2 points instead of
3.

His mistake is understandable in the light
of the tension between incompatible models: discrete
quantities do not
have a point of contact; continuous quantities
"join" at a

point (of contact).

Since two distinct discrete quantities

do not share a point of contact, no third "point
of contact"
is required.

This kind of characterization of contact has as a prime

paradigm such things as stacks of coins or columns of
bricks.

Macroscopic objects all have at least two distinct

points (and all points between) so can remain distinct apart
from a shared "point of contact".
a set of

objects is discrete.

Further, the type of such

One can use the point of

contact along with the other two distinct points (one for
each of the two objects) to evoke the adjacent, or next,

relationship.

Starting with the point not of contact in

object "A" (and we are guaranteed that at least one such

:

.
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point exists), move first to the
point of contact and then
to the point not of contact in
object "B» (and we are guaranteed that at least one of these
points exists
also).

By

this method we move from one object
to "the next" (a notion
Aristotle uses).
In doing this, we have ignored any
points
of objects "A" & "B" except for one
point not of contact
from each object and the point of contact.

Anywhere is not Everywhere
For parts to form a continuous whole, there
must be a

point of contact between one part and "the next".

if some-

thing were divisible everywhere, the parts would be
mere
points

—

which, according to Aristotle, cannot be recom-

bined into anything of size.

Aristotle must find a way to

disallow divisibility everywhere while still permitting
infinite divisibility.

Lear, in "Aristotelian Infinity",

notes

Aristotle offers a paradigmatically Aristotelian solution. He distinguishes two senses in
which a line may be said to be divisible 'through
and through' (317a3ff). A length is divisible
through and through in the sense that it could be
divided anywhere along its length. But it is not
divisible through and through in the sense that it
could (even potentially) be divided everywhere
along the length. One can thus actualize any
point but one cannot actualize every point; for
any process of division, there must be divisions
which could have been made which in fact were not
made 19

,

,

117

Lear, who is more interested in
infinity than infinite

divisibility, takes the potential/actual
distinction at face
value and does not elaborate further.

In 317a3 Aristotle states:

inoe
there
point
which

no point is contiguous to another point
is one sense in which divisibility at
every
belongs to things of size and another in
it does not.

The distinction between these senses will
be clear when we
examine his argument in the next few lines.
It follows from
an apparent distinction between his usages of
"anywhere" and

"everywhere".

He goes on to state:

When this is asserted, it is thought that there is
a point both anywhere and everywhere, so that the
magnitude has necessarily to be divided up into
nothing;
(317a5)
.

.

.

Here Aristotle begins to hint at his argument by implying a

distinction between (divisibility) "anywhere" (hopeoun) and
"everywhere" (pante) and by using the conjunction "both
.

.

and" (kai

.

.

.

.

kai) to join them.

The rest of the

sentence
for because there is a point everywhere, it is
formed either out of contacts or out of points
317a6
(

)

118

introduces his distinction between places
where the line is
divisible (contacts) and places where it is
not (points).

Aristotle continues with his analysis and
refutation of
the atomists' argument.
He is quite terse in his dealings
with it, and the brevity of his rebuttal leaves much
to be

desired.

Williams comments:

The above paraphrase of 317a2-12 is the nearest I can come to making sense of this baffling
passage. A large part of it, 317a8-12, is so
resistant to my attempts to understand it that I
have contented myself with a literal translation
which I have placed between obeli to indicate that
no claim is made to have found a sure way of making sense of the Greek.
Other commentators and
translators seem to have fared no better, and I
can hope to surpass them only in frankness. 20

Better sense,

I

think, can be made of Aristotle's discussion

by fleshing out certain contextual presumptions.

When this is asserted, it is thought that there is
a point [where something with magnitude is] both
[divisible] anywhere and [divisible] everywhere,
.

.

.

.

(317a5)

Aristotle is leading to the conclusion that something
with magnitude is divisible anywhere but is not divisible
everywhere, and since it is not divisible everywhere the
atomists' argument is defeated.

This distinction can be

interpreted as corresponding to the distinction between
being potentially divided and being actually divided.

Aris-

)

.
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totle seems actually to agree
with the atomists, though
he
potentially does not. Although he
agrees that there is a
sense in which something with
magnitude is not everywhere
divisible, he denies that it follows
from this that magnitude is not infinitely divisible.

Aristotle seems to connect 'anywhere'
with "potentially
divisible" in the following passage:
In one sense there is a point everywhere,
because
there is one anywhere and all are like each

one;

.

.

.

(317a8)

Here, the distinction between 'anywhere' and
'everywhere' is
used in an entailment manner: "If there is a point
'any-

where' then there is a point 'everywhere'", with the
reason

given that "all are like each one".

By this Aristotle means

that there is no reason to suppose that one point is any

different from any other.

Potentially, there is a point

anywhere

He goes on with his crucial "point" that "but there is
no more than one."

By this he means that there is no more

than one point anywhere (at each position).

His argument to

support this immediately follows: "since they are not consecutive,

.

.

.".

(

317a9

)
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One might expect 'contiguous' in
place of 'consecutive'
above.
'Contiguous' would seem to fit more
easily in the
reading that follows. His use of
'consecutive' at this

point seems more in keeping with the
undivided, or potentially divided, state under consideration.
The undivided
line is continuous, so any parts are
contiguous to each
other; in this state, the parts are not
discretely separated
by actual division.
Consequently, there
is no "next" part

adjacent to any chosen one.

consecutive

So,

two points (parts) are not

(But they are not contiguous either

.

—

the

"parts" of something continuous are normally contiguous,
but
points are an exception.) Aristotle concludes:
so it is not the case that there is a point everywhere.
317a9
(

Point and "Place"
Sense can be made of the argument at this point if we

interpret Aristotle to be thinking of both point and place
but ambiguously using the term 'point' for both.

We need to

recall that, for Aristotle, a point must be actualized in
some way

.

He would say that the place of a potential point

does not hold an actual point.

We can distinguish between

place where there is an actualized point and

a

there is no (actualized) point (there would be

point in such a place).

place where
a

potential

By the symmetry of arbitrariness,

a

)
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any place could have a point.

Once such

a

then the contiguous places have no
points.
works, here is an expanded interpretation
(

place is chosen,
To show how this
of the argument at

317a9
If there were points everywhere,
then there would
be contiguous points at every point.
Contiguous
points must touch.
Since points take up no space
at all, touching points would be in
the same
place.
This would necessitate there being two
contiguous points at every place. But there
can't
be two points at the same place.
Conseguently
points cannot be contiguous.
Since points
be contiguous, the "place" of the potential cannot
contiguous point must be empty. So, there is a sense
which there is not a point everywhere.

m

This argument entails a presumption that "place"
is

both contiguous and consecutive.

Every place has both

contiguous place and a consecutive place.

So,

a

since points

can t be contiguous, there must be places where points
aren't, namely the contiguous places.

This is the sense in which there isn't a point everywhere, while the sense in which there is a point anywhere is
its potentially having been chosen as the starting "point".
I

think this establishes that Aristotle differs in his in-

terpretation of (divisible) 'anywhere' and 'everywhere'.

He

has concluded that even though there is a point "anywhere"

there is not a point "everywhere".

There is a loose associ-

ation between the term 'anywhere' and the potentially chosen

.
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starting point and the term
'everywhere' and the contiguous
Places which might hold points
loose, but

-

not consistent.

There is a kind of logic in his
argument which is illustrated by the following example.
Suppose we want to talk
about "the Universe" and intend by
that term to include all
things, including all space and all
time.
Then, suppose
someone wants to use the term 'edge',
or 'boundary',
in

talking about the universe as we have
defined it.

By

'edge', or 'boundary', we usually mean
a distinction or

division between two things, one of which
belongs to one
side and the other of which belongs to the other

side of the

distinction

"Edge of the universe" presupposes that there is some-

thing which is in the universe and, on the other side of
the
edge, something which is not in the universe.

But we de-

fined 'universe' as including all things, so we can conclude

that there is no edge to the universe.

That is, we cannot

consistently use the term 'edge', or 'boundary', with its
usual meaning, if we hold the meaning of 'universe', as we

have defined it, to include all things.

It requires careful

analysis to notice that simply using the term 'edge', or
'boundary', with 'universe' introduces a contradiction and

yields a (verbal) structure which is no longer consistent.

.

123

Aristotle seems to be displaying

a

similar type of

argument, but one which is more subtle,
in creating a distinction between the intended usages of
the terms 'everywhere' and 'anywhere'.
He allows for two senses of 'everywhere', in one of which there is a
point (and hence divisibility there) and in the other of which
there is not a point
(and hence no divisibility there).
The argument is confused
because he does not create a separate term
for each usage
and, moreover, does not seem to be consistent
in his usages
of 'everywhere' and 'anywhere' in regard to
the distin-

guished senses.

In the sentence that follows, Aristotle is referring
to

the "place" which is contiguous to any point:
For
is divisible at the middle it will also
be divisible at a contiguous point.
(317al0)

This appears to introduce a terse reductio supporting his

previous sentence.

1.

Suppose we have two points (anywhere) at which magnitude is divisible.

(He seems to be presuming that he

is considering two "consecutive" divisible points.)

2.

Suppose it is divisible at the middle (between these
two points

)

)
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2.1 Then it would also be divisible +a
at a contiguous point.
.

.

(Either could have been actualized.)

2.2 But it cannot be divisible
at both the middle and
a
contiguous point because there is no
contiguous point.

"For position is not contiguous to
position or
point to point." (3l7al2)

(Actualizing one precludes actualizing the
other, but by
symmetry either both must be actualizable
or neither

can be

And we have shown that one cannot be, so
neither can be
actualized.

3.

Therefore, by reductio, it could not have been divisible at the middle.

The presumption that any place has both a contiguous

place and a consecutive place allows one to conclude that

there is a "point" contiguous to the middle point.

But

points cannot be contiguous (without being coincident).

This presumption allows us to confuse the notions of

discrete sets and dense sets, notions which are otherwise
incompatible.

With our visual model of the real line we

125

think of a continuous set as
something in which no amount
of
"stretching" will create breaks
or "holes".
Of course, with
the rational numbers, which
could be thought of as having
a

"granular" quality, stretching does
not separate the grains
any more than before stretching.
There are always more
points between any two points, no
matter how close they were
to start with.

The presumption that any place has
both a consecutive
place and a contiguous place cannot be
modeled, because it
is inconsistent in the context of
Aristotle's definitions of

'contiguous' and 'consecutive'.

As such, it represents a

syntactic-level" constraint or connection between
the two
incompatible models.

Aristotle abandons his visual model in favor of this
syntactic-level argument when he nonchalantly states "since
they are not consecutive".

(317a9) He thereby justifies his

statement that there is no more than one point anywhere.
What he seems to be doing is shifting levels of argument
from semantic considerations of the visual model of the real
line to more purely syntactic-level constraints.

In the

semantic-level analysis, which is driven by the visual model,

statements are judged by their agreement with the model
in this case the visual image of the real line.

By ap-
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pealing to the assertion that the
points are not contiguous
(presumably after division), he allows
a shift to the discrete model which provides the
appearance of solving the
problem.
By not consistently sticking to
semantic-level
considerations, or conversely to syntactic-level
con-

straints, he permits a kind of inconsistency
to invade his
argument.
This inconsistency results directly
from the
notion that any place has both a contiguous
place and a consecutive place.

Aristotle notes that, once an object is divided
(into
points), no point has a contiguous neighbor;
allowing
that

leads to a contradiction of the hypothesis that
the object

was divided at every point.

He denies that points are con

tiguous but implicitly assumes that there is a next point,

distinct from the "one anywhere", and that the intervening
distance is not divisible.

He concludes that there are no

points in this interval.

His argument here is based upon a view of the divided

object represented by an exploded set of separated points,

presumably in an array similar to what we see when we look
at a newsprint photo with a magnifying glass.

This kind of

view represents a discrete set of points, while the set of
points in an undivided region of space (line segment, or

.
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disk in the plane) is

a

dense set.

Aristotle has unwitting

ly converted from dense to
discrete in the middle of his

argument

The remainder of his sentence, "and
this is division or
composition " (317al2) simply states that he
has dealt with
the problem of infinite divisibility and,
its converse,
.

composition.

In

3

17al5-18

,

Aristotle confirms this interpretation

when he states:
nor in such a way that division can occur everywhere (for this is what would happen if point were
contiguous to point)

....

In 317al8, he states:

but into smaller and yet smaller parts, and aggregation out of smaller cinto greater>.
Here, he recalls his purpose in examining infinite divisi-

bility, namely to shape the concepts of aggregation and

segregation, which will relate to alteration and growth.

Aristotle does not carry the smaller and smaller to its
logical limit because he has just argued that there is

a

sense in which divisibility at every point is not applicable
to objects of size.

The process of dividing something into
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smaller and smaller parts seems
a simple concept to grasp
and, aside from practical
considerations, easy enough to
carry out, but Aristotle has asserted
that there
are some

places at which the division cannot
occur

where there isn't a point.

—

those places

He does not relate the sense
in

which "there is not a point everywhere"

(

317 a 9

)

to the pro-

cess of consecutive division.

would like to have the consequence that there
is not
a point everywhere directly related
to the process, so
I

I

could have some model or definition of how the
process miss
es these points.
The consequence itself doesn't seem

like-

ly.

It could be arqued that any process which
yields any

potential division point, finite or otherwise, will always
select the point which is "anywhere"
the "not-everywhere" ones.

,

makinq other points

In other words,

it doesn't mat-

ter which points you choose; you can't choose any of the

ones at which the thinq is not divisible.

points are forever inaccessible.

Non-divisible

Aristotle would say that

that's because there aren't any "points" at these places.

Aristotle does not connect the two distinct adjacency
criteria in the notion of "place", as instantiated in the
two incompatible models (discrete and continuous), and con-

sequently fails to notice the resultinq contradiction.
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Since his purpose was not to
clarify infinite divisibility
itself but only to clarify it in
relation to its
use in

accounting for coming to be,
alteration, growth, and undergoing the contrary of these, he
stopped short of unearthing
the contradiction.

Many discussions have attempted to
reconcile the apparent contradiction by use of the
potential/actual distinction.
There is a point everywhere in the sense
that a mag-

nitude is potentially divided at the point.

On the other

hand, the uncompletable nature of (the process
of) infinity
is such that any magnitude subject to
successive division is

never fully divided.

So, there are places at which there is

no point (where it is actually divided).

This might seem to

be a promising way to remove the contradiction; yet
David

Bostock has extended Zeno's arguments to show that the po-

tential/actual distinction does not, in fact, work. 21

Ar-

istotle uses the distinction to dispute Zeno's argument

—

he argues that Achilles does not actualize an infinity of

points on his way to the tortoise.

(263a23)

Now, one way

for a point to be actualized is for something to stop at it

(262a21), and, in order for something to reverse direction,
it must stop at, and thus actualize, the point of reversal.

Bostock extends Zeno's argument to a bouncing ball in
that actualizes an infinity of points.

a

way

® 1
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But

was able to deny the factual
“ 18t[Aristotle]
? n S e of these points only by denyinq that
h
^

they had been actualized,
for
5
supposed to have done anything Achillea „L
at or to the
.
as he passed them.
However "hif reply is
not available to the revised
version of 7 onn' c ^
problem that I have just put
forward, for the
ball s motion is certainly
divided into infin-H-^i
Y
®
man Y P°ints which
mark the^c^of*
h bounce, and these must
be admitted to „
7
have been actualized in the surely
course
of bouncmg
I conclude, then, that
Aristotle
1
right S ° lution to
Zeno ' s°problem
1

^^

.

Aristotle himself asserts that points
are not contiguous.
Any object made up of points cannot
be divisible at
"non-points" "between" non-contiguous
points.
Unfortunately, between any two points there
is another, to any desired
degree of precision, using our usual order
relation.
So,

between any non-contiguous points there are
other points at
which the object is potentially divided. We
now know that
the axiom of choice is equivalent to the axiom
"Every set

can be well ordered." 23

(A set is well ordered if every

subset has a least element.)

This axiom makes no statement

about the cardinality of a set or the order under which
it

exhibits denseness.

When it comes to the real number line,

we don't know what the well-order relation is, but when so

ordered, the points, separated by that order relation, would
be consecutive without intervening points; but this would

not be by the usual order relation,

uous objects are dense).

'<'

(under which contin-
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Summa ry of Aristotle's views
A tension pervades Aristotle's
thoughts on the infinite
in general and infinite divisibility
in particular,
one
form of this tension is a conflict
between the dense structure of the potentially divided or
undivided model on the
one hand and the discrete structure of
the actually divided
or exploded model on the other hand.
The basic incompati-

bility of these two views is not discovered by
Aristotle.
He appears to shift back and forth between
the two models

using predominately syntactic-level arguments.

This shift

may be facilitated by his holding a view of "place"
which is
inconsistent with his view of "points". There are both

contiguous and consecutive places, while there can't be both
contiguous and consecutive points.

Since there is no logi-

cal way to tell places from points aside from the definition

that points go into place, the view is inconsistent at
worst, ambivalent at best.

Aristotle, and his predecessors, also had an (understandably) immature understanding of infinity; he believed
that, essentially, zero times infinity is zero

now know the product to be indeterminate.

—

whereas we

Further, neither

Aristotle nor his predecessors were aware that infinity
could be differentiated into different "sizes"

—

a

distinc-
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tion which could go a long way
toward resolving difficulties
with infinite divisibility.

In chapter VI

I

show that a careful analysis of
the

positions of atomism (page 167) and
infinite divisibility
(page 158) reveals that both points of
view are internally
self-consistent. Both perspectives coexist
in a manner comparable to the wave/particle duality of
modern
physics.

Many of Aristotle's insights are still
current, but he neither proved that magnitude is infinitely
divisible nor did
he refute the atomists.

.
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CHAPTER V

ATOMISM AND DIVISIONISM AFTER
ARISTOTLE
Epicurus ('141-270 bn)

Epicurus's argument regarding atomism
and divislonism
is similar to Aristotle's, except
that Epicurus arrives at
the opposite conclusion.
Furley distinguishes among three
kinds of indivisibility. They are
physical (atom), theoretical, and perceptual.
It is Furley's contention that
Epi-

ourus s Letter to Herodotus begs the
question regarding the
'

atom.

I claim that the passage to be
discussed offers no
argument at all for the existence of a physical
minimum, but assumes it. 1

But Furley then summarizes Epicurus's premisses
and includes
a quotation of Epicurus's reasoning.

Nothing comes into being out of nothing or passes
away into nothing, and the universe is a closed
system
it has no relations with anything outside it.
The irreducible contents of the universe
are bodies and space; everything else can be reduced to these. The bodies in question are "physically indivisible and unchangeable, if all things
are not to be destroyed into non-being but are to
remain durable in the dissolution of compounds
solid by nature, unable to be dissolved anywhere
or anyhow.
It follows that the first principles
must be physically indivisible bodies". 2

—

—
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According to Fur ley, the argument
goes as follows:
Real things cannot be destroyed
into 'non-bpin^.
but mness there were a limit
to physical
X
W at
Uld happen; there therefore
must be a lii?lt
h°
limit to
physical
divisibility. 3

Sii

L

The argument expands not uniike
Aristotle's presentation,
but is much simpler because the
distinction between place
and point is not involved.
1.

No real thing can pass-away into
non-being (by division or otherwise).

2.

If something is infinitely divisible
then it can be

divided into non-being.
3.

If something can not be divided into
non-being then

it can not be infinitely divisible.

ive of
4.

2

.

(Contraposit-

)

No real thing can be infinitely divisible,
1.

&

3.

(by

using quantitative logic)

An examination of premiss

2

suggests a flaw.

When

something extended is divided, the parts are extended.

When

these extended parts are divided, their parts are extended.
There is no limit to this process.

Since having no limit to

the process is what we mean by "infinitely divisible", we

always have extended parts.

As the number of times an ex-

tension is bisected increases, the limit of the size of the

remaining extension is indeed zero.

But at every stage in
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the process what is yet to be
bisected has non-zero extension.
At no stage will dividing a
non-zero extension yield
zero extension.

There is a special case: removing
the end-point of a
closed interval removes a -piece"
with zero extension, but
the remaining part still has the
same extension as the original.
But this operation can only be
performed twice
once for each end of the line segment.
Cantor examined continuing the process by removing individual
points in a line.

—

This extended process can continue for
countably many removals and still not diminish the extension of
the original
segment.

(Such a set of points as was removed is known
as a

set of measure zero.)

If it be argued that the removed single points
somehow

pass away into non-being, the extension of the remaining

parts is not diminished at all.

Hence even allowing points

to pass away into non-being does not cause the object under

consideration to pass away into non-being.

In the former case, dividing an extended object into

extended objects does not cause the object to pass away into

non-being even if the division process is continued to infinity.

A trivial proof by mathematical induction on the

-
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N

bisection shows that for all

N,

the parts are extended.

consequently, it is an error to
conclude that that which is
infinitely divisible is divisible
into non-being.
We may

conclude that Premiss

2

is false.

Now let us consider the case of a
minimum theoretical
quantity (idea or conception), as Furley
translates EpicurUS'

"Letter to Herodotus".
(A) Moreover one must not suppose that
in the
ited body there are infinitely numerous parts limeven parts of any size you like. 5

(Bl) Therefore we must not only do away with
division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity,
so that we may not make everything weak and in
our
conceptions of the totals be compelled to grind
away things that exist and let them go to waste
into the non-existent, 6

but also we must not suppose that in finite
B2
bodies you continue to infinity in passing on from
one part to another, even if the parts get smaller
and smaller. 7
(

)

Furley interprets Epicurus's argument as meaning that the

alternative to theoretical atomism is essentially infinite
regress of thought, which is unacceptable.
We must reject infinite divisibility, [Epicurus]
says, for otherwise we should make everything weak
that is to say, when we tried to get a firm
mental grasp ... on the atoms, we should find
them crumbling away into nothingness. Every time
we thought we had arrived at the irreducible minima, we should have to admit that even these minima
are divisible.
And so our search for the reality
of the atoms would be endlessly frustrated. 8

—
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The weakness is motivation for
rejecting infinite divisibility. The impossibility of
completing an infinite se
quence of contemplation of parts is
grounds for rejecting
infinite divisibility. Here's how I
see the argument expanded.

a:

We clearly comprehend a whole finite
object.

b:

To comprehend a whole object, we must
compre-

hend its parts.
c

*

-*-

ts parts are infinite in number, then
we

cannot complete

a

sequential process of com-

prehending each part.
d:

Therefore, we cannot comprehend its parts.

e:

Therefore, we cannot comprehend the whole object

.

According to Furley, both arguments are theoretical:
One deals with what would be left after an infinite number
of divisions; the other deals with how such a thing might be

comprehended.

He suggests these correspond directly to two

of Zeno's arguments.

(Cl) For when someone once says that there are
infinite parts in something, however small they
may be, it is impossible to see how this can still
be finite in size; for obviously the infinite
parts must be of some size, and whatever size they
may happen to be, the size <of the body> would be
infinite 9
.
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It is not obvious that the
"some size" that the infi-

nite parts must have does not
have zero as a limit. For
the
argument to hold, "some size" must
have a limit greater than
zero.
The process of bisection reduces
the size by half and
has a limit of zero. Although
every bisection starts with
something of "some size" it yields
parts which still have
"some size".
And each bisection yields parts which
have
"some size", there is no non-zero limiting
size.
This argument is infected by question begging in
assuming that there
is a positive limit to "some size"
(atomism).

Epicurus suggests that a theoretical or "cognitive"

minimum can be conceived of as "next" to something
similar,
and that this sequential, one at a time, cognition
trans-

verses the finite body.
(C2) And if the finite body has an extremity which
is distinguishable, even though it cannot be
thought of in isolation, it must be that one
thinks of the similar part next to this and that
thus as one proceeds onward step by step it is
possible, according to this opponent, to arrive at
infinity in thought. 10

But by using the term 'next' he introduces the atomic per-

spective.

Furley notices a difficulty but fails explicitly

to note the question begging nature of the assumption im-

plicit in the notion of "next".

.

141

^

We are considering someone's
suqqestion thsi[nUmber ° f]
boly^tartt"^
Starting from one
Y
7°f ;a “ ln te part of it/ edge of the body we imaa'the extremity'^ inconceivabie V
in isolation from the body.
if we think
t
is extremit
we
aniy think of another distinct part »ust necessarilv
similar to
the extremity itself.
But according to oir Laqinary opponent, there are in our
finite
infinite number of such parts. So if body an
we ?
proceed
in thought from one such part to
another, it must
be possible, when we traverse the
whole object to
reach mfmity in our thinking, which
is ab11
surd.
.

°“

^

It will be seen that this argument
needs support.
It is not yet clear why the extremity
is a
part, nor why we can only think of the part minute
next
to the extremity as being similar to it.
This
support is provided in the next sentence, by
an

analogy with the visual minimum. 12

According to Furley, Epicurean theory often depends
upon analogy with the perceptible for explaining
the imperceptible. 13

The existence of a perceptual minimum is taken

to support the existence of imperceptible minimum.
(Dl) We must observe that the minimum in sensation, too, is neither quite the same as that which
allows progression from one part to another, nor
wholly unlike it; it has a certain similarity to
things which allow progression, but it has no
distinction of parts. 14

D2 When because of the closeness of the resemblance we think we can make distinctions in it
one part to this side, one to that
what confronts us must be equal. 15
(

)

—

—

(D3) And we study these parts in succession, beginninq from the first, and not all within the
same area nor as touching each other part to part,
but, in their own proper nature, measuring out the
sizes, more of them for a larger one, fewer for a
smaller 16

!
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This analogy, we must believe,
is followed bv
V
10 a * om; for in its
smallness?
clearly it J?,?
differs from that which is perceptible, but it follows the same
analogy.
For we have
already stated that the atom has
magnitude in
virtue of its analogy with the things
of this
USt projectin 9 something small on
a large
scale 17
(E)

"*

(F) Further, we must take these
minimum partless
limits as providing for larger and smaller
things
the standard of measurement of their
lengths being themseives the primary units, for
our use in
studying by means of thought these invisible
bod1
the similari ty between them and change2?’
able things is sufficient to establish so
much; 18

In the light of modern knowledge of vision
systems,

there is an element of question begging in the use
of the

perceptual analogy.

The difficulty comes from the structure

of the visual receptors in our eyes.

The retina of each eye

is comprised of an array of thousands of receptor
cells,

each with a finite size.

The fact that there are two kinds

of such cells is of no consequence.

We know that these

cells respond by triggering the discharge of an optical
neuron.

Aside from the fact that these cells are either

discharging or are quiescent is the matter of their physical
layout on the retina.

Incoming light signals that activate

a single receptor cell produce a minimum perceptual experi-

ence.

It does not matter whether we choose to view light as

corpuscular in nature or as a wave.

It is simply not pos-

sible to have a visual or perceptual experience with less
than one whole cell of the retina activated.

And since
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there are a finite number of
discrete cells, this amounts
to
built in atomism of the perceptuai
apparatus.

The geometry of the eye requires
that light from an
object stimulating a single receptor
cell be within a minimum angle. The most dense
concentration of cells occurs
within the fovea.
(Light from an object strikes the
fovea
when we look directly at the object).
But when only one
cell is activated, it is not possible
to determine if the
object has a relative size smaller than
the minimum angle
subtended by the cell. Figure 2 shows a
diagram
of the

angle that can subtend one retina cell.

Notice that the

light from objects smaller than this angle
can activate the
cell, but because the cell response is simply
on or off,

there is no information in the perceptual system
about how
big the image of the object may have been on the
cell it-

self.

The perceptual response is simply that it sees the

smallest possible activation.

(Anything less would be no

cells activated at all.)

The visual system has an atomic structure.
in bias is to respond in atomic terms.

Its built

Consequently, using

an analogy to argue from the perceptual to the actual brings

the atomic structure of the visual system and imposes it via
the analogy onto the actual.

This is a subtle form of ques-

.
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Figure 2. Visual apparatus involved in the minimum perceptual experience.
tion begging.

"There are atoms because

I

see atoms."

But

I

see atoms because my vision system has an atomic structure,

and it shapes it's incoming information into its own atomic

structure
Chrvsippus (280-207 bcl

Although Zeno of Citum (334-262 be) founded the Stoic
school, its view is largely known through Chrysippus.
stoics, we are told, rejected atomism.

The

The rejection ap-

pears to have centered around problems with infinity.

Today

it is well known that both the natural numbers and the even
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numbers are infinite; the even numbers
are a part of the
natural numbers. There is no difference
[in number] between
them.
it would be inappropriate to
interpret 'no difference' in terms of subtraction
infinity minus infinity is
indeterminate.
But it appears that Chrysippus may
have been
onto one of the paradoxes of infinity.

—

Chrysippus, we are told, held "bodies" to be
divisible, not in the sense that a body could infinitely
be divided into an infinite number of parts, but in
the sense
that there was no limit to division.
It followed from
this, as he observed, that there was no sense in
saying
that the whole of any extended magnitude contained
more
parts than any one of its parts.
"Man does not consist
of more parts than his finger, nor the cosmos of
more
parts than a man; for division of bodies continues to
infinity, and of infinities none is greater or smaller
than others." This Stoic doctrine is a more precise and
deliberate formulation of a principle first announced
by Anaxagoras; "Of the small there is no smallest, but
always a smaller, since what exists cannot cease to exist; also there is always a larger than the large
"
It is worth noting, too, that Chrysippus appears to have avoided saying that two infinities are
equal; he said that no infinity is greater or smaller
than another 19
.

.

.

.

.

In the light of this view, questions would arise con-

cerning what the terms 'more', 'less', and 'same' mean in
the context of the infinite.

that 'same'

Obviously, lack of recognition

[size] in the context of infinity could mean

different things, allows equivocation to creep into arguments about it.

But Chrysippus 's care in this matter seems

not to have been followed by Lucretius.
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Luc retius (99/94-55/51

hr.)

Lucretius seems to be aware of what could
both be described as a characteristic of and as a problem
with infinity.

One modern way to show that a set is infinite
is to

show that it can be placed in one-to-one correspondence
with
a proper subset of itself.
For every integer there
is a

corresponding even integer.

Multiply the integer by

get the even integer; divide the even integer by
the integer.

2

2

to

to get

It is this very thing that causes Lucretius to

reject infinite divisibility.
The argument for the existence of minimae
partes is worth a little attention, since it seems
to be something not found in the Letter to Herodotus.
The argument is simply this: if everything
is infinitely divisible, then the smallest bodies
as well as the largest will be composed of an
infinite number of parts, and there will be no
difference between them.
This has been said to be directed against the
Stoics. 20

There seems to be something disquieting about

with a proper subset "as big as" itself.

a set

It seems absurd

that the very largest of things is the same in number of
parts as the very smallest of things.
this absurdity in favor of atomism.

Lucretius rejects
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A rnauld

f 1

nivi^hii^..

By the time Arnauld
published T he Port-Pnv.i

»any arguments were taken
for granted to ..prove"
the infinite divisibility of extension.
Arnauld cites three from
geometry himself.
1. Geometry demonstrates
tain pairs of lines which do that there are r P r
not have a common
nd
r
reason
-°
suraWes»
An exam Ple is the diagonal "^ommen_
and the
side of a square.
if the side of a square and th*
square s diagonal were each
composed of a certain
number of indivisible parts, one
of these parts
would be the common measure of
the two lines
e
S e 1
n ° C ° mmon measure
it is impossible
?that the r
" C ° mP ° Sed ° f " ny n
of
indivisible°parts?
2. Geometry also demonstrates
that althouah
there is no square of a number
which is twice the
square of another number, still it
is quite possible that the area of one square be
twice
the area
of another square.
if these two squares were
composed of a certain number of ultimate
parts
rger
UarS W ° Uld contain twice as iany
oa?t. as the smaller
??
parts
one; and since both
are squares, there would exist a square figures
number
double another square number
an impossibility.
3. Finally, nothing is clearer
than this
principle; Two entities of zero extension
taken
together still do not have any extension; that
is
to say, an extended whole has parts.
Take any two
of these parts which we assume to be
indivisible.
I ask whether the parts have
extension.
if they*
do not have extension, they have zero extension
and the two taken together cannot have extension;
if the indivisible parts have extension, they
have
parts and are hence divisible. 21

^
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The first argument depends upon the Pythagorean theorem
(A

+ B

— C

)

.

The length of the diagonal is computed as

the positive square root of the sum of the squares of the

.
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other two sides (C=Va 2 +B 2
are each of length

1.

the square root of

1

root of

2.

)

.

Suppose the sides of the square

Then the length of the hypotenuse
is

squared plus

1

squared, or the square

It is a simple reductio proof to show
that the

square root of two is not a rational number. 22

The first

argument is valid, but the premisses are not all
true.

The

argument assumes that the Pythagorean theorem applies
in the
case of discrete metrics, a premiss that is not
true.

The

Pythagorean theorem formula is derived using the premiss
that extension is infinitely divisible.

(See chapter VII for

a detailed demonstration of the dependence.)

Consequently,

using the Pythagorean theorem in this context begs the question by presuming what the argument purports to prove.

Moreover, a geometric device for

dividing a line of unknown length into
a

fixed number of equal parts using

parallel lines and line segments of
known fixed length shows commensura-

bility and is illustrated in figure

3.

The ratio of the respective segments
is not 1:1.

But the perspective ra-

tio 23 for different directions in a

discrete metric space is not 1:1 either.

Figure

3.

Dividing

a line of unknown

length into equal
parts

.
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The second argument suffers from a
similar fate.
it
assumes that every line has a midpoint.
Unfortunately, in
discrete metric spaces, not every line has
a midpoint.
A
line with an even number of points does
not have a midpoint;
only a line with an odd number of points has
a midpoint.

Moreover

,

the perspective ratio varies

as lines are rotated in the plane;

lines at "45

"

have a 1.414:1 perspec-

tive ratio and may have fewer points

than a line of the same (continuous)
length.

To illustrate the difficulty

consider a square inscribed inside
..
another
square as shown in figure
.

.

4.

Figure 4. Continuous Metric inscribed
squares

Consider the same diagram using a

discrete metric as illustrated in figure

5.

I

shall select a size which is

odd and has many points.

square is

7

The outer

points long and has an

area of 49 points; the inner, rotated,

square has an area of 25 points, al-

though each side has only

4

points.

Figure 5. Atomic
metric inscribed
squares

One may conjecture that as the size of
the outer square gets large relative to the size of a point,
the ratio of the size of the outer square to the inner
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square approaches 2:1.
and an area of

A square with a side

points long

3

points has an inscribed square with
an area
and sides of length 2 points, but a
square with only

of 5

9

two points on a side has no inscribed
square at all.

The third argument

,

if not outright self-contradictory,

merely asserts that to have extension is to be
divisible:
"if

are

.

.

.

.

.

.

indivisible parts have extension,
divisible".

.

.

.

they

24

Arnauld goes on to add another alleged proof.

demonstration imagines a flat (Euclidean) sea with

His
a ship

that is receding in the
distance.

He constructs a

similar triangle argument
using the eye of the observer, the light ray coming

from the waterline of the
ship, one coming from the

horizon, and an interceded

parallel transparent glass.
Figure

6

involved.

shows the geometry
One is supposed

to be convinced by this

argument that there is a

Similar triangle
Figure 6.
perceptual argument.

.
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point in the plane of the glass where
the light ray coming
from the waterline of the ship passes.
The illustration
shows that the passage of the "continuous"
line goes through
actual points in the interceded parallel
plane only when
the

distances are fortuitously correct.

Rays that do not inter-

sect points can be called "virtual" lines.

Every line re-

guires at least two points, but the remainder of
any line
may be virtual rather than actual. The ray that
intersects
the transparent glass does so at a virtual point
rather than
at an actual one.

When extension is measured with a dis-

crete metric, the experiment proposed by Arnauld results
in
a

hypotenuse which gets "thinner" and "thinner".

it does so

by passing through only as many points as are between the

water line and the horizon.

The line is so nearly parallel

to the horizontal baseline that it extends for long distances without passing through actual points.

The perspective

ratio is nearly infinity.

One cannot "pick out" two points

in the transparent glass.

Once one line intersects at

a

point, the other is "too close" to hit an adjacent point and
is only a virtual intersection.

The computer implementation

shows only a single row of dots close to the pane, as the

triangle in figure

Figure 7.
end

7

shows. 25

'

26

A long thin triangle only two atoms high on one
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Hume and Infi nite Divisibility

Hume argues against infinite
divisibility; he interprets space or extension in terms of
the objects which might
occupy it. A consequence of the Humean
view would
be an

empirical answer to the question whether
extension is infinitely divisible or not.

Hume's argument involves treating space or
extension as
not distinct from matter.
According to Baxter, Hume's view

subsumes matter and extension into one structure.
Hume believes that our idea of a region of space
is an abstract idea of the following sort: We
think of a region by thinking indifferently of
various objects that could occupy that region
[The] upshot of this theory is that regions of space have the structure of extended objects 27
•

_

•

•

•

.

Under this view, space or extension would have the same

structure as matter.

Consequently, the findings of modern

physics would be doubly relevant.

What we learn about mat-

ter is immediately generalizable to extension (space).

Bax-

ter essentially showed that Hume believes that the smallest

things have no extension and that extended things are created by combining these unextended smallest things

28
.

Modern physical theory corroborates this Humean view.

According to current theory, all matter is mostly empty
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space; extended objects are created
by combining objects
which have (nearly) no extension of
their own. The smallest
particles are called 'quarks' and are described
by physicists as "point-like" entities.

The first evidence for the existence of
quarks
came about 15 years ago [1969] in experiments
probed nuclei with energetic electrons. They that
vealed point-like objects (then called partons reor
quark— partons inside the neutrons and protons of
29
the nuclei.
)

The influence of these point-like particles "extends"
space
and matter and produces extended particles (including
pro-

tons and neutrons).

However, whether matter is infinitely

divisible or not is still not settled.

Underneath the standard [physical] model [of matter] is the realm of "compositeness".
The standard model holds that everything is built out of
six kinds of quarks and six kinds of leptons, and
that these quarks and leptons are the most elementary forms of matter. Up to now, whenever physicists have thought they had reached the most elementary constituents of matter, they have been
proven wrong. There is a fraction of theorists
who think they are still wrong.
Believers in compositeness say the quarks and leptons are themselves composite, made of more elementary objects,
which may be called preons or technicolor quarks
or something else. 30
Hume's approach would allow the question of infinite

divisibility to be settled by empirical physics.

But Hume's

tack represents a significant departure from Aristotle's
thinking.

Even if modern physics did provide a definitive

.
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answer, Aristotle's difficulties would
not be disposed of.
Aristotle clearly distinguishes between place
and matter in
T he Physics
"Place is no part of the thing."
:

(211al).

As a

result, Hume's approach could be conceived of
as predating

Aristotle

.
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Such a proof might go as follows.
Suppose v^2 is
0 9!'
Then there exists numbers P and
Q such that
i P/Q
p
(1).
We may suppose that the fraction P/Q
is expressed in lowest terms. This would require
that
P and Q
are relatively prime, that is, that they
have no greatest
common divisor ( GCD ) (2). Now then, squaring
both sides
gives us the equation 2 = P 2 /Q 2 or that 2 = 2 P 2
Q
(3)
since
the right hand side of the equation is divisible
by 2 so
must the left hand side be. But for that to be
o
must itself be divisible by 2, and Q must be of possible
the form' 2 R
2
2
(4).
Consequently Q (=
must equal (2R) 2 (5). This
)
allows us to conclude that P must also be divisible
by 2
•

2P

(8,9) contradicting the assumption that %/2 could be expressed as a rational number in lowest terms.

V2 = P/Q.
(1)
(2)23. GCD ( P Q ) =1
2
2
(3)
Q = 2
(4)24. Q = 2
R 2 = 2 P2
(5)
( 2
2
= 2 P2
4 R
( 6 )
2
= P2
2 R
(7)
P = 2
(8)
GCD ( P Q ) =2
(9)
,

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

,

(10)

\f2

*

P/Q

See note

8

Assume y/~2 is rational
P/Q is expressed in lowest terms
Square both sides & multiply by Q 2
Both sides must be divisible by 2
Substituting
Expanding
Divide both sides by 2.
Both sides must be divisible by 2.
Both P and Q divisible by 2.
By reductio V 2 cannot be rational.
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CHAPTER VI

THE VALIDITY OF BOTH VIEWS
In this chapter

I

of the two positions.

present

a

consistent model for each

The traditional number line is devel

oped and examined for the purpose of contrast
with the less
familiar view
atomism.

—

The Validity of Divisionism

Flour is finely grained stuff which has been being

divided for millennia.
of flour?

Have you ever tried to measure

One cup, more or less, is likely to differ from

another by minute amounts.
tity.

cup

a

Water is another divisible guan-

While the grains of flour can be made visible by

a

sufficiently strong magnifying glass, the "grains" of water
cannot.

True, we have obtained electron micrographs which

seem to show the individual atoms of some of the heavier
metals.

But the same still cannot be said of water.

We are accustomed to dividing "stuff".

To assist in

dividing stuff, we have devised units of measure.

We have

invented arbitrary units of measure and conversions between
them.

For example, to convert from liters to gallons we

multiply the number of liters by

0

.

2641720524

1

The pro-

cess of dividing materials, in conjunction with measuring
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how much (quantity), has developed
into the use of numbers
for measuring and dividing.

Developing Numbers
The fifth or sixth century equivalent of
a Certified
Public Accountant kept track of inventories.
One may reasonably presume that counting filled containers
along with
adding tallies was sufficient for inventory
purposes.
But,

when the auditors came along, subtraction was
necessary to
determine how much there "ought to have been". Tallying

the

last inventory, adding the records of the amounts
received,

and subtracting the records of the amounts drawn from
stores

would yield how much a current inventory should find.

Negative Numbers
With the advent of subtraction it is only
time before negative numbers are needed.

a

matter of

When the plans for

issues from stock, say in planning for a battle or a trip,
are compared with the inventory and found wanting, this

wanting can be quantified by negative numbers. "We need 100
sacks of flour more", the planner might say.

The answer to

"How many will we have after the trip?" becomes "minus 100".

Inventing multiplication merely needed an extremely
rich person or a ruler with too many inventories to tally
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directly.

Adding the same size tally many
"times" yields
how many "times" we have that tally.
it isn't easy to

tell

the ruler with 45 granaries and
a tally of 150 sacks of
flour in each granary how many sacks
of flour he has.
We
soon learned how to multiply 150 "times"
45

.

Fractions

Division follows quickly with the need to
allocate
stocks evenly to a number of storage locations,

or to the

legions of soldiers.

How much do we have?

How many battal-

ions of legionnaires must we divide this among?

Finding out

how many supplies to take away and give to each
battalion is
a long and cumbersome process when trial and
error subtraction is used.

The bigger the bureaucracy, the more the need

there is for division as

a tool.

With a notation for num-

bers in place, it's just a matter of time before someone

devises a better way; division is that way.
answer doesn't come out even, the result is
whole.

But when the
a

fraction of a

Since simple fractions (dividing in two, etc.) were

not unfamiliar, that division sometimes yields them makes it
less strange. 2

Pure Numbers
It falls to the philosophers to analyze these relations

and develop a theory of pure numbers

—

numbers which are

.
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viewed apart from that which they
might be applied to in
measuring or counting. The '3' in '3
bags of flour' is seen
as something existing apart from
the bags of flour.

There is a natural progression in this
development.
First there are tally strokes. Tally
strokes are measured
by numbers which count the tally strokes.
Addition

of num-

bers becomes a shorthand for tallying a lot
of tallies.
This process generates the natural numbers.
Whenever any
two natural numbers are added, the result is a
natural number.

tion.

The natural numbers are said to be closed under
addiIf something is added to something else and a
result

is obtained, then one ought to be able to subtract
something

from the result and obtain something else.

This process

works well enough for some pairs of natural numbers, but not
for other pairs.

Three less one gives two, but one less

three does not give any known natural number.

number which, when added to two, gives zero.

It gives the

We extend the

natural numbers to include this zero as well as the other

strange numbers, which we call the negative integers.

When we include these negative integers, zero, and the

positive integers and thereby obtain simply the integers, we
find that the integers are closed under both addition and

subtraction
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Multiplicati nn
We found that adding a natural
number to itself many
times is tedious and invented or
discovered a shorthand

—

multiplying that natural number by the
number of times we
took it as an addend. We found that

the natural numbers are

closed under multiplication.

We also found that the inte-

gers are closed under multiplication.
was noted

—

One strange effect

the product of two negative integers
is

a

posi-

tive integer.

Division
Naturally, if one thing is multiplied by something
else
and a product is obtained, one might well ask how
the one

thing might be obtained from the product and something
else.
Since a product is obtained by adding one thing many times,
the one thing could likewise be subtracted many times

—

distributed among the many somethings or divided among them.
In such a case the one thing is called the divisor and the

other factor, which when multiplied by the divisor gives the
product, is called the quotient.

A similar problem to the one which arose in subtraction

arises.

For some pairs of numbers, taking one as a product

and the other as a divisor, dividing the divisor into the

product yields a known integer.

For example, six divided

.
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among (by) two gives three.

But for some of these pairs
of

numbers, taking the first as a divisor
and the other as a
product, dividing the divisor into the
product does not
yield a known integer. For example, two
divided among six
does not yield any known integer, positive
or negative.
Each of the six only gets a "fraction" of
a whole.

Initial-

ly,

fractions, as such new numbers are called,
are added to
our growing list of types of numbers.
Combining fractions
with the integers gives what we call rational
numbers.
We

notice one more anomaly.
numbers.

Zero cannot be divided into other

It seems an ad-hoc solution, but we just
forbid

division by zero.

It doesn't work.

I've given a hypothetical account of how numbers might

logically have been developed.

For the purpose of this

work, rational numbers are all we need.

Let's look at the

properties we pretty much take for granted of the rational
numbers.

Whenever any two rational numbers are added, mul-

tiplied, subtracted, or divided (excluding the forbidden

division by zero)

,

the result is another rational number.

The rational numbers are closed under the four arithmetic

operations

division

—

addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
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Order
The relation "less than" (or "greater
than") has been
taken largely for granted. Higher counts
are greater than
lower counts. Using this relation, it is
found that any two
number must satisfy one of three relations (the
trichotomy).

1.

The first is less than the second.

2.

The first is equal to the second.

3.

The second is less than the first (the first is

greater than the second).

When a number is greater than a first number and less
than a third number it is said to be "between" the other
two.

It is easy to show that given any two distinct ratio-

nal numbers, it is possible to find another between the

other two.
and 1/2.

For example, consider the rational numbers 1/3
1/3 is the same as 4/12; 1/2 is the same as 6/12.

Clearly 5/12 is between 4/12 and 6/12.

Since 4/12 is 1/3

and 6/12 is 1/2, 5/12 is between 1/3 and 1/2.

As a general

procedure, one may add 1/2 the difference between the num-

bers to the smaller number.

This will always yield a number

less than the higher number and larger than the lower number, or between the two given numbers.
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The property of having another element
between any two
given members is called denseness. A set
of numbers is
dense if and only if between any two numbers
in the set
there is another number in the set.

The natural development of numbers for counting
and

measuring originally had the numbers intimately
associated
with the stuff being counted or measured. At these

practi-

cal levels numbers were never separated from the
things they

were

a

measure of

.

It was only with the invention of "pure"

numbers, numbers taken apart from the things they were tra-

ditionally used to count or measure, that the properties of
numbers could be separated from the properties of the things
they were used to measure.

And the properties of numbers

drives the questions about the properties of the stuff they
are used to measure.

Extension Without Measure
When rational numbers are used in measuring the quantity of stuff, it is presumed that the stuff is as divisible
as are the numbers.

More in question is the so-called "ex-

tension" of stuff rather than its matter.

The rational num-

ber system we use to measure "how much" (stuff) with has the

property of denseness.

We can continue dividing between

numbers as long as we like.

The question that arises natu-
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rally is "can the stuff we associate
the numbers intimately
with be similarly divided?" Even
talk of (pure) extension
dissociates the "distance across" some
stuff from its matter.
When we remove the matter from consideration
we talk
Of pure "extension".

We are accustomed to measuring extension
relative to
directions.
Two (non-parallel) directions are required
to

measure area; three are required for volume.

We can cer-

tainly conceptualize the (empty) space as something
apart
from the system of numbers we use to measure it.
But

when

we ask "how much" in regard to such extension, we
talk about
its "measure"

the numbers we use to describe how much.

Talk of divisibility also asks after the "stuff", including
the empty space, we use the numbers to measure.

We are posed with a complex question.

We have a con-

sistent model for measuring divisibility, one that exhibits
denseness, and can therefore support infinite divisibility.
We also have only conceptualization as a way of holding onto

the concept of the extension of empty space (or of matter).
But our conceptualization is amenable to using the model

provided by numbers.

We conceptualize the difference be-

tween two distinct points in a visualized blow-up where we
can picture ourselves walking (part way) from one point to

.

.
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the other.

So we naturally argue, by analogy,
that "pure
extension" is similarly divisible. One
point of the present
work is that, sufficiently informed, the
analogy is not so

obvious

In the following section

I

present a much less familiar

model, one which presumes that the model provided
by the

rational numbers does not apply,

Once that model has been

presented it will no longer be such an "intuitively
obvious"

conclusion that the "stuff" of empty space is best modeled
by the rational (or real) number system.

The fifth postu-

late of Euclidean geometry was once thought so intuitively

obvious it was taken to be

a

"self evident" truth, yet we

now know of self-consistent geometries based on "less intuitive" statements of the postulate.
The Validity of Atomism
In this section

I

build and examine a consistent model

which is based upon the premiss of an indivisible minimum
extension.

Computer graphics screen displays implement this

model
But although most geometricians from the time of Euclid
have in fact worked with the principle of infinite
divisibility, mathematicians do not refuse to consider
the possibility of a geometry of finite divisibility 3
.
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A model of extension using
atomic magnitudes, while not
consistent with infinite divisibility,
is not inconsistent
by itself.
An analogy with geometry will
serve to illuminate my view.
For millennia people tried to prove
the insight that parallel lines never meet
the so-called Euclidean or fifth postulate. More recently
the fifth postulate was shown to be independent of the
others.
This inde-

—

pendence allows constructing
geometries.

a

variety of non-Euclidean

They are each internally consistent but gen-

erally not compatible with each other.

Each geometry de-

pends upon the form chosen for the fifth postulate.

in a

similar manner people have argued for the intuition
that

extension is infinitely divisible.

As in the history of

geometry, in which various arguments were thought to prove
the Euclidean form of the fifth postulate, various arguments

have been advanced as refuting atomism.

Two modern views

belie these historical alleged refutations of atomism.

One view is that provided by the invention of the mi-

croscope.

Microscopically granular substances appear con-

tinuous at macroscopic levels.

Modern particle physics has

found a hierarchy of successively smaller particles cumulating in quarks and leptons which are indivisible

—

so far.

Matter, strictly speaking, is not extension, but the exten-

sion of matter appears to be quantized (atomic), although at

.
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smaller levels than the namesake,

Extension per se can be

quantized with a discrete metric.

The other view derives from the advent
of computer
graphics.
Computer display screens exhibit de facto
atomic
extension. The smallest portion of a display
is called a
pixel (picture element).
IBM PC Monochrome Graphics Adapter
(MGA) and Color Graphics Adapter CGA)
displays have 640
(

horizontal by 200 vertical pixels.

Enhanced Graphics Adapt-

er (EGA) displays have 640 by 350 pixels.

Vector Graphics

Adapters (VGA) displays have 640 by 480 pixels.

Drawing a

line on one of these graphics displays requires turning
on

successive or contiguous pixels.

A minimum length line con-

sists of two adjacent pixels (points).

Except on very high

resolution displays, lines not aligned with the axes appear
as small step functions.

Even on very high resolution dis-

plays, lines appear as step functions when viewed through a

magnifier

Now that computer displays have become commonplace,
they may be used as an example for illustrating discrete
metrics.

By their very nature they implement discrete met-

rics, and they serve as a good example to illuminate a cer-

tain "weirdness" inherent in discrete metrics.
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Let a display be specified as composed
of an NxM array
of pixels.
Drawing a square on such a field requires
using
the same number of pixels across as up and
down.
Drawing
the diagonal, however, uses only one pixel
for each of the
vertical and horizontal positions. There are exactly
the

same number of pixels in the diagonal as there are
in both
the horizontal and the vertical
sides.

Figure

8

is an example of a

7x7 square with one diagonal drawn

on such an array.

The usual metric with the Py-

thagorean criteria of preserving
distance with any rotation cannot
be presumed to hold.

The distance

between adjacent pixels is

1

mini-

Figure 8. A 7x7
square with one diagonal drawn on an atomic
array,

mum unit, no matter what the direction.

The shape of the

pixel affects the "size" of the distance according to some

external criterion.

Within the system, there is no way to

discern that the diagonal distance differs from horizontal
or vertical distances.

"sizes", but
first.

I

I

shall discuss these differing

shall have to deal with a few preliminaries
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In addition to squares,
triangles and hexagons also

form plane-filling patterns using
pixels which exhibit some
kind of radial symmetry. Hexagons
seem likely choices as
they approximate circles or "dots".
There are "more" directions which have the same "distance"
(o", 60", 120",
etc.)

Hexagons allow

6

directions of symmetry, but unfortunately,

hexagons cannot "slide" past one another,
while triangles
and squares can. Also, hexagons are
made up of smaller triangles.
Triangles allow three directions of symmetry,
while
squares allow two.

When it comes to three-space, cubes form
space-filling
solids.

Equilateral pyramids do also.

Cubes allow three

directions of "sliding", while pyramids allow four.

But specifying a position in two-space requires only

two coordinates; similarly, specifying a position in three-

space requires only three coordinates.

Consequently, the

simplex pattern (triangle, pyramid) has a redundancy in its

directions of movement resulting in a loss of
freedom.

1

degree of

Parsimony is achieved by requiring orthogonality

in each additional dimension.

Squares and cubes are there-

fore the logical choice for conceiving atomic pixels.

How-

ever, using squares for illustrations prevents distinguish-
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ing individual pixels.

pixels,

I

To allow distinguishing individual

shall use circles for illustrations.

We are not accustomed to thinking of
extension in terms
of atomic distances.
in fact, we are so accustomed to

thinking of extension as being continuous that
we have difficulty even conceiving of it as being atomic.
One branch
of mathematics which covers theories of distance
is metric
space theory. A theory of distance which has integral

units

of distance is called a discrete metric.
a

The distance from

point to itself is always zero in a metric space, discrete

metrics included.

Under an atomic theory of extension,

there is no zero unit of extension, although there is
unit of distance.

a

zero

The measure of distance between two

points is different from the extension or length of the line
that includes those two points.

The distance from a point

to itself is always zero, even though the extension of the

point itself is not.

The distance from a point to its near-

est neighbor is one unit of extension, but the length of the
line including the two points is two units of extension.

The length of a line composed of only two points is

actually a minimum of two units of extension.

The continu-

ous length of such a line can be larger than two units of

extension.

The ratio of the length of such a line to one
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with the minimum extension may not
be

1

1

•

One can concep-

tualize these differences in "distance"
using the concept
"aspect ratio".
Aspect Ratio
The ratio of the horizontal and vertical
distances is
usually not one to one on computer displays.
For example,

my EGA display on a 13" monitor has 640
pixels wide by 350
pixels high displayed in an area which is 10
inches wide by
7.5 inches high.
The ratio of the horizontal height to the

vertical width of a picture or screen is called the
'aspect
ratio'.

On my display, which is 10 inches wide by 7.5

inches high, the aspect ratio is 10/7.5, which is 1.33
or
4:3.

Drawing lines on such a display is also affected by the
shape of pixels themselves.

In the case of my EGA display,

there are 640 pixels in 10 inches horizontally and 350 pixels in 7.5 inches vertically.

pixel is 10"/640

.

The vertical size of a pixel is 7.5"/350.

The ratio of these is 0.729
35:48.

The horizontal size of a

—

0.729 =

(

10/640 )/( 7 5/350
.

)

or

The screen itself is wider than it is tall, but each

pixel is taller than it is wide.

These facts must be taken

into consideration when drawing pictures on such displays.
If one presumes that the aspect ratio of a pixel is

1:1
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when one draws pictures on such a
display, the resulting
pictures will appear distorted.

When a picture is stored or recorded
using one aspect
ratio and reproduced using another aspect
ratio the resulting view will also appear distorted.
This effect can be

illustrated by a familiar technology in film.
or cinemascope 5

Wide screen,

motion pictures do not use wider films to
store and project the wider picture. 6 Cinemascope
pictures
,

use standard 35 millimeter films.
be stored on the film?

How can the wider picture

A special lens, called an anamorphic

lens, is used which distorts the image on the film
by

shrinking it in the horizontal direction.
The aspect ratio of the cinemascope frame is
23.8:18.67 = 1.275 instead of the normal 1.38.
Since the anamorphic system operates with a ratio
of 1:2 the effective screen aspect ratio will be
(23.8/18.67) *2 = 2. 55. 7

The image of a square will appear on the film as a

rectangle which is narrower by half than it is tall, and the
image of certain double wide rectangles will appear on the

film as squares.

The image is stored on the film with a

"perspective ratio" 8 which is not 1:1.

Because the hori-

zontal compression is twice the vertical compression, the

perspective ratio on film is 1:2.

When a cinemascope motion
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picture is projected a special
anamorphic projection lens is
used to widen the image back to
its original proportions. 9

A picture recorded using a cinemascope
lens will be
stored with a perspective ratio which
is 1:2.
if that picture is projected using a standard
lens it will be projected

presuming a perspective ratio of 1:1.
projected using
er and too tall.

a

A cinemascope picture

standard lens will appear sgueezed togethI

have seen Cinemascope pictures appear

this way on television while the credits
are running.

Con-

versely, a standard picture projected with a
cinemascope
lens will appear stretched out and too short.

A standard

film is stored with and projected with a 1:1
perspective
ratio.
a

A cinemascope film is stored with and projected
with

perspective ratio which is 1:2.

Each picture will appear

normal when it is projected using the same perspective ratio

with which it was stored.

But when either picture is pro-

jected using a different perspective ratio from that with

which it was stored, it will appear distorted.

Anyone who has tried to draw a low resolution picture
on a computer screen using a character, say the asterisk,

can see the effect immediately.

A square number of aster-

isks, say 6x6, hardly looks like a square.

And when one
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finally gets something that looks
reasonable on the display
screen, it looks different when it is
printed.

The aspect ratio of most display screens
for characters
10
is about .42
To make a square using six lines of
text
one would need 6 divided by .42 or 14.4
characters on each
line.
But what looks like a square on the screen
prints out
as too wide.
The aspect ratio for printed text in
.

a 10

characters per inch by

lines per inch mode is

6

.6.

11

printed square using six lines of text would require
of only 10 characters.

The
a

width

In figure 9, the left array is nu

mencally
square.

On the

screen the middie one looks
square, and on

******
******
******
******
******
******

6x6
1/1=1
6x1=6

**************
**************
**************
**************
**************
**************

14x6
1.8/. 75 = 2.4
6x2.4 = 14.4

the printed page
the right one

looks square.

**********
**********
**********
**********
**********
**********
10 x 6
1/ 6 = 1.67
6x1.67 = 10
.

Figure 9.
Square, Display, and Print
aspect ratios.

Measuring distances using

a

metric based on the atomic

premiss requires that any "distance" be in terms of multiples of the minimum distance, the distance between adjacent
points.

The concept of perspective ratio can be adapted to

give us a quantitative measure of the difference, in non-a-
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toinic terms,

tions.

between the scales used for
different direcPixel aspect ratios show that one
perspective

can

illuminate (or obfuscate) the other,
as when the square on
the display screen doesn't print
square.
But one perspective (atomic or continuous) cannot
be used to evaluate the
other lest a contradiction be introduced
in the overall
system.
Like the wave particle duality of matter,
transformation equations must be rigorously (and
religiously)
used

when switching perspectives.

Under the atomic presumption there are adjacent
points,
and the minimum length of a line segment consisting
of
two

adjacent points is two minimum units.

We can only visualize

these points as "dots" of a fixed size and indeterminate
shape.

We would like to presume that these dots can be

thought of as small disks and will do so for illustrative
purposes, but in consideration of the foregoing discussion
of the aspect ratio of pixels, we must be ready to cast this

assumption aside.

Some argue that this assumption might

entail a contrary presumption

—

that angle is infinitely

divisible, a question dealt with elsewhere.

.
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Drawing lines in discrete metric
spaces
A line between two points may

have two sides.

illustration on
els.

Figure 10 is an
a 7x9

array of pix-

The line from point A to

point B passes directly through
point 0 but passes immediately to
the right of points represented by
a left

semicircle and to the left

of points represented by a right

semicircle

Figure 10. The two
sides of a line.

A closed plane figure would have to include either
the
left semicircle points or the right semicircle points
de-

pending upon on which side of the line the figure was.
figures would include points A, 0, and

B.

Both

Obviously, the

degree of overlap depends upon the orientation of the line
as well as its length.

As a practical matter, computer im-

plementations of line drawing functions presume
direction".

a

"preferred

Turning on the rightmost one of a horizontal

pair of pixels and the lower one of a vertical pair is only
one of

4

possible implementation strategies and is shown in

figure 11.

.
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Before we can intelligently discuss overlapping plane figures, we

must examine intersecting line segments.

Two lines intersect at a

point, and in atomic or discrete

metrics a point has a finite size
or a minimum length.

For the fol-

lowing discussion, lengths (and areas) are given in terms of the min-

imum unit of size.

If the length

of two intersecting line segments

are A and B, then the length of the

combined segment is A + B -1.

Figure 11. Using the
rightmost and lower
points to fill out a
line

One point is shared by both

line segments, and its size must be subtracted.

If A and B

were merely added, as we are accustomed to doing with con-

tinuous distances, the
Segment
Segment
Segment

overlapping point would

A B
B C
A
C

length
length
length

2

*

*

*

*
*

2
3

*

*

be counted twice; its

length must be subtracted.

Figure 12 is an il-

lustration

Figure 12. Adding lengths of
line segments.

.

Of course, there are also line segments which cross

each other but which do not share an actual intersection
point.

Figure 13 shows such

a case.

Line segment AB has a

.
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slope of -2; segment CD has a
slope of
1*

Tile

positioning of these lines is

such that there is no point that
both
line segments pass through.

if the only

points the line actually passed through
were selected in an implementation, seg-

ment AB would appear as a sequence of
dots

cross but do not
share a point of
intersection.

To "thicken" the line and make it more visible,
the

points immediately to the left of or to the right
of the
line must be selected.
Figure 14 identifies the
points

which would be selected were the line

thickened "to the left".
13 and 14,

In both figure

line segment AB "crosses"

line segment CD but does not pass

through a point on segment CD.

In such

cases the extension of the two line seg-

ments taken together does add up to the
sum of the individual extensions.

The

geometric interpretation of this is satisfied for finite
geometries.
right.

In figure 15, the line is thickened to the

This option implements the strategy mentioned illus-

trated in figure 11 above.

In this case one of the points

used to thicken line segment AB is one of the points on line

.

.

181

segment CD.

There is a shared point of

intersection in this case, but it is
not
located where it would be located were
the lines continuous.

in such cases the

extension of the two line segments adds
up to the sum of the individual exten-

sions less the extension of a single

point

Figure 15.
Points selected
for thickening a
line to the
right

When it comes to drawing plane figures, we must
rely on
our experience with continuous metrics, but we
must be
pre-

for "weird" (unintuitive) differences.

Constructing triangles in the atomic plane
Let us examine some "minimum sized" triangles with

atomic magnitudes.
of length
a point,

2

Clearly the smallest has two sides each

(points).

Since the two side lines intersect at

one point is shared by both lines.

Rotation aside, there are only two ways to
draw such a figure.
erate triangle

—

Figure 16 is a degen-

a line

segment consisting

of two intersecting collinear line seg-

ments.

Figure 17, on the other hand, is a

recognizable triangle.
agonal has a length of

Notice that the di2

points, hence is

Figure 16. A
degenerate
atomic triangle
.

182

the same "size" as the other two
sides.

However, the perspective ratio
between the
diagonal and the horizontal (or vertical)
is not

1

:

1

.

in fact,

it is 1.414:1.

Per-

spective ratio relates ratios of atomic

distances (number of pixels) to continuous
(infinitely divisible) distances along
f ©rent

directions or dimensions.

Figure 17. The
minimum sized
atomic triangle.

We

must beware that we do not evaluate atomic
figures from the
perspective of presuming infinite divisibility.
To do so

would be to beg the guestion or, worse yet,
introduce

a

contradiction, from which anything follows.

this seems a little strange when held up against

our conventional view, which is based upon continuous lines
However, lest we fall into the same trap the ancients did,
it behooves us to develop a little familiarity with the

atomic perspective.

Drawing a triangle in a discrete metric space so that
the length of its sides in continuous distances is comparable to the number of pixels on the line reguires some ingenuity.

There is a way which can make maximum use of our

familiarity with continuous metrics.

Locate the vertex

points on the centers of pixels as shown in figure 18.

Draw
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continuous (divisible) lines connecting the vertexes.

Examine the center

point of each pixel interior to the

continuous triangle or overlapping it.
the center point of the pixel falls
on or inside the triangle, then count

this pixel as part of the area of the

Figure 18. Locating
vertex points of a
continuous triangle
on a tomic points,

triangle. The illustrations help guide our
understanding,
but we must develop a formula for the area of a
triangle

which can be compared to the familiar continuous formula.
Computing Area of an Atomic Triangle
The area of an atomic triangle is
not simply ^BH.

We can compute the area

by devising a mapping from the continuous

plane to the atomic plane.

Here's how.

Draw a right triangle with the vertices

centered on atomic points so that the
base B and height H cover the reguisite

Figure 19. Locating the vertices of a right
atomic triangle.

number of atomic points as in figure 19.
Next fill in the points on the base line and the height line
as in figure 20.

Then draw the diagonal line connecting the

two vertices, and fill in the points which are on or interior to that line as in figure 21.

.
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We can compute accurately the number
of points to fill in without actually

drawing the line by noting the relation
between distance along the base and the

proportions of the triangle.

We are, in

effect, computing the height of each similar triangle which has an integer number
of points along the line of the base.

Figure 20. Filing in the base
and height of an
atomic right

In

figure 22, the smaller triangle and the
larger triangle are similar.

This simi-

larity may be expressed in a precise proportion.

Side h is to side b as side H

is to side B

—

h:b::H:B.

Figure 21.
Filing in the interior points of
an atomic right
triangle

The corre-

sponding mathematical formula, h/b=H/B
allows us to compute side h; h=(H/B)-b.
Even though the extension of the

sides is the number of points and
is given by B and H, the length in

continuous distances is actually
B-l and H-l.

(The starting point

is not counted in measuring dis-

Figure 22.
Similar
continuous triangles

tances, but must be counted in mea-

suring the atomic extension of the sides.)
to the

I

th

If we count out

point along the line of the base, we can compute

how many points are under the (continuous) diagonal by using

)

.
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the proportion in continuous distances.

Because of the

relationship between length and extension, the
actual length
of the base of the smaller continuous
triangle is
l

than the number of points.

triangle with

I

less

The length of the base of the

points is 1-1.

The length, in continuous

distance, of the vertical line under the diagonal is
computed using the appropriate proportion of the height,
when the

appropriate values are inserted the atomic version of the
formula becomes

(H-l ) / B-l
(

(

)
)

•

(

i-i

or

(

1-1

)

(

H-l /B-l )
)

.

if

we take the integer part of this we will have the length in

atomic distance units of the height of the triangle with

I

points along the base. But the extension of that line is one

point more than its continuous length.
the extension of this line is INT( 1-1
(

which is

The expression for
)

(

H-l ) / B-l ) +l
(

)

—

just the total number of points in the vertical

column of points at the

I

th

point along the base.

Adding

those extensions for each point along the base gives us the
total area of the triangle in atomic points
I

=

1

to B of

I NT

(

(

1-1

)

(

—

the SUM from

H-l /(B-l)+l)
)

The area of an atomic triangle with base B and height H
is

S INT( (1-1)

•

(

(H-1)/(B-1) )+l)

;

it is not simply ^BH.

Figure 23 is a table of the areas of discrete triangles up
to 10x10.

The values are computed using the above formula.

It can be shown that this formula reduces to the familiar

.

.
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~2

as the size of the

individual points ap-

proaches zero. 12

I

have developed a

consistent mathematical
formula, but it is not

Height
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2

Area of atomic triangles
11 16 22
10 15 19
9 13 17
8 12 16
7 10 13
6
9 11
5
7 10
4
3

Base

6
4

7
5

26
25
21
19
16
15
11

31
28
25
22
21
16
13
9 10
6

7

37
33
29
28
22
19
16
12

41
37
36
29
25
21
17
13

8

46 55
45 46
37 41
33 37
28 31
25 26
19 22
15 16
9 10 11

7

8

9

10

always clear exactly
Figure 23. Table of areas for
selected atomic triangles.
like when compared to corresponding continuous figures.

what the drawings look

Figure 24 shows various small discrete (right) triangles.

Tabulated with each one is its size and the lengths of the
opposite and adjacent
sides (A and B)

Overlapping Atomic Figures
Armed with some

familiarity with intersecting (and non-intersecting) lines and

simple triangles, we
are now in a position
to examine overlapping

Figure 24.
triangles

Various small atomic
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plane figures.

Consider the square with

a

diagonal in Fig

ure 25.

Drawing a diagonal across a
square usually divides the square
into two triangles.

It is no dif-

ferent in atomic metrics.

But, be-

cause there is a minimum extension
in atomic metrics, the line that

forms the diagonal is itself extended.

Figure 25. A square
with one diagonal.

This line is a part of both triangles; its extension is

therefore included in the extension of each of the two triangles.

Consequently, the area of the two triangles, which

includes the area of the line twice, is larger than the area
of the square.

The area of triangle ABC is 28 units of

extension.

The area of triangle BCD is also 28 units of

extension.

But the sum of the areas of triangles ABC and

—

BCD

—

28 + 28 = 56

x 7 = 49.

7

—

is larger than the area of the square

The area of their common line, BC, is

7.

The area of square ABDC is the sum of the areas of triangles

ABC and BCD less the area of the common line
49

.

— 28+28-7
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This property must be taken into
consideration very
carefully whenever traditional geometric
demonstrations are
attempted.
The areas of adjacent figures do not
just add up
to the area of the figure they comprise.
Any such demonstrations must be reexamined in the light of the
atomic

perspective,
be made.

if a corresponding atomic demonstration
is to

The results of such demonstrations are often
dif-

ferent from those in continuous geometries.

One such demon-

stration involves the traditional (non-atomic) "proof"
of
the Pythagorean theorem; this theorem has figured into
al-

leged proofs of infinite divisibility.
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4. Aspect Ratio: ratio of width to height of the picture
image projected on the screen or printed on the film, the
height being taken as unity. The long-established film
aspect ratio, still retained for narrow-gage film, is 4:3
(1.33:1).
The Focal Encyclopedia of Film & Television Technique
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.

5. Cinemascope: Trade name of the most widely used method
of anamorphic wide-screen presentation; camera lenses producing images on 35mm film with a 2:1 lateral compression
are viewed with compensating horizontal expansion on projection.
The Focal Encyclopedia of Film & Television Technique
(London: Focal press, 1969), p. 132.
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To do so would have required theaters to invest in
expensive additional projectors, and the expense would have
inhibited the spread and use of the technology.
.

7. Michael Z. Wysotsky, Wide Screen Cinema and Stereophonic Sound translated by Wing Commander A. E. C. York, (New
York: Hastings House, 1971).
,

While there are no "pixels" on recorded film, we can
8
measure an effective pixel aspect ratio by comparing the
ratio of the sides of the image of a true square (as measured by continuous metrics) when it is recorded on film.
But since 'effective pixel aspect ratio' is a cumbersome
phrase, and the concept will need to be used frequently, I
I shall
shall coin 'perspective ratio' to use in its stead.
also extend the concept to cover any ratio involving two
different scales of measurement. The need for this exten.
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sion will be apparent, and its use will
be
propriate,
for discussions involving lines
9.
plane.
While an aspect ratio is the ratio
perspective ratio, as defined here, is the
scales for measuring distance.
10.

immediately apin the atomic
of two distances,
ratio of two

These

lenses cost only a tiny fraction of what an en
re pr °'ieCtor would cost, enabling the spread
and use of
-i
i
the
4

technology.
.

Aspect ratio for characters is very similar to aspect
ratio for pixels. The difference is that each character
position is treated as a low resolution pixel. An 80x25
character screen using my 13 inch monitor (10x7.5) gives a
horizontal "pixel" size of 10"/30. The vertical "pixel"
size is 7 5"/25
The aspect ratio is 10/80 )/( 7 5/25 )= 42
or 5:12.
.

.

(

.

11. Aspect ratios for printed characters is also very
similar to aspect ratio for pixels. Printed page formats
can be measured in terms of lines per inch and characters
per inch.
The width of a character is simply the reciprocal
of these parameters. Ten characters per inch gives a horizontal "pixel" size of 1/10 inches.
Six lines per inch
gives a vertical "pixel" size of 1/6 inches. The aspect
ratio is (l/10)/(l/6) = .6 or 3:5.
12. For this demonstration we note that as the size of
each point gets smaller the number of points per inch gets
larger. We must transform the equation into an expression
using inches rather than points. For this purpose we may
let the number of points per inch be K.
Then B and H will
be the sizes in inches of the sides, and KB and KH will be
the corresponding number of points. As the number of points
per inch, K, gets very large, the contribution of one point
to the length gets very small, and any error introduced by
dropping the "INT" portion of the formula will become negligible.
The formula itself,

Z INT( (1-1)

(

(

•

1-1

H-l ) / ( B-l

)

)

+1

reduces to:
(

(

H-l / ( B-l
)

)

)

•

Z (1-1)
1-1

+

El.
1-1

Transforming the formula so that the result includes expressions for length in inches requires substituting the corresponding number of points expressed in inches times the
number of points per inch. To obtain an area result which
is in terms of square inches, the point area formula must be
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divided by the number of points in
The new area formula becomes:
K
[

(

(K H-1)/(K B-1)

)

a

square inch, namely K 2

K

Z(I-1) + S1]/K 2
1=1
1=1

Performinq the summation and some alqebra yields:
[

[

(

K H-l / ( K B-l
•

)

(KH-1)

(H-l/K)

)

)
•

)

)

K-B/2 +
B/2

4-

-KB- (KB-l)/2

KB]/K

+ K B ] /K 2
•

.

2
.

B/K.

Takinq the limit of this as K approaches

°°

yields: ^BH.

.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS
Most of this chapter will be devoted to showing why
the
Pythagorean Theorem cannot be used in the argument against
atomism.

Without the Pythagorean Theorem many arguments

against atomism fail.

The less mathematically inclined may

wish to skip ahead to the concluding remarks on page 208.
Th e Atomic Destruction of the Pythagorean Theorem

One alleged proof of infinite divisibility appeals

indirectly to the Pythagorean theorem. 1

In this section

I

examine a classic proof of the Pythagorean Theorem and show
that that proof depends upon and presumes that extension is

infinitely divisible.

I

also show that, when atomism is

presumed, the corrected proof fails to yield the well known
formula; a different formula results.

Since the original

Pythagorean formula itself depends upon infinite divisibility, using it to "prove" infinite divisibility,

in effect,

begs the question.
A Classic Proof of the Pythagorean Theorem

One diagram used in demonstrating the proof of the Py-

thagorean theorem involves
other dplane. 2

6

overlapping figures in the

Figure 26 shows
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a

square with sides of
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length C that is inscribed inside

another square.

The sides of the

triangles so formed are of length A
and B respectively.

The area of

each triangle is AB/2.

The length

of a side of the outer square is A
+ B.

To prove the Pythagorean the-

orem, the total area of the outer

square is set equal to the area of
the

4

triangles plus the area of

the inner square.

Figure 26. A square
with sides of length C
inscribed inside another square.

The proof involves simple algebra.

P ythagorean Theorem Proof (with infinite divisibility'! 3
= 4 (AB/2) + C 2
(A
+ B) 2
2
2
A + B + 2AB = 2AB
+ C2
2
2
=
A + B
C2
•

This proof of the Pythagorean theorem depends upon a
line having no area and a perspective ratio of 1:1.

proof the area of contiguous triangles and

a

in the

square is added

and set equal to the area of the overall figure.

In order

for the area of contiguous figures to add to the area of the

overall figure, there must be no overlapping.

That means

that the common border, a shared line, must have no area.
But a line is made up of at least two points.

And if points

have a minimum extension, as would be the case under atomism, then the line they make up must also have a minimum

area.

Area, after all, is the square of extension.

The
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area of a line cannot be less than the
sum of the areas of
its points
For the area of a line to actually
.

be zero, the

width of the line must be zero.

But the width of a line is

just its extension in another direction.

For the width to

be zero, extension must be zero, and that
violates the presumption that there is a minimum extension.

Another way to look at this is by making an analogy
between extended figures with area and extended figures
with
length.

When a line segment is divided into shorter and

shorter segments, the limiting case is

a

single point.

If

Infinite divisibility is presumed, then the limiting case
has no extension; but if atomism is presumed, then the lim-

iting case is reached after a finite number of divisions and
has a minimum extension.

Analogously, when an extended

figure with area is divided into narrower and narrower
widths, the limiting case is a single line.

And this line

cannot be "narrower" than the minimum atomic extension.

In

order for the limiting width to be zero, the division process must continue infinitely.

Since a line is the limiting

case of a plane figure which is being divided, a zero width
is obtained only by presuming that this figure can be divid-

ed to infinity -- by presuming infinite divisibility.

In

other words, a line whose width (and area) is zero is ob-

tained only by presuming infinite divisibility.

As a conse-

.
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quence, proofs of the Pythagorean theorem
that do not take
into consideration the area of shared points
and lines can-

not be valid under atomism.

In the atomic case, a line has a small but
finite

width, and hence a determinate area.

This means that adja-

cent plane figures, figures which share a common boundary
line,

have overlapping areas, and the above proof of the

Pythagorean theorem is therefore invalid in the atomic case;
it does not account for these overlapping areas.

The Py-

thagorean theorem is used to prove the incommensurability of
the diagonal with the sides of a triangle.

Without the

Pythagorean theorem, this incommensurability cannot be
shown

In atomic metrics, points have a minimum extension, and

consequently, have a minimum length, area, and volume.

If a

point is extended in one direction, it must also be extended
in all other directions.

that there is

a

If it weren't, the proposition

minimum extension would be contradicted.

Lines, which are made up of points, must also have a minimum
length, area, and volume.

As noted in the last chapter, the length of two line

segments, say of length A and B, which touch at a point is
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the sum of the individual lengths less the
extension of the
common point: A + B - 1. The same principle holds
for area
and adjacent plane figures with a line of intersection
as

holds for length and lines with

a

point of intersection.

Two plane figures which share a common boundary line
have

overlapping areas.

The sum of the areas of two plane fig-

ures is more than the area they jointly cover by exactly the
area of the line they share.

The true (atomic) area of the

combined figure is obtained by adding the areas of the contiguous figures and subtracting the area of their common

border line.

Lines drawn in the atomic plane have

a

minimum area of

two atomic units, since it takes two points to determine a
line, but may have an area from two up to the "length" of

the line; skew lines which pass "between" points are less

"dense" than lines which hit the points exactly.

In general, the calculation of the area of a plane

figure is not a simple matter.

Moreover, determining how

many points are shared by adjacent figures is no simple
matter.

Standard (continuous metric) mensuration formulas

are based on lines having no area.

Blithely using these

standard continuous metric mensuration formulas when "refuting" "atomic" distances presumes infinite divisibility

—

.
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begs the question

—

or worse yet, introduces an
implicit

contradiction

The length of two lines which meet at a
point is:
A + B -

1

The area of two figures which share line C is:
D + E - C

For a square with a side whose length is divided into A
and
B the area is:

B-1)

(A +

2

= A 2 + B 2 + 2AB - 2A - 2B +

1

Computing the Area of Atomic Triangles
The area of a right triangle with sides B and H is

computed by the formula:
B

A = S I NT
1=1

(

(

1-1

)

(

H-l )/(B-l)+l)

This formula does not readily render itself into

simple relation using B and H.

a

We can transform this formu-

la into one which can be compared with the familiar formula

in continuous metrics for the area of a triangle.

For the

purpose of this demonstration we will not need to make the
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transformation into a general formula that
works for all
atomic triangles. We will be showing that
one particular
special case of atomic triangles disproves the
Pythagorean
theorem, so we will only need an area formula for

that spe-

cial case.

If the Pythagorean formula is to hold,

it must

hold in the special case we will be considering; if
it does
not hold in that special case, then it cannot hold
in general.

By limiting our examination to this special case, our

task is greatly simplified.

The length of the sides of an atomic triangle is an
integer.
are just

As such, the length is either even or odd; there
4

possible combinations.

Let the base of the tri-

angle be B and the height of the triangle be H.
look at the special case when B is even.
to divide it by

2

We will

This will allow us

and still have an integer.

The advantage

to doing this will become apparent.

Since B is even, there are an even number of terms in
the sum, and half an even number is also an integer.

We can

divide the series into two halves and then add the first and
last term, the second and the next to the last, etc., ending

with adding the two middle terms.

To convert these terms

for a sequence of integers we would substitute an expression

which evaluates to the number of terms when an indexing

) )) ))

(
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variable is set to

1

Such a conversion is accomplished
by

.

substituting B+l-l for
B
£ INT(

1=1

(

I-l

)

I.

This allows us to sum to B/2.

h- 1 / ( B-l ) +l
)

)

becomes:

B/2
2

!EN T

(

(I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+INT( ( B+l-I-1

)

(

H-1 / B-l +1
)

(

)

We want to get both INT terms of the expression into
a form

with as much similarity as possible; we want to combine like
terms and remove quantities from under the INT function.
I

perform a little algebra,

I

bold items of interest to make

following the steps easier.
INT( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+INT( (B+l-I-1) ( H-1 ) / B-l +1
(

)

By rearranging we get a '(B-l)' which we can divide out.
= INT ( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+INT( (Bz^-I+1) ( H-1 / B-l +1
)

(

)

Multiply through by '1/(B-1)'.
= INT ( (I-l) (H-1)/(B-1)+1)+
INT ( ( B-l ) (H-1 ) /( B— 1 ) + -1 + 1
(

)

(

H-1 ) / ( B-l +1
)

Cancel out (B-l) /(B-l).
= INT ( (I-l) ( H-1 ) / B-l ) +1 ) +INT ( H— 1+ (-1 + 1) H-1 / B-l +1
(

As

(

)

(

)

;

.

.

)

200

Factor out a '-1'.
INT

(

(

I

1

)

(

H

1

)

/ ( B-l ) +1 ) +INT ( H-l— ( I— 1 ) H-l ) / B-l )
+1
(

(

Integer values may be removed from the INT function,
so we
do so.
= INT( (1-1) (H-1)/(B-1) )+l+H-l+INT(-(I-l)(H-l)/(B-l))+l

Rearrange terms.
= INT

(

U" 1

)

(H-l) /(B-l) )+INT(-(I-l) (H-1)/(B-1))+1+H-1+1

Simplify
= INT( (1-1) (H-l) /(B-l) )+INT(-(I-l) (H-l) /(B-l) )+H+l

We have reduced the expression to one which is the sum of
the integer part of a number plus the integer part of its

negation plus an integer

—

INT(Z)+INT(-Z)+N.

Note that INT(X.O) = X, INT(-X.0)=-X
and INT(X.Y) = X; INT(-X. Y)=-X-l
so, INT X 0 +INT -X 0 =0
and INT X Y +INT ( — X Y ) =— 1
(

.

)

(

.

)

(

.

)

.

The INT parts of the above expression is just

pending upon whether the expression

(

or -1, de-

0

1-1 (H-l / B-l
)

)

(

)

eval-

uates to an integer or a number with a fractional part.

.

.
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We are summing
I NT

(

(

I-l

)

(

H-l )/(B-l) +INT ( - ( I — 1 ) ( H-l
B-l
) /
)

(

from 1=1 to B/2.

)

+H+1

)

So that we may compare our result with
the

familiar continuous formula for the area of a
triangle, let
us include the 1 with the INT expression and
leave the
H

separate

The INT parts of the expression evaluated to
so adding the
0.

1

0

or -1,

yields an expression which evaluates to

This leaves the H.

1

or

Summing from 1=1 to B/2 gives BH/2

plus the sum of the revised INT expression, which can be in-

terpreted as just the amount by which the area of an atomic
triangle is larger than a corresponding continuous triangle.
We get:
B/2

BH/2 +

Z INT ( (I-l)

(

H— 1 ) / ( B-l

)

)

+ INT (-(I-l)

1=1

(

H-l / B-l
)

(

)

)

Without a loss of generality we can assume that H
By this hypothesis, H/B is either
1.

1

+1

< B.

or something less than

Since the final formula must hold for all special cases,

it must also hold if H=B.

let H=B

To simplify our demonstration we

)

.
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If H-B then (H-1 )/(b- 1)

is l.

4

with this special case

we will be able to completely eliminate
the INT function
from the expression.
INT( (1-1) H-l / B-l ) ) +INT ( ( 1-1
= INT(I-1)+INT(-(I-1) )+H+l
(

)

(

(H-1)/(B-1))+H+1

= I-1-(I-1)+H+1
= H+l

Pictorially we can show what we are doing; we are
"chopping off" part of a triangle, rotating it, and fitting

Figure 27.
Pictorial representation of area computation for
an atomic triangle with an even base.
B/2
£ H+l =

(

H+l B/2
)

1=1

The area is BH/2 + B/2 (or BH/2 + H/2, since B=H)

Having worked out a formula for the area of certain
atomic triangles, let us consider the proof of the Pythago-

.
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rean theorem for the special case when
B=H and both are even
The Pythagorean Formula in Atomic Metrics
Let us now examine the same diagram which
purports to
demonstrate the proof of the Pythagorean theorem, by
using

overlapping plane figures, using an atomic metric.

6

The area

of the outer square is (A+B-l) 2 = A 2 + B 2 + 2AB -2A
-2B +1.

The area of a triangle is AB/2 + B/2.

We will assume the area of the inner square is C 2

.

This assumption is not generally valid because atomic

squares not aliqned with the
axes do not generally have

square areas, as Figure 28

demonstrates

There are some diagonal

Figure 28.
Squares in the
atomic plane without square
areas.

squares with square areas though.

The illustration in Fig-

ure 33 below has an offset square with an area of 16, and
the inner square in Figure 31 below has an area of 25.

The number of points on the diagonal of a triangle

which are in common with a side of the inner square is
This is true even of triangles with odd lengths.

B.

Figure 29
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The triangles overlap at the end points, so four points

would be counted twice
and must be subtracted.

Figure 30 illustrates
this.

Adding the four

triangle areas and sub-

tracting the area of
Figure 30.
Intersection points of
4 triangles.

the overlapping points

gives 4*(A*B/2 + B/2)

-

4

The perimeter of the inner square consists of

4

lines,

each of which overlaps with a triangle and has B points.
But these lines intersect with each other at the vertices of
the square, so the combined area of these
is 4B - 4.

We already have 4(AB/2 +B/2)

lines themselves

4

-

4

as the area of

the four outer triangles, so we can add the area of the

:
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inner square, C 2
ary (4B

-

4),

,

and subtract the area of the common
bound-

to get the combined total area.

This gives

us

4

(

AB/2+B/ 2

)

-

4

+ C2 -

(4B - 4)

Setting these two areas equal and performing algebra,

Outer square area
(A

A2
A2
A2
A2
A2

+
+
+
+
+
+

B -l) 2
B 2 + 2AB -2A -2B +1
B2
-2A -2B +1
B2
-2A
B2
B 2 = C 2 +2A -1

Four triangles + Inner square
4 AB/2+B/2 - 4 +
- 4B - 4)
- 4 + C 2 - 4B + 4
2AB + 2B
)

(

(

-

2B

+ 2A

+ C2
- 1 + C2
- 1 +

Since A=B this reduces to
2A 2 = C 2 +2A -1
2A 2 -2A +1 = C 2

The infinitely divisible Pythagorean equivalent would be
2A 2 = C 2

.

Figure 31 is an illustration with A = B =

4.

Since 2A 2 -2A +1 = C 2 is satisfied for A=4 and C=5
can interpret the fact that the diagonal line has only

points while C =

5

as meaning that the

4

we

,

4

points are "sparse-

ly" distributed along the line that, were it aligned with

the axis, would be "densely" populated with

5

points.

Fig-

ure 32 shows a 5X5 square rotated 45° and superimposed upon
a

diagonal square with an area of 25 points.

As you can

see, they take up the same space as well as have the same

.

,
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Figure 31.
Illustrating the equivalent of the Pythagorean
proof figure with atomic figures.
area

Let us look at atomic Py-

thagorean theorem demonstration
for the simple case of A=3

and C=4 5

—

as shown in figure

The length of the outer

33.

square side is A + B
is

B=4

,

3

+ 4 - 1 = 6.

- 1

which

,

The area of

the outer square is 36.

The area

of a triangle with sides

3

is 7.

and

4

Figure 32. A 5x5 square
rotated 45° and superimposed on a diagonal
square with an area of 25
atomic units.

The four triangles touch another at four vertices, so

the combined area of the four triangles is
or 24.

The area of the inner square is 16 s

4

.

times

7

less

4

But the outer

.
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triangles and the inner square
share a common border which is

only

4

points.

Adding these

areas and subtracting the area of
the common border gives 24 + 16 4

= 36.

The Pythagorean formula

fails for even this special case.
It is unnecessary to go through

the even more complicated exam-

ples for the other cases, since
the damage could not be undone.

The necessary condition for the

Figure 33. Atomic Pythagorean theorem demonstration for the case of
A=3
B=4 and C=4
,

Pythagorean theorem to hold is

,

that the intersection between two lines be of zero area.
But,

for that to be true, points must have zero extension;

for points to have zero extension, infinite divisibility

must hold.

Loomis collects and presents 370 "proofs" for the Py-

thagorean theorem. 7

These proofs all involve either the

addition of lengths, or ratios of lengths.

None of the

proofs which involve the addition of lengths takes into

consideration the area of the shared points.

And none of
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the proofs which depend upon ratios makes any
provision for
integer results. Both conditions fail to yield
the Pythagorean formula when atomic extension is considered.

Since the Pythagorean theorem does not hold in the

atomic plane, it cannot be appealed to in any argument
pur-

porting to disprove atomism.

Doing so begs the guestion.

Some Final Remarks
Is there a limit to dividing?

If the object is matter,

the answer is a qualified yes (according to the standard

model of physics).
no.

If the object is numbers, the answer is

But when the object is space, the answer is less clear.

Epistemological concerns point out that the structure of our
perceptual processes bias the answer toward yes.

If we

generalize away from the bias of our own perceptual process
and attempt to reason toward some general way of conceptual-

izing space, we come to the uncertainty of what we mean by
"how much" or "quantity".

Typically we have determined

quantity by counting or measuring.
difficulty.

And therein lies the

We count things that are one.

things that are divisible.

We measure

We can't answer the question of

the quantity of space without choosing one of the ways we
use to determine quantity.

But so choosing begs the ques-
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ti°n

Tt now seems that thing are atoms because
we count

•

them and that things are divisible because we
measure them.

Is there some a priori way to rule one way
out as some-

how not primary?

That is, can one of the general views,

atomism or divisionism, be ruled out by showing it to be
flawed in some way?
have thought so.
times.

Over the millennia most philosophers

The pendulum has swung back and forth many

And each swing usually followed some development in

our way of viewing the world.

Prior to its expression atomism held sway in the form
of Melanesian Monism.

Everything was one.

plied that motion was impossible.
pluralism.

But monism im-

So monism gave way to

But pluralism suffered from infinite regress.

In a resurgence of monism, extension was claimed to be infi-

nite.

But the problem of motion remained, so space was

invented.

Now the problem of infinite divisibility can be

applied to pure extension (without body)

.

But each side

continues to find flaws and question-begging in the other
side's arguments.

At the same time we find a proliferation

of mathematical tools on both sides.

right along side counting.

Measuring develops
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Infinite sets correspond to many; singleton
sets correspond to one.
Either thesis (one or many) generates
its
antithesis (many or one), but both are required
to synthesize a solution.
In physics relativity theory shows
the

identity of matter and energy, and De Broglie
developed an
equation relating the wavelength of a particle to
its momen
turn.

Modern developments in the philosophy of science show
that any description we make of reality is at best

a not-

yet-disconf irmed model, and while we can continually improve
the model by testing and revising it, there is no a priori

way to know when the final model is achieved.

Moreover, we

know that our present model of physics is not the final
model because it does not include an account of gravity.

We also now have ample evidence that both points of

view (atomism and divisionism) can reliably be used in various circumstances.

Although there is as yet very little

general familiarity with discrete metrics, modern computer

display screens are becoming more and more common, and users
who deal with computer graphics are becoming much more ac-

customed to the discrete metrics involved.
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For some things, we use the perspective
of infinite
divisibility; for others, we use the perspective
of atomism.

Although incompatible with each other, these
perspectives
appear to be internally self-consistent. I make

an analogy

using model theory.

Each point of view is a language capa-

ble of describing "stuff" in a certain way.

point of view may be taken.

And either

But as modern philosophy of

science has shown, we have no access to the "stuff" except

through the language we choose.

It has been said by that great philosopher Anonymous:

—

There are two kinds of people in the world
those who divide the world up into two kinds of
people and those who do not.

That jest illustrates the tension that pervades our thinking.

The two kinds illustrates counting and atomism while

the opposition illustrates measuring and divisionism.

We

count and we measure, and the distinction between these

pervades even our basic physical theory.

contrasted with Quantum mechanics.

Wave mechanics is

Interference patterns in

light are explained by choosing the divisionist perspective.
The photo-electric effect is explained by choosing the atomist perspective.

In our physical theory there is an egua-

tion to relate the two views.

either to generate the other.

In mathematics we can use
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We may, in fact, reject the need to choose
between

these views, choosing each in its turn according
to our
needs and its efficacy in the use to which we intend

to put

it.

Heraclitus may have said it first.
From out of all the many particulars comes oneness, and out of oneness comes all the many par8

ticulars

.

.
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2.

Antonie Arnauld, The Ar t of Thinking; Port-Rm, a i
Locf i c
Translated by James Dickoff and Patricia James (New
YorkBobbs-Merrill 1964), p. 299.

'

,

Loomis, Elisha Scott, The Pythagorean Proposition
(Washington D. C.: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 1968), p. 224.
3. Loomis, p. 197.
The proof given using figure 269 most
closely conforms to the present demonstration.

4. Since B is the base of a triangle and H is its height,
neither can be 1, and we needn't worry about division by
zero
5. Although C would be equal to 5 for continuous metric
spaces, it is not 5 in the atomic case; C is 4 for the atomic case.
Because the length of the side of the outer square
formed by "adding" the lengths of the sides of the triangles
is "shorter" (by 1) than it would be in continuous metrics,
the size of the atomic inscribed square is smaller than its
corresponding continuous analogue.

6.

See Note

7.

Loomis

5.

8. Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus
(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959; reprint, New York: Atheneum, March
.

1971), p. 90.
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